Also known as: rights of contribution · contribution right · right to contribution
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A right held by one of several persons liable in tort for the same harm that permits recovery of an equitable share from the others after discharging the common liability. The right arises upon payment exceeding the payer's equitable portion and is capped at the excess amount paid. No right exists in favor of a tortfeasor who intentionally caused the harm or where one tortfeasor holds an indemnity right against another.
Raphael Rivera and Rowan Russell both negligently caused injury to Renee Rogers when their vehicles collided with hers. A jury found them jointly liable and awarded damages. Raphael paid the full judgment amount. He may now recover from Rowan the portion exceeding Raphael's equitable share of the common liability.
Regina Robinson and Rebecca Ross were found jointly liable for contaminating a neighbor's property. Regina paid the entire judgment while Rebecca paid nothing. Regina may recover only the amount she paid beyond her own equitable share. Rebecca cannot be forced to contribute more than that share.
Rosa Ruiz and Riverfront Developments were held liable for harm to a third party. Rosa acted with intent to cause the harm while Riverfront acted only negligently. After Rosa paid the full judgment she sought contribution from Riverfront. The claim fails because intentional causation precludes the right.
Raven Logistics and Riverstone Manufacturing were both liable for damage to Rising Sun Electronics. Raven held a contractual indemnity right against Riverstone. After Raven paid the entire judgment it attempted to obtain contribution from Riverstone. The indemnity right prevents any contribution claim between them.
Two defendants were found negligent for a single accident injuring a plaintiff. One defendant paid the full judgment after the other refused to contribute. The paying defendant may recover contribution measured by the nonpaying defendant's proportionate share of fault rather than an equal split.
On April 22, 1974, Glen Gregos, a teenage boy, was injured while participating in a cross-country motorcycle race for novices sponsored by the American Motorcycle Association and the Viking Motorcycle Club. Glen's second amended complaint alleged that the American Motorcycle Association and Viking negligently designed, managed, supervised, and administered the race and negligently solicited entrants. Such negligence was a direct and proximate cause of his injuries, including a crushed spine resulting in permanent loss of the use of his legs. Glen's parents, acting as guardians ad litem, filed the underlying action against the American Motorcycle Association, the Viking Motorcycle Club, and the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission. The American Motorcycle Association answered the complaint, denying the charging allegations and asserting affirmative defenses that included a claim that Glen's own negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. Thereafter the American Motorcycle Association sought leave of court to file a cross-complaint against Glen's parents. The first cause of action alleged that the parents knew motorcycle racing is dangerous, were knowledgeable about Glen's training, directly participated in his decision to enter the race by signing a parental consent form, and negligently failed to exercise their power of supervision over their minor child. The second cause of action sought declaratory relief. It asked for a declaration of the allocable negligence of Glen's parents so that any damages awarded against the American Motorcycle Association could be reduced by the percentage allocable to the parents' negligence. The trial court denied the American Motorcycle Association's motion for leave to file the cross-complaint. The American Motorcycle Association petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to grant the motion. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ. Ultimately the court granted a peremptory writ of mandate. Because of the statewide importance of the questions presented, the Supreme Court ordered a hearing in the case on its own motion.
View caseA plaintiff obtained a judgment against one defendant for harm caused by multiple actors. The paying defendant sought to create a new federal common-law contribution right against the others. Courts decline to fashion such a right when the underlying statute supplies no basis for it.
In 1985, DEA agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar was captured on assignment in Mexico, taken to a house in Guadalajara, tortured over the course of a two-day interrogation, and murdered. Based in part on eyewitness testimony, DEA officials in the United States came to believe that respondent Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican physician, was present at the house and acted to prolong the agent's life, thereby extending the interrogation and torture. In 1990, a federal grand jury in the Central District of California indicted Alvarez for the torture and murder of Camarena-Salazar, and the district court issued a warrant for his arrest. The DEA asked the Mexican government for help in getting Alvarez into the United States, but when requests and negotiations proved fruitless, the DEA approved a plan to hire Mexican nationals to seize Alvarez and bring him to the United States for trial. Petitioner Jose Francisco Sosa participated in the group that abducted Alvarez from his house, held him overnight in a motel, and brought him by private plane to El Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by federal officers. Once in American custody, Alvarez moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his seizure was outrageous governmental conduct and violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. The district court agreed, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fact of Alvarez's forcible seizure did not affect the jurisdiction of a federal court. The case was tried in 1992 and ended at the close of the government's case when the district court granted Alvarez's motion for a judgment of acquittal. In 1993, after returning to Mexico, Alvarez began the civil action at issue here. He sued Sosa, Mexican citizen and DEA operative Antonio Garate-Bustamante, five unnamed Mexican civilians, the United States, and four DEA agents. Alvarez sought damages from the United States under the FTCA alleging false arrest and from Sosa under the ATS for a violation of the law of nations. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss the FTCA claim but awarded summary judgment and $25,000 in damages to Alvarez on the ATS claim. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ATS judgment but reversed the dismissal of the FTCA claim. A divided en banc court reached the same conclusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the companion cases to clarify the scope of both the FTCA and the ATS.
View caseThe right arises when two or more persons become liable in tort to the same plaintiff for the same harm and one tortfeasor pays more than its equitable share of the common liability. Payment of the full judgment satisfies the discharge requirement even without separate judgments against each defendant.
Recovery is limited to the excess paid beyond the contributing tortfeasor's own equitable share. No tortfeasor may be compelled to contribute more than its own share of the total liability.
Yes. No right of contribution exists in favor of any tortfeasor who intentionally caused the harm. The bar applies even if other negligent tortfeasors also contributed to the injury.
When one tortfeasor holds a right of indemnity against another, neither may obtain contribution from the other. The indemnity relationship displaces the contribution doctrine entirely.
Yes. A settling tortfeasor who discharges the entire claim by paying more than its equitable share may still pursue contribution from other jointly liable parties.