Also known as: separation of powers · separation-of-powers doctrine · separation of powers principle
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
An allocation of governmental authority among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches that prevents any branch from exercising powers assigned to another. The doctrine bars Congress from directing federal courts to reopen final judgments or from retaining control over execution of the laws through mechanisms such as legislative vetoes. It also limits executive officials from exercising core legislative functions without statutory authorization.
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After a district court entered final judgment for Simone Sanders in a securities case, Congress passed a statute directing courts to reopen and reinstate all such judgments. The court refused to reopen the case. The statute could not compel reinstatement because it interfered with a completed judicial decision.
Congress created a review board of its own members with power to veto an executive agency's airport-noise rules affecting Sylvia Santos's airline. The court invalidated the scheme. The arrangement improperly retained legislative control over execution of the laws.
A special prosecutor subpoenaed tapes from the President in a criminal investigation. The President resisted on separation of powers grounds. The court enforced the subpoena because the judicial need for evidence outweighed a generalized claim of confidentiality.
After final judgment against Sabrina Shah, Congress enacted a statute ordering courts to reopen and apply a new standard to her zoning case. The court refused. Reopening a completed judgment would let the legislature override judicial finality.
Congress passed a statute giving an executive task force power to issue nationwide rules on contraceptive counseling without any statutory standard. Spencer Silver challenged the rules. The court struck them down because the executive may not exercise core legislative power without congressional authorization.
A federal judge removed by the Senate challenged the procedures used during his impeachment trial. The court dismissed the suit because the Constitution assigns the trial of impeachments exclusively to the Senate. Judicial review of those procedures would violate separation of powers.
Congress may change substantive law and direct courts to apply the new rule in all non-final cases. The doctrine prohibits only legislative interference with final judicial judgments already entered.
No. Assigning such veto authority to members of Congress either creates an unconstitutional legislative veto or improperly transfers executive power to legislators.
…of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles [of] the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers.” Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). B The majority acknowledges none of this doctrinal background, and it is easy to see why:…
…of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers
…1966 S. Ct. Rev. 79, 97. The design of the Fourteenth Amendment has proved significant also in maintaining the traditional separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary. The first eight Amendments to the Constitution set forth self-executing prohibitions on governmental action, and this Court has had primary authority to…
…national security may be involved they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be. Under the separation of powers created by the Constitution, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disinterested; rather it should vigorously investigate and prevent breaches of national security and…
…for by the Constitution and not enacted by Congress. We would more surely preserve the important values of the
No. The doctrine does not prevent courts from reviewing and enforcing subpoenas against the President when the need for evidence outweighs a generalized confidentiality interest.
No. Article I vests all legislative power in Congress. An executive body may implement existing statutes but may not create new generally applicable obligations without statutory authorization.
No. Immunity protects only official acts performed while in office. Private pre-office conduct remains subject to civil suit without violating separation of powers.