The action of recalling something to the mind, especially through conscious effort. In evidence law the term denotes a witness's revived memory of past events sufficient to permit testimony or the substitution of a record when memory has faded.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Prior Identification Despite Memory Loss
Roberto Reyes was robbed at gunpoint and later identified the perpetrator in a lineup. At trial Reyes testified he could not recall the basis for his earlier identification. The court admitted the lineup identification as nonhearsay because Reyes remained available for cross-examination.
Competency Requires More Than Memory
Rosalind Reed faced criminal charges and underwent a competency evaluation. She demonstrated orientation to time and place plus recollection of some events, yet could not rationally consult with counsel. The court found her incompetent to stand trial.
Dusky v. United States362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)
Following his conviction in the United States District Court, Milton Dusky appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment.
Dusky then sought further review by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis with the Supreme Court of the United States.
The record before the Court included psychiatric testimony regarding Dusky's mental condition at the time of the trial proceedings, which had taken place more than a year prior to the Supreme Court's consideration.
Rhea Reynolds, a journalist, was subpoenaed before a grand jury concerning conversations with confidential sources. She possessed detailed recollection of the interviews but refused to disclose them. The court weighed her memory against the need for testimony.
Branzburg v. Hayes408 U.S. 665 (1972)
In November 1969, Paul Branzburg, a staff reporter for the Courier-Journal newspaper in Louisville, Kentucky, published an article describing his observations of two individuals synthesizing hashish from marijuana in Jefferson County.
The article included a photograph and stated that Branzburg had promised not to reveal the identities of the two. He was subsequently subpoenaed by the Jefferson County grand jury and refused to identify the individuals he had observed. A state trial court ordered him to answer, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals denied his petition for relief.
In January 1971, Branzburg published a second article detailing drug use in Frankfort, Kentucky, based on interviews with several dozen users over two weeks. He was subpoenaed by the Franklin County grand jury to testify about violations of drug statutes. The Court of Appeals denied the requested writs and rejected his First Amendment claim. This Court granted certiorari.
In July 1970, Paul Pappas, a television newsman-photographer, was assigned to cover civil disorders in New Bedford, Massachusetts, involving the Black Panthers. He entered Panther headquarters under an agreement not to disclose what he saw or heard inside except for an anticipated police raid, which did not occur. Two months later, he was summoned before the Bristol County grand jury but refused to answer questions about his observations inside the headquarters. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that he must appear and testify.
In February 1970, Earl Caldwell, a New York Times reporter covering the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, received a subpoena to appear before a federal grand jury investigating possible violations of federal law by the group, including threats against the President. The District Court denied the motion to quash but issued a protective order. Caldwell refused to appear and was held in contempt. The Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing a qualified privilege. This Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.
Raphael Rivera, a presidential aide, participated in discussions about an employee's termination. Discovery revealed only inferential evidence and a tentative recollection that he supported the dismissal. The court examined whether that recollection supported a conspiracy claim.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
In 1968, Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress that a new transport plane, the C-5A, was substantially over its projected cost. This testimony apparently embarrassed the Department of Defense and the Air Force. Shortly thereafter, Fitzgerald's job was abolished in a reorganization of the Air Force. Fitzgerald brought suit against a number of officials of the Executive Branch, including petitioners Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield.
Fitzgerald alleged that Harlow and Butterfield had participated in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional and statutory rights by arranging to have him dismissed from his position in the Air Force in retaliation for his testimony. As evidence of Harlow's involvement, Fitzgerald relied on a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. He also relied on a recorded conversation in which the President later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for canning" Fitzgerald.
As evidence against Butterfield, Fitzgerald cited a May 1969 White House memorandum. In it Butterfield claimed to have learned that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public view. Fitzgerald also cited communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970 as evidence that Butterfield participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment.
Harlow asserted that Secretary Seamans had advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force. Harlow had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. Butterfield stated that he was not involved in any decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until more than a month after the termination had been scheduled and announced publicly. Butterfield never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department.
The District Court denied the motions of Harlow and Butterfield for summary judgment based on absolute Presidential immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Rajesh Rao gave a statement to police implicating the defendant. At trial Rao testified with lingering doubts about his recollection of the timing. The court required cross-examination to test the accuracy of that recollection.
Crawford v. Washington541 U.S. 36 (2004)
On August 5, 1999, Michael Crawford stabbed Kenneth Lee in the torso during a confrontation at Lee's apartment.
