Also known as: FRCP 55 · Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 · Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 · default judgment · entry of default
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A federal rule of civil procedure that authorizes the clerk to enter default when a party fails to plead or otherwise defend and permits the clerk or court to enter default judgment against that party.
Rosalind Reed sued Ronald Reed for breach of contract seeking exactly $50,000 in damages. Ronald failed to answer and the clerk entered default. Rosalind then requested judgment for $50,000 plus an injunction barring future competition. The court refused the injunction because it differed in kind from the relief demanded in the complaint.
Roberto Reyes sued Rachel Ramirez for unpaid invoices totaling a sum certain. Rachel never answered and the clerk entered default. Rachel promptly moved to set aside the entry, showing good cause through excusable neglect and a meritorious defense that the invoices had been paid. The court granted the motion under the good cause standard.
Rita Russell filed a state court action to dissolve her marriage but could not afford the filing fee required to serve process. The court refused to waive the fee and later entered default against her spouse. The Supreme Court held that the fee requirement violated due process by denying a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a default judgment terminated the marriage.
Appellants, welfare recipients residing in the State of Connecticut, brought this action in the Federal District Court for the District of Connecticut on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The action concerned state procedures for the commencement of litigation, including requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of process, in connection with efforts to bring divorce actions. The average cost to a litigant for bringing an action for divorce is sixty dollars. Section 52-259 of the Connecticut General Statutes provides that there shall be paid to the clerks of the supreme court or the superior court, for entering each civil cause, forty-five dollars. An additional fifteen dollars is usually required for the service of process by the sheriff. There is no dispute as to the inability of the named appellants to pay either the court fees required by statute or the cost incurred for the service of process. The affidavits in the record establish that appellants' welfare income in each instance barely suffices to meet the costs of the daily essentials of life. It includes no allotment that could be budgeted for the expense to gain access to the courts. The clerk of the Superior Court returned their papers on the ground that he could not accept them until an entry fee had been paid. Subsequent efforts to obtain a judicial waiver of the fee requirement and to have the court effect service of process were to no avail. Appellants sought a judgment declaring that the fee requirements were unconstitutional as applied to them and an injunction ordering the appropriate officials to permit them to proceed with their divorce actions without payment of fees and costs. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to twenty-eight United States Code section 2281. On July sixteen, nineteen sixty-eight, that court issued its decision. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in nineteen sixty-nine. The case was heard at the nineteen sixty-nine term and thereafter was set for reargument at the present term.
View caseRuby Rivera sued Ridgeway Partners in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The defendant failed to answer and the clerk entered default. State law would have required additional steps before default judgment, but the federal district court applied Rule 55 to enter judgment without those steps.
On February 6, 1963, petitioner, a citizen of Ohio, filed her complaint in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming damages in excess of $10,000 for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of one Louise Plumer Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen deceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Respondent, Mrs. Osgood's executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with respondent's wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4 (d) (1). Respondent filed his answer on February 26, alleging, inter alia, that the action could not be maintained because it had been brought contrary to and in violation of the provisions of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 197, Section 9. On October 17, 1963, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below.
View caseRadiant Technologies sued Raven Logistics under a contract containing a clause designating an agent for service. After proper service on the agent, Raven failed to appear. The court entered default judgment, holding that the contractual designation satisfied due process and supported the default.
In 1961 Steve and Robert Szukhent, father and son farmers residing in Michigan, obtained two incubators from National Equipment Rental, Ltd. under a lease. National Equipment Rental is a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is in New York. The lease was a standard printed form less than a page and a half long that contained eighteen numbered paragraphs. The final numbered paragraph, printed in the same type as the rest of the document and appearing immediately above the Szukhents' signatures, stated that the lessees designated Florence Weinberg, 47-21 Forty-first Street, Long Island City, New York, as agent for the purpose of accepting service of any process within the State of New York. The Szukhents had never met, seen, or heard of Florence Weinberg before the lawsuit. In 1962 National Equipment Rental filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging that the Szukhents had failed to make any of the periodic payments required by the lease. The marshal delivered two copies of the summons and complaint to Florence Weinberg. On the same day she mailed the summons and complaint to the Szukhents by certified mail together with a letter stating that the documents had been served upon her as their agent pursuant to the lease. National Equipment Rental also notified the Szukhents of the service by certified mail. The Szukhents moved to quash service. The District Court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseReliance Insurance sued Roberto Reyes and he failed to appear or contest personal jurisdiction. The court entered default judgment. Reyes later challenged jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court held that failure to raise the defense before default constituted waiver of the personal jurisdiction objection.
Respondent Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée is a Delaware corporation. Its principal place of business is in the Republic of Guinea, where it operates bauxite mines and processing facilities. Forty-nine percent of its stock is owned by the Republic of Guinea. The remaining fifty-one percent is owned by Halco (Mining) Inc., a Pennsylvania company that contracted to procure insurance for CBG. In 1973, Halco instructed broker Marsh & McLennan to obtain $20 million in business interruption coverage. The first $10 million was placed with Insurance Company of North America. The excess $10 million was placed through Bland Payne in the London market with 21 foreign insurers. Fourteen of those insurers are petitioners here. The placing slip was initialed effective February 12, 1974. The excess insurers adopted the INA policy terms. After CBG allegedly suffered mechanical problems causing more than $10 million in losses, it filed a two-count diversity action in the Western District of Pennsylvania in December 1975. CBG named INA on the first count and the excess insurers on the second count. The excess insurers answered by asserting lack of in personam jurisdiction. They later moved for summary judgment on that ground. CBG served its first document request in August 1976. The request sought copies of all business interruption policies issued between 1972 and 1975. After objections and motions to compel, the district court overruled the objections in June 1978. The court later narrowed the request to policies delivered in or covering risks in Pennsylvania. Petitioners stated the documents were held by London brokers. The court ordered them to request the files and gave successive extensions through November 1978. On December 21, 1978, after petitioners offered only to make four million files available in London, the district court warned that failure to produce the information within 60 days would result in an order under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) assuming jurisdiction. On April 19, 1979, the court found the material had not been produced and entered the sanction. It also made independent findings of jurisdiction under the Pennsylvania long-arm statute and by implicit consent through adoption of the INA contract. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the jurisdictional holding as to all but three excess insurers. It relied solely on the validity of the Rule 37 sanction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the decision conflicted with Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134 (CA5 1980).
View caseThe clerk may enter default judgment when the claim is for a sum certain or one that can be made certain by computation, the defendant has failed to appear, and the plaintiff supplies a proper affidavit. The amount must appear on the face of the complaint and require no further proof.
A defendant must demonstrate good cause, which includes reasonable reliance on another party to defend, prompt action after default, and a meritorious defense that would preclude liability if believed. Courts favor resolution on the merits when these elements are met.
No. Only a formal pleading or motion filed with the court satisfies the obligation to plead or otherwise defend. A telephone call or other informal objection does not qualify and the clerk must still enter default.
No. Rule 54(c) prohibits a default judgment from differing in kind from or exceeding the amount demanded in the pleadings. Any additional relief such as an injunction or emotional distress damages requires court involvement rather than clerk entry.
No. The clerk acts on the showing made at the time of the application. A tardy answer does not undo a default that has already occurred or block entry based on the prior failure to plead or defend.
…were considered not to be an appealable final judgment, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), appellants would have the choice of suffering a default judgment or entering a general appearance and defending on the merits. This case is in the same posture as was Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn , 420 U. S. 469, 485 (1975): "The [Delaware] Supreme…