Also known as:reasonable wear & tear · normal wear and tear · ordinary wear and tear
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Deterioration that results from the intended use of leased premises, including breakage or malfunction due to age or deteriorated condition. The phrase excludes deterioration caused by negligence, carelessness, accident, or abuse. Lease language may shift responsibility for such deterioration to the tenant when a broad repair covenant lacks an express exception.
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Broad Covenant Triggers Tenant Liability
Raymond Ramos leased an office suite under a written agreement requiring him to maintain, repair, and keep the interior in good order, with no mention of ordinary wear and tear. After five years of daily use the carpet showed deep traffic wear, ceiling tiles sagged from condensation, and chair upholstery cracked. The landlord demanded replacement costs at lease end. Because the covenant contained no exception, Ramos bore responsibility for restoring the interior elements that had deteriorated through ordinary use.
Temporary Taking Includes Wear Assessment
Ridgeway Partners occupied a government-requisitioned warehouse under a temporary taking order. At the end of the period the government returned the building with scuffed floors, faded paint, and minor fixture wear from normal storage operations. The court included the reasonable cost of restoring those conditions in the compensation award because the wear resulted directly from the authorized use during the taking period.
United States v. General Motors Corp.323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)
In 1928 General Motors Corporation leased a one-story warehouse building in Chicago for a term of twenty years for the storage and distribution of automobile parts and fitted the premises for this use. In 1942 the United States became subtenants of a portion of the floor space, leaving General Motors in possession of some 93,000 square feet.
On June 8, 1942 the United States filed a petition in the District Court seeking condemnation of the temporary use of the remaining space for a term ending June 30, 1943 pursuant to the Second War Powers Act. The court entered an order declaring the property condemned and granting the United States immediate possession, use, and improvement. General Motors removed its personal property from the area and dismantled bins and fixtures so that the space was available for government use by June 19.
At the trial for compensation the Government called a real estate expert who testified that the fair rental value of the space was 35 cents per square foot per year. General Motors called expert witnesses who testified that the fair rental value was 43 cents per square foot. It also introduced evidence that the rent it paid its landlord had varied from 41.9 to 43.24 cents per square foot during 1940 to 1942. General Motors then offered to prove items of cost caused by removal of the contents, including salaries of employees engaged in the work, compensation due employees put out of work, wages of janitors and watchmen, shipping costs, freight and haulage charges, rental of storage space, the value of bin equipment destroyed, and the estimated original cost of installation of fixed equipment lost, but the court sustained an objection to the offer.
The jury awarded compensation in a lump sum at a rate of approximately 40 cents per square foot for the term of one year. General Motors appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment by a vote of 2 to 1. The Supreme Court granted review of the ruling on the elements that may be considered in arriving at just compensation.
Riley Rivera installed accessibility ramps and widened doorways in a rented retail space under a lease silent on alterations. At lease end the landlord requested restoration of the original layout. Rivera performed the work but left minor scuffs and paint mismatches from the removal process. The landlord could not recover for those residual marks because they constituted reasonable wear and tear incident to the permitted changes.
John K. YEE, et al. v. City of ESCONDIDO, California503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153
John K. Yee and Irene Yee own the Friendly Hills and Sunset Terrace Mobile Home Parks in Escondido, California.
In 1988 the voters of Escondido approved Proposition K, a rent control ordinance that reset rents to 1986 levels and barred increases without city council approval after consideration of eleven enumerated factors such as the Consumer Price Index, comparable pad rents, capital improvements, property taxes, and operating expenses.
A few months after the ordinance took effect the Yees filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court, alleging that the ordinance deprived them of all use and occupancy of their property and granted tenants and their successors the right to occupy it permanently; they sought six million dollars in damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction.
The complaint was filed against the background of California's Mobilehome Residency Law, enacted in 1978, which restricts the grounds on which a park owner may terminate a tenancy, prohibits requiring removal of a mobile home upon sale, bars transfer fees, and prevents disapproval of a purchaser who can pay the rent. Eleven other park owners filed identical suits against the city; by stipulation the twelve cases were consolidated for appeal and submitted on the briefs and argument in the Yee case alone. The Superior Court sustained the city's demurrer and dismissed all complaints.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissals. The California Supreme Court denied review. Eight of the park owners, including the Yees, petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted in 1991 to address a conflict between the decision below and holdings of the Third and Ninth Circuits in similar mobile-home rent-control cases.
The Yees' complaint and opposition to the demurrer relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hall v. Santa Barbara. They asserted that the combined state and local measures transferred to tenants the right to occupy pads indefinitely at below-market rents while preventing park owners from selecting incoming tenants or changing the use of their land without extended notice.
How does a broad repair covenant affect responsibility for reasonable wear and tear?
A tenant covenant to maintain, repair, and keep the interior in good order without an express exception for ordinary wear and tear obligates the tenant to perform all necessary repairs, including those arising from normal use. Courts construe such language broadly to shift the cost of worn flooring, damaged ceilings, and deteriorated seating to the tenant at lease end.
What types of deterioration qualify as reasonable wear and tear under uniform acts?
Normal wear and tear includes deterioration resulting from the intended use of a dwelling unit, such as breakage or malfunction due to age or deteriorated condition. It excludes deterioration caused by negligence, carelessness, accident, or abuse by the tenant or guests.
503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153
…land; (7) changes in utility charges; (8) changes in operating and maintenance expenses; (9) the need for repairs other than for ordinary wear and tear; (10) the amount and quality of services provided to the affected tenant; and (11) any lawful existing lease. Ordinance § 4(g), App. 11-12. Petitioners John and Irene Yee own the Friendly…