Crawford and his wife Sylvia had gone there after Sylvia alleged that Lee had attempted to rape her several weeks earlier. Lee was taken to the hospital and later died from his wounds. Police arrested both Crawford and Sylvia that night.
Detectives gave Miranda warnings and interrogated Sylvia twice at the station house. In her recorded statement Sylvia initially denied involvement but eventually admitted she had led Crawford to Lee's apartment and had seen the stabbing. Crawford also gave police a statement describing the events and his belief that Lee may have reached for something before the stabbing. At trial Crawford asserted self-defense, but Sylvia did not testify because of Washington's marital privilege.
The State offered Sylvia's tape-recorded statement as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-defense and invoked the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. The trial court admitted the statement after finding it bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The jury convicted Crawford of assault. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed after applying a nine-factor test and concluding the statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability.
The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. It determined that Sylvia's statement interlocked with Crawford's statement and therefore bore adequate guarantees of trustworthiness, noting that both accounts were ambiguous on whether Lee had possessed a weapon. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Ronald Reed, a developer, recalled conversations with a feed-lot operator about shifting development plans. The recollection concerned when sales resistance became serious. The court considered that memory in assessing the nuisance claim.
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972)
In 1956, Spur’s predecessors in interest developed feedlots about ½ mile south of Olive Avenue in an area between the confluence of the usually dry Agua Fria and New Rivers, some 14 to 15 miles west of the urban area of Phoenix. By April and May of 1959, the Northside Hay Mill was feeding between 6,000 and 7,000 head of cattle and Welborn approximately 1,500 head on a combined area of 35 acres. In 1960, Spur purchased the property and expanded the feedlot operation from approximately thirty-five acres to one hundred fourteen acres by 1962, eventually maintaining between twenty thousand and thirty thousand head of cattle at the time of trial.
Del E. Webb Development Co. began planning Sun City, a retirement community, in May 1959 after purchasing twenty thousand acres of farmland for fifteen million dollars. Construction of a golf course started that September. Homes were first offered in January 1960. The first residents moved in during 1960. By the time of trial, Sun City had a population of approximately fourteen thousand people, and the development had extended south to within five hundred feet of Spur's feedlot north of Olive Avenue.
Residents of Sun City began complaining about odors and flies from the feedlot, which produced over a million pounds of wet manure per day, and Webb encountered sales resistance starting around 1963 in the southwestern portion of the development. Webb attempted to buy the feedlot from Spur but the parties could not agree on a price. Webb then filed suit alleging that the feedlot was a public nuisance because flies and odors drifted over the southern portion of Sun City, rendering in excess of one thousand three hundred lots unfit for residential development.
The trial court, after proceedings that included an advisory jury later discharged and special actions in the Arizona Supreme Court, found the feedlot to be a nuisance, permanently enjoined its operation, and awarded damages to Webb. Spur appealed from the injunction and the damages award, while Webb cross-appealed from the trial court's refusal to award attorneys' fees. During the appeal process, Spur agreed to and did shut down its operation without prejudice to the final determination.
When may a witness read a record into evidence under the past-recollection-recorded exception?
A witness may read the record when the witness once knew the matter but now cannot recall it well enough to testify fully and accurately, the record was made or adopted when the matter was fresh, and the record accurately reflects the witness's knowledge. The record itself may be received as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.
Supporting sources
What must a court do when a party claims that portions of a writing used to refresh recollection are unrelated to the testimony?
The court must examine the writing in camera, delete the unrelated portions, and order delivery of the remainder to the adverse party while preserving the deleted portions for the record.
Supporting sources
Does a witness's inability to recall events automatically render the witness incompetent to testify?
No. Every person is competent unless state law in diversity cases or another rule provides otherwise. A conservatorship based on cognitive decline may render a witness incompetent under applicable state law, but mere memory loss does not.
Supporting sources
May a party introduce testimony whose recollection was restored through hypnosis in a civil case?
A court may exclude hypnotically refreshed testimony in civil cases because the constitutional right recognized in Rock v. Arkansas applies to criminal defendants facing liberty interests. The categorical bar remains available to protect against unreliable memory.
Supporting sources
541 U.S. 36 (2004)
…ambiguous is hard to accept. Petitioner's statement is ambiguous only in the sense that he had lingering doubts about his recollection: "A. I could a swore I seen him goin' for somethin' before, right before everything happened. . . . [B]ut I'm not positive." Id. , at 155. Sylvia's statement, on the other hand, is truly…