Also known as: seise · seises · seised · seising · seisins · seisina · seisor · seisors · seizin · seysin
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Possession of a freehold estate in land under a claim of ownership. The concept requires both actual possession and a freehold interest such as a fee simple or life estate, distinguishing it from mere possession under a leasehold.
Imperial Homes LLC conveyed an apartment complex to Horizon Estates Corporation by general warranty deed. Years later a tenant proved that part of the land lay outside the grantor's chain of title. Horizon Estates sued for breach of the covenant of seisin contained in the deed. The court held that the covenant was breached at delivery because the grantor lacked seisin of the disputed portion.
Sylvia Santos and her husband held Blackacre as joint tenants. Sylvia executed a deed conveying her interest to herself alone in an effort to sever the tenancy. The deed failed because common-law seisin could not pass from a grantor to herself without a third-party intermediary. The joint tenancy therefore remained intact.
Mr. and Mrs. Riddle purchased a parcel of real estate, taking title as joint tenants. Several months before her death, Mrs. Riddle retained an attorney to plan her estate. After reviewing pertinent documents, he advised her that the property was held in joint tenancy and that, upon her death, the property would pass to her husband. Distressed upon learning this, she requested that the joint tenancy be terminated so that she could dispose of her interest by will. As a result, the attorney prepared a grant deed whereby Mrs. Riddle granted to herself an undivided one-half interest in the subject property. The document also provided that “The purpose of this Grant Deed is to terminate those joint tenancies formerly existing between the Grantor, Frances P. Riddle, and Jack C. Riddle, her husband. ...” He also prepared a will disposing of Mrs. Riddle’s interest in the property. Both the grant deed and will were executed on December 8, 1975. Mrs. Riddle died 20 days later. The trial court refused to sanction her plan to sever the joint tenancy and quieted title to the property in her husband. The executrix of the will of Frances Riddle appeals from that judgment.
View caseSebastian Santos pursued a wild fox across open land with hounds. Pierson captured and killed the fox before Santos could seize it. The court held that Santos never acquired seisin because he lacked bodily possession or a reasonable prospect of immediate capture. Pierson therefore obtained rightful possession.
Lodowick Post was in possession of dogs and hounds under his command. Upon wild and uninhabited waste land called the beach, he found and started one of those noxious beasts called a fox. Post then hunted, chased, and pursued the fox with his dogs and hounds while the animal remained in view. Pierson, well knowing that the fox was so hunted and pursued, killed and carried it off in the sight of Post to prevent his catching the same. Post commenced an action of trespass on the case against Pierson in a justice's court. The declaration set forth these facts, and a verdict was rendered for Post as the plaintiff below. Pierson sued out a certiorari directed to one of the justices of Queens county. The cause came before the court on the return to the certiorari. The proceedings presented the question of whether Post had acquired a property right in the fox sufficient to maintain the action against Pierson for killing and taking it away.
View caseThe United States flew military aircraft at low altitudes over Causby's chicken farm, destroying the use of the surface. The Court ruled that the overflights constituted a taking because they destroyed the owner's beneficial ownership and seisin of the land. The absence of physical touching was irrelevant to the destruction of seisin.
Respondents Thomas Lee Causby and his wife purchased 2.8 acres of land near an airport outside Greensboro, North Carolina in 1934. The property included a dwelling house and outbuildings used for raising chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway was 2,220 feet from the barn and 2,275 feet from the house, and the glide path passed over the property at 83 feet above the ground. In April 1942 the airport was taken over by the Greensboro-High Point Municipal Airport Authority. In May 1942 the United States leased the airport for military operations beginning June 1, 1942, with the lease renewable until 1967 or the end of the national emergency. Military planes including four-motored heavy bombers used the northwest-southeast runway about four percent of the time for takeoffs and seven percent for landings, frequently flying low over the Causbys' land and buildings. The flights caused the chickens to become frightened, resulting in the loss of approximately 150 birds that flew into walls, a decline in egg production, and the eventual destruction of the commercial chicken business. The noise and glare from the planes also deprived the family of sleep and caused them to become nervous and frightened. Although no accidents occurred on the property, several happened nearby. The Causbys brought suit in the Court of Claims, which found that their property had depreciated in value due to the flights and entered judgment for them in the amount of $2,000. The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the case.
