Also known as: Rule 11 · FRCP 11 · Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 · Rule 11 FRCP · FRCP Rule 11 · Rule 11 sanctions
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A procedural rule that requires every attorney or unrepresented party presenting a pleading, motion, or other paper to certify after reasonable inquiry that the paper is not presented for an improper purpose, that legal contentions are warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for change, and that factual contentions have or will likely obtain evidentiary support. The rule authorizes courts to impose sanctions on violators after notice and opportunity to respond, with joint responsibility for law firms absent exceptional circumstances.
Rhea Reynolds, counsel for Nova Build, filed an answer denying receipt of any structural warnings from the engineer. She made the flat denial after accepting only her client's verbal assurance and without checking project emails or texts. The court found the denial lacked evidentiary support and was not labeled as based on belief or lack of information, so it imposed sanctions to deter repetition of the conduct.
Ricardo Rojas, counsel for Elm Teach, filed a notice of removal in federal court containing a short statement of federal-question grounds. He signed the notice after accepting only his client's verbal assurance of jurisdiction and without reviewing the complaint allegations or any supporting documents. The court found the certification violated Rule 11 because reasonable inquiry had not been made before signing.
Rosalind Reed, counsel for shareholders in a Disney board dispute, filed a complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty in approving an employment agreement. After the court dismissed the claims, she sought to amend without conducting further inquiry into the board's process. The court sanctioned the filing because the amended allegations lacked reasonable factual support under the certification requirements.
In 1995, The Walt Disney Company hired Michael Ovitz as its president through an employment agreement dated October 1, 1995. Ovitz, a longtime friend of Disney Chairman and CEO Michael Eisner and a prominent Hollywood talent broker, lacked experience managing a diversified public company. The agreement, unilaterally negotiated by Eisner and approved by the Old Board, provided Ovitz with a five-year term, a $1 million annual base salary, a discretionary bonus, and stock options to purchase five million shares of Disney common stock, split between "A" options vesting over three years starting in 1998 and "B" options conditioned on contract extension. The Old Board knew Disney needed a strong second-in-command due to recent acquisitions and questions about Eisner's health following heart surgery. When Eisner informed three Old Board members of his decision to hire Ovitz in mid-August 1995, they denounced it, but the Board ultimately approved the agreement unanimously two months later. The Board received advice from compensation expert Graef Crystal, though Crystal later stated in media interviews that no one had quantified the total cost of the severance package under a non-fault termination. Ovitz's performance deteriorated during his first year, leading him to seek alternative employment and express dissatisfaction in a September 1996 letter to Eisner. On December 11, 1996, Eisner and Ovitz agreed to a non-fault termination, which the New Board approved by mutual consent. A December 27, 1996 letter confirmed the end of Ovitz's service as an officer and director, treated the departure as a Non-Fault Termination, set the total amount payable at $38,888,230.77 net of withholding, and provided for immediate vesting of the three million "A" options. Stockholders filed a derivative complaint in the Court of Chancery on January 8, 1997, later amended on May 28, 1997, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and waste by both the Old and New Boards in connection with the Ovitz agreement and termination. The Court of Chancery dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to plead particularized facts excusing pre-suit demand under Chancery Rule 23.1. The Supreme Court of Delaware granted review on appeal.
Ravi Reddy, counsel for Masson, filed a complaint alleging defamation based on a magazine article's portrayal of his statements. The filing rested solely on the client's recollection without reviewing interview transcripts or tapes. The court sanctioned the pleading because the factual contentions lacked evidentiary support and were not identified as likely to be confirmed by discovery.
Jeffrey M. Masson served as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives until his termination. In 1983, Janet Malcolm published a two-part article in The New Yorker magazine detailing the circumstances of Masson's departure from the Archives and his disputes with board members including Dr. Kurt Eissler and Dr. Anna Freud. The article drew primarily from tape-recorded interviews Malcolm conducted with Masson and was subsequently published in book form by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Masson claimed that several quotations attributed to him in the article did not appear on the tape recordings of his conversations with Malcolm. Among the challenged passages were statements that he changed his middle name because it sounded better, that he was viewed as an intellectual gigolo, that Freud's theory was the product of moral cowardice, that Anna Freud's house would have been a place of sex, women, fun, and that he would be considered the greatest analyst who ever lived after Freud. On November 29, 1984, Masson filed a diversity action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Malcolm, The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., and Knopf. He alleged that the defendants had libeled him and placed him in a false light by fabricating quotations and by misleadingly editing his statements to portray him as unscholarly, irresponsible, vain, and lacking in honesty and moral integrity. Masson further alleged that The New Yorker and Knopf knew of Malcolm's misconduct prior to publication. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the ground that Masson had failed to establish actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Masson appealed the district court's order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which heard argument on June 16, 1988, and issued its decision on August 4, 1989.
Rule 11 requires the attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry so that the denial is warranted on the evidence or, if the attorney cannot confirm its accuracy, to identify the denial specifically as based on belief or lack of information. A flat denial without review of available records violates the rule even if the client provided an assurance.
Supporting sources
…some of the "tools at hand" from which the pleader intends to derive the particularized facts necessary to comply with Chancery Rule 11(b)(3) and Chancery Rule 23.1. But many of the quotations from the media in the Complaint simply echo plaintiffs' conclusory allegations. Accordingly, they serve no purpose other than to…
…both fact and law. They moved for attorneys fees and costs under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and Cal.Code Civ.P. § 1021.7 (West Supp.1988). Rule 11 provides that "the signature of an attorney or party [on a pleading, motion or other paper] constitutes a certificate by him ... that it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by…
…such as noise, odor, or light alone, are dealt with as nuisance cases, not trespass. [Citations.] [¶] Succinctly stated, the rule
A court denies sanctions when the legal contention is supported by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law. The rule protects good-faith efforts to develop doctrine even if the theory is ultimately rejected on the merits.
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Yes, but only if the attorney identifies the contentions as likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation. Allegations resting solely on suspicions without any basis for believing discovery will confirm them violate the certification requirement.
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A sanctions motion must be made separately from any other motion, must describe the specific conduct alleged to violate the rule, and must be served but not filed until 21 days after service to allow withdrawal or correction of the challenged paper.
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Yes, because the violation is complete upon filing a baseless pleading and the court retains jurisdiction to address collateral issues such as sanctions even after dismissal.
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