Section 8

The history of public transportation in San Antonio began with private operators. In 1959 the City of San Antonio purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Company and replaced it with the publicly owned San Antonio Transit System. In 1978 the city transferred its facilities and equipment to appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, a public mass-transit authority organized on a countywide basis. SAMTA became the major provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area. Between 1978 and 1980 its vehicles traveled over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 million passengers. San Antonio began receiving federal subsidies under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. SATS and SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants from December 1970 through February 1980. This total included $12.5 million in operating grants during SAMTA's first two fiscal years. The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 without applying to local mass-transit employees. Congress amended the statute in 1961 to extend minimum-wage coverage to private mass-transit carriers with annual gross revenue of at least $1 million. In 1966 Congress withdrew exemptions from public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and services were subject to state regulation. The 1974 amendments provided for the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption for mass-transit employees while extending FLSA coverage to virtually all state and local government employees. Following the 1976 decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, SATS informed its employees that the decision relieved it of overtime obligations under the FLSA. On September 17, 1979, the Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion that SAMTA's operations were not constitutionally immune from the FLSA. On November 21, 1979, SAMTA filed suit against the Secretary of Labor in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas seeking declaratory relief. On the same day appellant Garcia and other SAMTA employees sued SAMTA in the same court for overtime pay under the FLSA. On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted SAMTA's motion for summary judgment. The court held that local public mass-transit systems constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. After the Supreme Court decided Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co. in 1982, the District Court's judgment was vacated and remanded. On remand the District Court adhered to its original view and again entered judgment for SAMTA in 1983. The Secretary and Garcia took direct appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, restored the cases for reargument after initial argument, and requested briefing on whether the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery should be reconsidered.

In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas. Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home. The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision. The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded. The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District. The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission. However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded. The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required. After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application. CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials. They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial. It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.

Sheila Myers worked as an Assistant District Attorney in the New Orleans office under District Attorney Harry Connick for approximately five and a half years. In early October 1980, Myers was informed she would be transferred to prosecute cases in a different section of the criminal court. She strongly opposed the transfer and expressed her objections to several supervisors including Connick. On October 6, 1980, Myers received formal notice of the transfer. Later that day she discussed her concerns with First Assistant District Attorney Dennis Waldron. That night Myers prepared a questionnaire soliciting the views of fellow Assistant District Attorneys on office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns. The next morning, she typed and copied the questionnaire. She then distributed it to fifteen Assistant District Attorneys. Connick learned of the distribution shortly after noon on October 7. He returned to the office, informed Myers she was being terminated for refusing the transfer, and stated that distributing the questionnaire constituted insubordination. Myers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the termination violated her First Amendment rights. The District Court found the questionnaire was the real reason for discharge, submitted the motivating-factor question to a jury which answered in Myers' favor, and ordered reinstatement with backpay. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In 1965 New York City enacted the Landmarks Preservation Law, which created an eleven-member Landmarks Preservation Commission and authorized it to designate buildings at least thirty years old that possess special historical or aesthetic interest. The law required owners of designated landmarks to obtain Commission approval before altering exterior architectural features and imposed an affirmative duty to keep those features in good repair. In August 1967 the Commission designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark and the city tax block it occupies a landmark site; the Board of Estimate confirmed the designation the following month. Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates owned the Terminal, an eight-story Beaux-Arts structure completed in 1913 that served as the main station for the New York Central and Harlem lines. On January 22, 1968, Penn Central entered a fifty-year renewable lease with UGP Properties, Inc., under which UGP agreed to construct a multistory office building cantilevered above the Terminal and to pay Penn Central at least three million dollars annually after construction. Penn Central and UGP submitted two plans prepared by architect Marcel Breuer: Breuer I, a fifty-five-story tower resting on the Terminal roof, and Breuer II Revised, a fifty-three-story building that would have removed part of the 42d Street facade. After four days of hearings at which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals. Penn Central filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for a temporary taking. The trial court granted the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Penn Central had failed to prove deprivation of all reasonable beneficial use. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Terminal could still earn a reasonable return and that transferable development rights provided significant compensation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.