reasonably related to legitimate penological interests

In August 1976 Walter Harper was sentenced to prison for robbery and incarcerated at the Washington State Penitentiary, where he spent most of his time in the mental health unit and consented to antipsychotic medication. In 1980 Harper was paroled on the condition that he participate in psychiatric treatment, which he received at Harborview Medical Center and later at Western State Hospital under a civil commitment order. His parole was revoked in December 1981 after he assaulted two nurses at a hospital in Seattle. Upon his return to prison, respondent was sent to the Special Offender Center, a 144-bed correctional institute established by the Washington Department of Corrections to diagnose and treat convicted felons with serious mental disorders. At the Center, Harper was diagnosed with a manic-depressive disorder and initially consented to treatment, including antipsychotic drugs, but in November 1982 he refused further medication. The treating psychiatrist then invoked SOC Policy 600.30 to administer the drugs involuntarily after a committee hearing found that Harper suffered from a mental disorder and posed a likelihood of serious harm to others. Harper was involuntarily medicated for about one year beginning November 23, 1982, then transferred to the Washington State Reformatory in November 1983 where he took no medication and his condition deteriorated, prompting his retransfer to the Center and another involuntary medication approval. He continued receiving the drugs subject to periodic reviews until his transfer to the Washington State Penitentiary in June 1986. In February 1985 Harper filed suit in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State and individual defendants, alleging that the failure to provide a judicial hearing before involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication violated due process and other constitutional provisions. After a bench trial in March 1987 the trial court upheld the policy's procedures as satisfying due process, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that a judicial hearing with full adversarial protections and proof by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence was required. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1989 to review the constitutional questions presented by the state court's decision.

The California Department of Corrections houses all new male inmates and inmates transferred from other facilities in reception centers for up to 60 days. During this period, double-cell assignments are based predominantly on race. The CDC has admitted that the chances of an inmate being assigned a cellmate of another race are pretty close to zero percent. The CDC further subdivides prisoners within each racial group, separating Japanese-Americans from Chinese-Americans and Northern California Hispanics from Southern California Hispanics. After the initial period, the rest of the prison facilities are fully integrated, and prisoners may choose their own cellmates. Garrison Johnson, an African-American inmate in CDC custody since 1987, was double-celled with another African-American inmate upon his arrival at Folsom prison in 1987 and each time he was transferred to a new facility. Johnson filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of California on February 24, 1995, alleging that the CDC's reception-center housing policy violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. After the complaint was dismissed and reinstated on appeal, Johnson filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on July 5, 2000, seeking damages against former directors Rowland and Gomez and injunctive relief against Director Cambra. Following discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on qualified immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, applying the deferential Turner standard. The Court of Appeals denied Johnson's petition for rehearing en banc. We granted certiorari to decide which standard of review applies. 540 U. S. 1217 (2004).

In 1998, Albert Florence was arrested in Essex County, New Jersey, after fleeing from police officers. He was charged with obstruction of justice and use of a deadly weapon. Florence entered a plea of guilty to two lesser offenses and was sentenced to pay a fine in monthly installments. In 2003, after he fell behind on his payments and failed to appear at an enforcement hearing, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. He paid the outstanding balance less than a week later, but the warrant remained in a statewide computer database. Two years later, in Burlington County, New Jersey, Florence and his wife were stopped in their automobile by a state trooper. Based on the outstanding warrant, the officer arrested Florence and took him to the Burlington County Detention Center, where he was held for six days before transfer to the Essex County Correctional Facility. Burlington County jail procedures required every arrestee to shower with a delousing agent. Officers would check arrestees for scars, marks, gang tattoos, and contraband as they disrobed. Florence claims he was also instructed to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and lift his genitals. The Essex County Correctional Facility admits more than 25,000 inmates each year. When Florence arrived, all arriving detainees passed through a metal detector and waited in a group holding cell. They were instructed to remove their clothing while an officer looked for body markings, wounds, and contraband. An officer looked at their ears, nose, mouth, hair, scalp, fingers, hands, arms, armpits, and other body openings. Florence alleges he was required to lift his genitals, turn around, and cough in a squatting position as part of the process. After a mandatory shower, during which his clothes were inspected, he was admitted to the facility. He was released the next day when the charges were dismissed. Florence sued the governmental entities that operated the jails, one of the wardens, and certain other defendants in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court certified a class of individuals charged with a nonindictable offense. Those individuals were processed at either jail and directed to strip naked even though an officer had not articulated any reasonable suspicion they were concealing contraband. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment on the unlawful search claim. A divided panel of the Third Circuit reversed.

Joseph Griffin had previously been convicted of a felony. On September 4, 1980, a Wisconsin state court convicted him of resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and obstructing an officer and placed him on probation. Wisconsin statutes placed probationers in the legal custody of the State Department of Health and Social Services and made them subject to conditions set by the court and rules and regulations established by the department. Department regulations permitted any probation officer to search a probationer's home without a warrant provided the supervisor approved and reasonable grounds existed to believe contraband was present. The regulations identified factors to consider in assessing reasonable grounds, such as information from an informant and the officer's experience with the probationer. Separate regulations prohibited a probationer from possessing a firearm without advance approval and treated refusal to consent to a home search as a violation of probation terms. On April 5, 1983, probation supervisor Michael Lew received a tip from a Beloit Police Department detective that guns might be in Griffin's apartment. Lew, accompanied by another probation officer and three plainclothes policemen, went to the apartment. Griffin answered the door, and the probation officers searched the home and found a handgun. Griffin was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the handgun, a jury convicted him of the offense, and the court sentenced him to two years' imprisonment. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also affirmed. It upheld the denial of the suppression motion after concluding that the search satisfied applicable standards. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Fourth Amendment question presented by the search.