Also known as:rationality reviews · rational basis review
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A deferential standard of judicial review under which a law is upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Mandatory Police Retirement Age
Ricardo Rojas, a physically fit 51-year-old officer with the city police department, challenges a rule forcing retirement at age 50. The city defends the cutoff as a means to maintain overall workforce capability without individualized fitness testing. The court upholds the rule because the age limit is rationally connected to the legitimate goal of ensuring a capable force.
Entry Restriction on Foreign Nationals
Raphael Rivera, a lawyer from a majority-Muslim country, sues after an executive order blocks his visa on national-security grounds. The order cites vetting concerns and applies to several nations. The court sustains the order because the stated security purpose is legitimate and the restriction is rationally related to it.
Robert Rivera is prosecuted under a federal statute banning firearms near schools. He argues Congress lacked power to enact the ban. The court rejects rationality review for the commerce-power claim and invalidates the statute.
United States v. Lopez514 U.S. 549 (1995)
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises.
The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools.
The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release.
Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Redwood Bank finances a proposed group home for adults with intellectual disabilities in the City of Cleburne. The city denies the permit citing neighbor concerns about safety. The court reviews the denial under rationality review and finds the city's stated interests insufficient to justify the classification.
City of Cleburne, Texas, et al. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., et al.473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985)
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas.
Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home.
The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision.
The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded.
The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District.
The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission.
However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded.
The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required.
After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application.
CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials.
They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial.
It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.
Riley Rivera, a state university employee over age 40, sues the state for age discrimination under federal law. The state asserts Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court holds that Congress lacked power under Section 5 to abrogate immunity because age classifications receive only rationality review and the remedy was not congruent and proportional.
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000)
In 1967 Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which initially applied only to private employers.
In 1974 Congress amended the Act through the Fair Labor Standards Amendments to extend its substantive requirements to the States. Congress redefined the term employer to include a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State. The same legislation also amended the incorporated Fair Labor Standards Act enforcement provision to authorize suits against any employer including a public agency in federal or state court.
In December 1994 Roderick MacPherson and Marvin Narz, associate professors ages 57 and 58 at the University of Montevallo in Alabama, filed suit alleging age discrimination, retaliation for filing charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and disparate impact from an evaluation system. In April 1995 J. Daniel Kimel, Jr., and other current and former faculty and librarians over age 40 at Florida State University and Florida International University filed suit against the Florida Board of Regents alleging that the failure to allocate previously agreed market-adjustment salary funds had a disparate impact on employees with longer service records. In May 1996 Wellington Dickson filed suit against the Florida Department of Corrections alleging failure to promote him because of his age and in retaliation for grievances concerning age discrimination.
The District Court in the MacPherson case granted the university's motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The District Courts in the Kimel and Dickson cases denied the state defendants' motions to dismiss. The United States intervened in all three cases. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit consolidated the appeals and held that the ADEA does not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals.
Rina Rahman, a state employee with a disability, sues the state for money damages under Title I of the ADA. The state claims sovereign immunity. The court rules that Congress exceeded its Section 5 authority because the statute reached much conduct valid under rationality review and lacked a sufficient pattern of irrational state discrimination.
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001)
Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, served as Director of Nursing for OB/Gyn/Neonatal Services at the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. In 1994 she was diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy that required substantial leave from work. Upon returning in July 1995, her supervisor informed her that she would have to relinquish the director position, leading Garrett to apply for and accept a transfer to a lower-paying nurse manager role.
Milton Ash worked as a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services. At the outset of his employment, Ash notified the department of his chronic asthma and, on his doctor's recommendation, requested modifications to minimize exposure to carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke. After later being diagnosed with sleep apnea, Ash sought reassignment to daytime shifts pursuant to medical advice. The department denied all requested accommodations. Shortly after Ash filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, his performance evaluations declined below previous levels.
Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, each seeking money damages under Title I of the ADA against their state employers. The state defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the ADA exceeds Congress's authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In a single opinion, the district court granted the motions and dismissed both cases. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed based on its prior decision in Kimel v. State Board of Regents holding that the ADA validly abrogates state immunity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals regarding whether individuals may sue states for money damages in federal court under the ADA.
When does a court apply rationality review instead of strict or intermediate scrutiny?
Rationality review applies to classifications that neither burden a fundamental right nor target a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Age, disability, and most economic distinctions receive this standard. The government need only show a rational relationship to a legitimate interest.
Supporting sources
How deferential is rationality review in practice?
The standard is highly deferential. A law survives if any plausible legitimate purpose exists, even if underinclusive or overinclusive. Courts rarely invalidate measures under this review absent evidence of animus or an illegitimate purpose.
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Does rationality review ever have bite in equal-protection cases?
Yes. When a classification appears driven by animus or lacks any legitimate purpose, courts may invalidate it even under rationality review. Examples include certain zoning decisions or laws resting solely on moral disapproval of private conduct.
Supporting sources
539 U.S. 558 (2003)
…(1996); Nordlinger v. Hahn , 505 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1992). Laws such as economic or tax legislation that are scrutinized under rational basis review normally pass constitutional muster, since "the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes." Cleburne v. Cleburne Living…