View caseSarah Whiton received land under a devise that limited her estate to a qualified fee. She later attempted to convey a fee simple absolute. The court held that she could convey only the estate of which she was seised, so the grantee took subject to the same qualification.
Johnson entered into an agreement to purchase land and paid a deposit toward the purchase price. The land had been devised under the will of Royal Whiton, specifically passing to his five grandchildren pursuant to the seventh clause of that will. Subsequently, the five grandchildren executed a deed conveying the property and tendered it to Johnson as the buyer. Johnson refused to accept the deed, asserting that Sarah A. Whiton, one of the grandchildren, lacked the ability to convey a fee simple absolute in the land due to the terms of the will. As a result, Johnson commenced this action to recover the deposit paid under the purchase agreement. The seventh clause of Royal Whiton's will contained the following language regarding the disposition to his granddaughter: “After the decease of all my children, I give, devise, and bequeath to my granddaughter, Sarah A. Whiton, and her heirs on her father’s side, one third part of all my estate, both real and personal, and to my other grandchildren and their heirs respectively the remainder, to be divided in equal parts between them.” This dispute over the quality of title offered by the tendered deed was presented to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, where Holmes, J., considered the matter and issued the court's opinion.
View caseThe Georgia legislature granted land to private buyers who later conveyed it to Fletcher. A subsequent legislature repealed the grant and conveyed the same land to Peck. The Supreme Court held that the original grantees had acquired seisin under the first grant and that the repeal could not divest that vested title.
The suit was instituted on several covenants contained in a deed made by John Peck, the defendant in error, conveying to Robert Fletcher, the plaintiff in error, certain lands which were part of a large purchase made by James Gunn and others, in the year 1795, from the state of Georgia. The contract for which was made in the form of a bill passed by the legislature of that state. The first count set forth a breach in the covenant that the legislature of the state of Georgia at the time of passing the act of sale had good right to sell and dispose of the same in manner pointed out by the said act. The second count assigned as a breach that the original grantees had promised and assured members of the legislature an interest in the lands if they voted for the bill. The third count alleged that a subsequent legislature passed an act annulling and rescinding the law under which the conveyance to the original grantees was made. The fourth count assigned as a breach that the right to the soil was in the United States and not in Georgia. In the circuit court there were demurrers to three pleas and a special verdict found on an issue joined on the fourth plea. The pleas were all sustained and judgment was rendered for the defendant. After the opinion of the court was delivered on the initial demurrers, the parties agreed to amend the pleadings and the cause was continued for further consideration. The special verdict found the grant of Carolina by Charles the second to the Earl of Clarendon and others. It found the subsequent erection of Georgia as a colony. It found the surrender of the grantees to the crown in 1752. It found the appointment of governors with commissions describing the boundaries. It found the 1763 proclamation creating new colonies and reserving lands on the western waters for the use of the Indians. It found the 1787 convention between South Carolina and Georgia settling their boundary line. The verdict described the situation of the lands in such manner that their lying within the limits of Georgia as defined in the proclamation of 1763, in the treaty of peace, and in the convention between that state and South Carolina has not been questioned. The case comes before this court on the amended pleadings consisting of sundry demurrers and the special verdict.
View caseThe covenant of seisin warrants that the grantor holds both good title and actual seisin at the moment of conveyance. It is breached immediately if the grantor lacks seisin, regardless of later events or record notice.
Yes. The covenant of seisin runs with the land and may be enforced by a subsequent grantee against the original grantor when a title defect is later discovered.
Seisin requires possession under a claim of freehold ownership such as a fee simple or life estate. A tenant for years has possession but lacks seisin, which remains in the reversioner.
No. Seisin requires beneficial ownership of a freehold estate. A trustee holding legal title for another lacks the beneficial seisin needed for doctrines such as dower.
…present, through waste and unoccupied lands, which must inevitably and speedily have terminated in corporal possession or bodily seisin, confers such a right to the object of it as to make any one a wrongdoer who shall interfere and shoulder the spoil. The justice's judgment ought, therefore, in my opinion, to be affirmed.