Also known as: rights to appointed counsel · appointed counsel · right to counsel
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Sixth Amendment guarantee that an indigent defendant facing potential imprisonment in a criminal prosecution receives government-appointed counsel at every stage from initial appearance through appeal unless the defendant waives the right.
Ryan Roberts appeared before a magistrate on federal fraud charges and stated he could not afford a lawyer. The court appointed counsel to represent him at the hearing and all subsequent proceedings including trial and appeal. The appointment satisfied the requirement that counsel be provided at every stage unless waived.
Roger Ramirez was in custody on robbery charges and clearly told officers he wanted a lawyer. Detectives later returned without counsel present and resumed questioning about the same offense. The statements obtained were inadmissible because counsel had not been provided after the invocation.
Ralph Richardson was indicted for burglary and then taken to a stationhouse showup where a witness viewed him in a lineup without counsel present. The identification procedure occurred after formal charging and constituted a critical stage. The resulting identification evidence was suppressed for lack of counsel.
Rebecca Ross faced charges after a witness selected her photograph from an array shown by police. No counsel attended the photo display because the procedure did not qualify as a critical stage requiring presence. The identification remained admissible subject only to due process review for suggestiveness.
Rhea Reynolds was arrested on felony charges and stated she could not afford counsel. Officers continued questioning without providing appointed counsel after she invoked the right. The statements were excluded because the indigent defendant was denied appointed counsel during custodial interrogation.
In March 1963 Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home in Phoenix and taken to the police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then questioned by two officers in Interrogation Room No. 2 for two hours. The officers did not advise him of any right to counsel. Miranda signed a typed confession that was introduced at his trial for kidnapping and rape. On October 14 1960 Michael Vignera was arrested in connection with a Brooklyn robbery. He was taken first to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan and later to the 66th Detective Squad. A detective questioned him for several hours without any advice concerning counsel. Vignera made an oral admission. He was then questioned by an assistant district attorney whose transcribed statement was also introduced at his trial for first-degree robbery. On March 20 1963 Carl Calvin Westover was arrested by Kansas City police as a suspect in two local robberies. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. The next day local officers interrogated him again throughout the morning. Westover was then turned over to FBI agents who questioned him for two to two-and-a-half hours about California robberies and obtained signed confessions. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover he had been in custody for over fourteen hours. On January 31 1963 Roy Allen Stewart was arrested at his home in connection with a series of purse-snatch robberies. During the next five days police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions without any advice of rights. On the ninth session Stewart confessed. Transcripts of the interrogations were introduced at his trial for kidnapping rape and murder. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Miranda's conviction. The New York courts affirmed Vignera's conviction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Westover's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed Stewart's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the four cases and consolidated them for argument.
Raphael Rivera was charged with a felony and could not retain counsel. The state provided appointed counsel for trial. The conviction was reversed on appeal because the defendant had been denied counsel at the felony proceeding.
Petitioner Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, Gideon asked the court to appoint counsel for him. The court denied the request, stating that under the laws of the State of Florida the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short argument emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the Information filed in this case. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. Later, petitioner filed in the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition. The petition attacked his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government. Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, upon consideration thereof but without an opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady was decided by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant’s federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts. To give this problem another review here, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments whether this Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady should be reconsidered.
The right attaches at the initiation of formal adversary judicial proceedings such as indictment or arraignment and extends to every critical stage thereafter. It guarantees counsel for an indigent defendant facing potential imprisonment unless waived.
Supporting sources
…that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. Illinois , 378 U. S. 478, 490, n. 14. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U. S. 458 (1938), and…
…as a drastic abridgment of democratic safeguards they embody, such as freedom of speech, press and religion, and the right to counsel. This has already happened. Betts v. Brady , 316 U. S. 455. Compare Feldman v. United States , 322 U. S. 487, 494-503. For application of this natural law concept, whether under the terms…
…laws it will permit state legislatures to enact. Gideon in applying to state prosecutions the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of right to counsel followed Palko v. Connecticut , 302 U. S. 319, which had held that specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, rather than the Bill of Rights as a whole, would be selectively applied to the…
…the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault notice of charges, right to counsel, the rights of confrontation and examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination. We therefore hold, in agreement with Chief Judge Fuld in dissent in the Court of Appeals, "that,…
…and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to assist her. The court shall, however, advise her that she has a right to court appointed counsel, and shall provide her with such counsel unless she wishes to appear with private counsel or has knowingly and intelligently waived representation by counsel." "§ 3207. Abortion…
No. Photo arrays are not considered a critical stage requiring counsel even after indictment. The procedure may still be challenged on due process grounds if it is unnecessarily suggestive.
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Police must cease questioning and may not reinitiate interrogation about any offense until counsel is provided or the suspect reinitiates communication and validly waives the right.
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No. The constitutional right does not extend to state post-conviction or federal habeas proceedings even for death-row inmates.
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No. A Gerstein hearing does not trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
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The court must inquire into potential conflicts and advise each defendant of the right to separate counsel. Measures must be taken to protect the right unless good cause shows no conflict is likely.
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