Also known as: De Donis Conditionalibus · Statute De Donis Conditionalibus · Statute De Donis · De Donis
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A thirteenth-century English statute that converted grants in fee simple conditional into estates in fee tail. The statute rendered such estates inalienable beyond the life of the first tenant in tail except through limited common-law methods and confined succession to the grantee's lineal descendants.
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Sarah Sullivan conveyed an apartment complex to her niece Sierra Santos by deed stating the property passed to Sierra and the heirs of her body to preserve a family legacy. Sierra later contracted to sell the complex outright to a real estate investment trust. Other family members objected that Sierra lacked power to convey full ownership outside the bloodline. A court applying the unmodified statute held that the deed created a fee tail preventing the sale.
Stephen Shaw conveyed land adjacent to a family airstrip to his nephew Spencer Silver by deed using the words unto Spencer and the heirs of his body to support family aviation endeavors. Spencer negotiated a long-term ground lease with purchase option to an aerospace startup. Other claimed heirs of the body sued to enjoin the transaction. The court ruled that the statute preserved the fee tail and barred Spencer from granting interests outside the lineal line.
The language creates an estate in fee tail limited to the grantee and the heirs of the grantee's body. The statute prevents alienation outside that line except through recognized methods such as common recovery. Succession passes only to lineal descendants rather than to the grantee's general heirs.
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The statute renders the fee tail inalienable beyond the life of the first tenant in tail. A grantee therefore lacks power to convey fee simple title or to grant long-term interests that would defeat the interests of lineal heirs. Any attempted conveyance outside the bloodline is ineffective to the extent it exceeds the tenant's limited interest.
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An added purpose clause does not constitute a fundamental statutory or judicial modification of the statute's operation. The classic words of limitation continue to create a fee tail when the statute remains in force without change. Courts treat the purpose language as precatory and subordinate to the operative fee tail limitation.
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The traditional fee tail remains fully operative. The absence of any pronouncement means the statute continues to restrict succession to lineal descendants and to bar alienation outside that line. A grantee therefore cannot convey marketable fee simple title to third parties.
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