solemnize

In 1916 petitioner Williams married Carrie Wyke in North Carolina and lived with her there until May 1940. In 1920 petitioner Hendrix married Thomas Hendrix in North Carolina and lived with him there until May 1940. At that time both petitioners went to Las Vegas, Nevada. On June 26, 1940, each filed a divorce action in the Nevada court. The defendants in those actions entered no appearance and were not served with process in Nevada. Service by publication was made for Thomas Hendrix and a North Carolina sheriff delivered process to Carrie Williams in North Carolina. The Nevada court granted Williams a divorce on August 26, 1940, on the ground of extreme cruelty after finding that he had been a bona fide resident of Clark County for more than six weeks. The Nevada court granted Hendrix a divorce on October 4, 1940, on the grounds of wilful neglect and extreme cruelty after making the same finding as to her residence. Petitioners married each other in Nevada on October 4, 1940, and thereafter returned to North Carolina where they lived together until the indictment was returned. They were tried and convicted of bigamous cohabitation under § 4342 of the North Carolina Code, and each was sentenced for a term of years to a state prison. At trial they pleaded not guilty and offered exemplified copies of the Nevada divorce decrees and their subsequent marriage, contending the decrees were valid in North Carolina. The State contended that the Nevada decrees were not entitled to recognition because the defendants had not been served in Nevada and had not appeared there. The trial court instructed the jury that a Nevada divorce decree based on substituted service would not be recognized in North Carolina. The trial court also instructed the jury that petitioners bore the burden of satisfying the jury of the bona fides of their Nevada residence. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the convictions. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In December 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper petitioned the Supreme Court for a rule requiring Secretary of State James Madison to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue commanding delivery of their commissions as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. The applicants had been nominated by outgoing President John Adams. The Senate had advised and consented to the appointments. Commissions in due form were signed by the President with the seal of the United States affixed by the Secretary of State. During the proceedings the Court heard testimony from Department of State clerks Jacob Wagner and Daniel Brent, who described the preparation and handling of the commissions. Wagner recalled that two commissions had been signed but could not confirm whether those of the applicants were recorded. Brent believed Marbury's and Hooe's commissions were made out. Ramsay's was omitted by mistake. None of the Adams-signed commissions for District justices were recorded. Attorney General Levi Lincoln, who had acted as Secretary of State, testified that he had seen signed and sealed commissions but did not know whether any for the applicants were ever sent out. James Marshall's affidavit stated that on March 4, 1801, he received and later returned several commissions from the Secretary of State's office, including those for Hooe and Harper. The applicants also submitted the affidavit of Hazen Kimball confirming that commissions for Marbury and Hooe were in the office on March 3, 1801. Madison did not appear or show cause after the rule was served. The motion for the writ itself was heard in the February 1803 term.

In February 1866, J.H. Mitchell obtained a judgment in an Oregon circuit court against Neff for less than $300 in an action for attorney services. At that time, Neff resided outside Oregon, received no personal service of process, and made no appearance in the case. The judgment was entered by default following constructive service by publication as authorized by the Oregon Code for non-resident defendants possessing property within the state. The Oregon Code also provided for attachment of a non-resident's property in money actions. No such attachment occurred with respect to the land at issue. Instead, after the judgment, an execution issued, leading to a levy on the land and its sale at a sheriff's auction. Pennoyer purchased the property at that sale and received a sheriff's deed. Separately, in 1866, the United States issued a patent to Neff for the same tract of land under the Donation Law of Oregon, which Neff valued at $15,000. Neff then brought suit against Pennoyer in the circuit court to recover possession of the premises based on his patent title. The lower court held the Oregon judgment invalid because of deficiencies in the affidavits used to obtain the publication order and to prove publication occurred. The Supreme Court of the United States granted review to consider the validity of the state court judgment and the resulting sheriff's sale.