Also known as:reasonable bases · reasonably based · reasonable basis standard
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A threshold of justification or evidentiary support that a reasonable person would accept as adequate for the action or position taken. The standard requires concrete grounding in facts, law, or circumstances rather than speculation or conjecture.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Attorney's Factual Denial in Pleading
Ravi Reddy sued a supplier for breach and denied in the answer that any delivery had occurred. The supplier produced shipping records showing the goods arrived. Because the denial lacked support in the evidence or a stated belief based on incomplete information, the court found the filing violated the reasonable basis requirement and imposed sanctions.
Separate Harms from Independent Acts
Ryan Roberts and Rosa Ruiz each operated factories that discharged distinct pollutants into a river, harming separate sections of a downstream fishery. Because the harms were distinct and a reasonable basis existed to divide responsibility according to each factory's contribution, the court held each defendant liable only for the portion of damages each caused.
Riley Rivera and Renata Russo both released chemicals that combined to contaminate a single aquifer. Evidence showed measurable differences in the volume and toxicity each contributed. The court found a reasonable basis for determining each party's share of the total harm and apportioned damages accordingly rather than imposing joint liability.
Jurisdictional Contacts and Fairness
Roger Ramirez, a California resident, was served with process while temporarily in New York on business. The court examined whether his brief presence supplied a reasonable basis for exercising personal jurisdiction consistent with traditional notions of fair play. Finding the contacts sufficient under the governing test, the court upheld jurisdiction.
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin495 U.S. 604, 618, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990)
Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia. In 1977 the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two children were born. In July 1987 the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to California, was visiting her parents in that State when she filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking spousal and child support, custody of the children, and possession of the family home.
In early August 1987 petitioner visited Mrs. Burnham in California to discuss the children and the separation. He took the children to San Francisco for a few days. Upon returning the children to Mrs. Burnham, petitioner was served with a summons and complaint for divorce filed in California Superior Court that also sought custody of the children. After being served, petitioner returned to New Jersey.
In January 1988 petitioner made a special appearance in the California action and moved to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the State Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts.
Ridgeway Partners, a political committee, allocated administrative expenses between federal and nonfederal accounts. The allocation rested on a reasonable basis tied to the proportion of federal versus state activity. The court upheld the method as satisfying the statutory requirement for a reasonable division of costs.
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission540 U.S. 93, 226–27 (2003)
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Communications Act of 1934, and other statutes to address the role of soft money and issue advocacy in federal elections.
Plaintiffs included a diverse group of entities and individuals such as the National Rifle Association and the American Civil Liberties Union who alleged that BCRA was unconstitutional. Defendants included the Federal Election Commission and the Attorney General of the United States.
The case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge panel pursuant to special procedures in BCRA Section 403. The District Court received a voluminous record from the parties and issued a judgment on May 1, 2003, that upheld some provisions of BCRA and invalidated others.
All losing parties filed direct appeals to the Supreme Court within ten days, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction on June 5, 2003, ordering expedited briefing and argument on September 8, 2003.
More than a century of federal legislation preceded BCRA, beginning with the Tillman Act of 1907 that banned corporate contributions in connection with federal elections. Congress later extended prohibitions to unions, required disclosure of contributions and expenditures, and enacted FECA in 1971 with further amendments in 1974 that imposed contribution limits, expenditure ceilings, and created the FEC.
The Supreme Court addressed constitutional challenges to the 1974 amendments in Buckley v. Valeo. After Buckley, the FEC permitted political parties to fund mixed-purpose activities such as voter registration and generic advertising in part with soft money not subject to FECA's source and amount limits.
Soft-money fundraising by the national parties grew from $21.6 million in 1984 to $498 million in 2000, with large corporate and union donations often motivated by a desire for access to federal candidates. National parties transferred substantial soft money to state parties, which could use higher percentages for mixed activities under FEC allocation rules.
The use of soft money also supported so-called issue ads that avoided express advocacy of a candidate's election or defeat and therefore fell outside FECA's disclosure and source restrictions. These ads frequently aired in the 60 days before federal elections, referred to clearly identified candidates, and were funded by corporations, unions, and tax-exempt organizations using misleading names.
A Senate investigation into 1996 federal election practices documented both parties' use of soft money to obtain special access for large donors and the coordination of issue ads with candidates. The District Court compiled extensive evidence from declarations, expert reports, and internal party documents showing that federal officeholders solicited soft-money donations, that parties maintained tallies crediting donors to particular candidates, and that large soft-money contributions were often made to secure influence rather than for ideological reasons.
Raven Logistics faced allegations of misconduct by a senior executive. The Attorney General referred the matter after determining a reasonable basis existed to believe further investigation was warranted. The special division appointed an independent counsel to proceed with the inquiry.
Alexia Morrison, Independent Counsel v. Theodore B. Olson487 U.S. 654 (1988)
How does the reasonable basis standard in Rule 11 differ from the substantial authority standard used in tax penalties?
Rule 11 requires factual denials to be warranted on the evidence or reasonably based on belief or lack of information. The tax substantial authority standard measures whether the position has a greater than 20 percent likelihood of success if litigated. The two standards serve different procedural and substantive goals and are not interchangeable.
Supporting sources
When does a reasonable basis permit apportionment of damages among multiple tortfeasors?
Apportionment is allowed when the harms are distinct or when evidence supplies a reasonable basis for dividing a single harm according to each party's contribution. Without such a basis, joint and several liability applies. The Restatement sections supply the governing tests.
Supporting sources
Does a reasonable basis for jurisdiction require the same contacts as minimum contacts analysis?
The reasonable basis inquiry focuses on whether the defendant's relationship to the forum supplies a fair ground for exercising jurisdiction. It incorporates traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice but is not limited to the defendant's own purposeful contacts. Courts may consider the relationship even when forum law would not impose liability.
Supporting sources
…or, if that does not work, referring it to the Attorney General, whereupon the whole process would recommence and, if there was "
reasonable basis
to believe" that further investigation was warranted, that new offense would be referred to the Special Division, which would in all likelihood assign it to the same independent counsel. It…