Also known as: recording statutes · recording act
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A statutory rule that determines priority among successive grantees of interests in the same real property. The rule protects a subsequent purchaser who acquires the interest for value without notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance and who records first under a notice or race-notice statute.
Ricardo Rojas bought a parcel from a seller who had already conveyed it to Raymond Ramos by an unrecorded deed. Rojas paid value but knew of Ramos's possession and failed to inquire further. When Ramos later recorded, the court held that Rojas lacked bona fide purchaser status and could not prevail under the recording statute.
Rina Rahman held an unrecorded mineral interest that lapsed under state law when she failed to record a claim. A later purchaser from the surface owner recorded without knowledge of the lapsed interest. The recording statute supplied the mechanism that confirmed the purchaser's superior title once the interest was treated as extinguished.
In 1971 the Indiana Legislature enacted the Dormant Mineral Interests Act. The Act provided that any severed mineral interest unused for a period of twenty years would be extinguished and its ownership would revert to the then-current surface owner unless the mineral owner filed a statement of claim in the county recorder's office. The statute took effect on September 2, 1971, and included a two-year grace period allowing owners of already unused interests to preserve them by filing claims. A mineral interest was deemed used if minerals were produced, rents or royalties were paid, or taxes were paid on the interest. Owners could also preserve interests by filing statements of claim, and an exception allowed owners of ten or more interests in the same county who inadvertently omitted some to file a supplemental claim within sixty days of receiving notice. The first of the two consolidated cases concerned fractional mineral interests severed in 1942 and 1944 from a 132-acre tract in Gibson County, Indiana. Eleven appellants claimed ownership of those interests, and a twelfth appellant held oil and gas leases executed by the others in 1976 and 1977. The appellee owned the surface of the tract. The parties stipulated that the mineral interests had not been used for twenty years and no statement of claim had been filed within the grace period, so the interests lapsed on September 2, 1973. On April 28, 1977, the surface owner published and mailed notice of the lapse. The mineral owners then filed statements of claim, and the surface owner commenced an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the interests had been extinguished. In the second case the severed mineral estate was created on March 1, 1954, when appellants Pond and Bobe conveyed land to the appellees by warranty deed that reserved the minerals. On June 17, 1976, Pond and Bobe executed a coal mining lease with appellant Consolidated Coal Co. The parties stipulated that the interest had not been used and no statement of claim had been filed during the twenty years following its creation, resulting in lapse on March 1, 1974. Notice of the lapse was given by letter and by publication in the Princeton Daily Clarion on March 4, 1977. The parties jointly filed suit on January 12, 1978, to resolve their conflicting claims to the mineral rights. In both cases the agreed statements of facts recorded that the mineral owners had neither used their interests nor filed claims within the statutory periods, and the surface owners had given notice after the periods had expired. The statements did not indicate whether any appellant had known of the Act or its possible effect before receiving notice. The state trial court held the statute unconstitutional. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the appeals.
View caseRaphael Rivera purchased land subject to an equitable servitude created by prior deeds that were not recorded in the chain of title. The planning committee sought to enforce the restriction. Because Rivera lacked constructive notice from the recording system, the statute left the servitude unenforceable against him.
In February 1964, Alpine Slopes Development Company conveyed Lot 101 of Alpine Meadows Estates Subdivision No. 3 in Placer County to Ernest H. and Jewel Riley by grant deed recorded on March 13, 1964. The deed contained no restrictions upon the use of the plaintiffs’ property nor any reference to any instrument purporting to impose restrictions upon Lot 101. At the time of the conveyance there was no document of record purporting to restrict the use of Lot 101. Nine months later, on November 25, 1964, the grantor recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions, restrictions and reservations on lots 72 through 116 of the subdivision. The declaration recited that the grantor had established a general plan for the improvement and development of the property and set forth 26 numbered paragraphs of restrictions, covenants and conditions, including paragraph 6, which required submission of plans and specifications to the Bear Creek Planning Committee and its approval before any dwelling, garage, building, fence, wall or other structure or excavation could be commenced or maintained. At a time not established by the record the Rileys constructed a snow tunnel on their lot. On January 12, 1972, the committee recorded a notice of violation of covenants, conditions and restrictions that referred specifically to Lot 101 and the declaration recorded November 25, 1964, and recited the probable violation of paragraph 6 in that a covered walkway had been constructed without prior compliance. The Rileys filed a complaint to quiet title and for damages for slander of title. The planning committee and some of its members cross-complained for declaratory relief. The trial court entered judgment quieting title in the Rileys against all claims of defendants and ruling for the Rileys on the cross-complaint. The Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. The California Supreme Court granted a hearing for the purpose of giving further consideration to the issues raised.
View caseRedwood Bank recorded a mortgage on property later conveyed to Radiance Media. The media company searched the records and discovered the mortgage before closing. The recording statute gave the bank priority because its interest appeared of record and the subsequent purchaser had notice.
The purchaser must take in good faith, give valuable consideration, and acquire the interest without actual or constructive notice of the prior unrecorded claim. A buyer with inquiry notice fails the third element and cannot claim priority.
Yes. The mortgage continues to encumber the land unless the transferee qualifies as a protected subsequent purchaser under the applicable recording act. Any buyer can discover the mortgage by examining the public records.
The beneficiary takes subject to all recorded and unrecorded interests that existed at the transferor's death. The deed itself is deemed recorded at death for purposes of the recording act.
The replacement mortgage retains the original priority unless a change in terms materially prejudices intervening interests or a protected purchaser acquires an interest while the senior lien is off record.
An installment purchaser holds only an equitable interest and does not automatically qualify as a protected subsequent purchaser. The prior legal title remains superior unless the buyer meets all statutory elements.