state of domicile

In February 1866, J.H. Mitchell obtained a judgment in an Oregon circuit court against Neff for less than $300 in an action for attorney services. At that time, Neff resided outside Oregon, received no personal service of process, and made no appearance in the case. The judgment was entered by default following constructive service by publication as authorized by the Oregon Code for non-resident defendants possessing property within the state. The Oregon Code also provided for attachment of a non-resident's property in money actions. No such attachment occurred with respect to the land at issue. Instead, after the judgment, an execution issued, leading to a levy on the land and its sale at a sheriff's auction. Pennoyer purchased the property at that sale and received a sheriff's deed. Separately, in 1866, the United States issued a patent to Neff for the same tract of land under the Donation Law of Oregon, which Neff valued at $15,000. Neff then brought suit against Pennoyer in the circuit court to recover possession of the premises based on his patent title. The lower court held the Oregon judgment invalid because of deficiencies in the affidavits used to obtain the publication order and to prove publication occurred. The Supreme Court of the United States granted review to consider the validity of the state court judgment and the resulting sheriff's sale.

Karen Capato married Robert Capato in May 1999. Shortly thereafter, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer and was told that the chemotherapy he required might render him sterile. Because the couple wanted children, Robert deposited his semen in a sperm bank before undergoing chemotherapy. Despite Robert's treatment, Karen conceived naturally and gave birth to a son in August 2001. Robert's health deteriorated in late 2001, and he died in Florida in March 2002. His will, executed in Florida, named as beneficiaries the son born of his marriage to Karen and two children from a previous marriage, but made no provision for children conceived after his death. Shortly after Robert's death, Karen began in vitro fertilization using her husband's frozen sperm. She conceived in January 2003 and gave birth to twins in September 2003, eighteen months after Robert's death. Karen Capato claimed survivors insurance benefits on behalf of the twins. The Social Security Administration denied her application. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the agency's decision. The court determined that the twins would qualify for benefits only if they could inherit from the deceased wage earner under Florida intestacy law. Under Florida law, a child born posthumously may inherit only if conceived during the decedent's lifetime. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. It concluded that the undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner and his widow qualify for survivors benefits without regard to state intestacy law. Courts of Appeals had divided on the question, with some circuits reaching conflicting results. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.

Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing. Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal. Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.

Tuan Anh Nguyen was born on September 11, 1969, in Saigon, Vietnam, to a Vietnamese mother and Joseph Boulais, a United States citizen employed by a corporation in Vietnam. Boulais and Nguyen's mother were not married. After their relationship ended, Nguyen lived for a time with the family of Boulais's new Vietnamese girlfriend. In June 1975, when Nguyen was almost six years old, he came to the United States with his father. He became a lawful permanent resident and was raised in Texas by Boulais. In 1992, at age 22, Nguyen pleaded guilty in a Texas state court to two counts of sexual assault on a child and was sentenced to eight years in prison on each count. Three years later, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings against him as an alien convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude and an aggravated felony. At his deportation hearing Nguyen testified that he was a citizen of Vietnam. The Immigration Judge found him deportable. Nguyen appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In 1998, while the appeal was pending, Boulais obtained an order of parentage from a Texas court based on DNA testing that showed a 99.98 percent probability of paternity; Nguyen was then 28 years old. The Board dismissed the appeal because Nguyen had failed to establish compliance with 8 U.S.C. §1409(a). Nguyen and Boulais appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which rejected their constitutional challenge to §1409(a). The Supreme Court granted certiorari.