Also known as: statutes of descent · statute of distribution
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A statutory rule that directs the passage of a decedent's real property to designated heirs when the owner dies without a valid will. The rule effects transfer by operation of law at the moment of death and requires no deed from the decedent. It operates as an alternative to transfer by deed or by devise under a will.
Elias died without a will while owning a rental house in his own name. Horizon Property Services continued collecting rent and signing leases after his death. Carla, Elias's niece and sole heir under the intestacy statute, claimed title in a quiet title action. Title vested in Carla at Elias's death by operation of law even though no deed was ever executed.
Marisol conveyed her office building in trust to Lena for life with remainder to Marisol's heirs at law. Marisol later died intestate survived by her parents and siblings. The parents and siblings qualified as heirs under the statute of descent and took the remainder interest that became possessory after Lena's death. A prior contract purporting to sell Marisol's reversionary interest conveyed nothing because no reversion remained.
Johnson entered into an agreement to purchase land and paid a deposit toward the purchase price. The land had been devised under the will of Royal Whiton, specifically passing to his five grandchildren pursuant to the seventh clause of that will. Subsequently, the five grandchildren executed a deed conveying the property and tendered it to Johnson as the buyer. Johnson refused to accept the deed, asserting that Sarah A. Whiton, one of the grandchildren, lacked the ability to convey a fee simple absolute in the land due to the terms of the will. As a result, Johnson commenced this action to recover the deposit paid under the purchase agreement. The seventh clause of Royal Whiton's will contained the following language regarding the disposition to his granddaughter: “After the decease of all my children, I give, devise, and bequeath to my granddaughter, Sarah A. Whiton, and her heirs on her father’s side, one third part of all my estate, both real and personal, and to my other grandchildren and their heirs respectively the remainder, to be divided in equal parts between them.” This dispute over the quality of title offered by the tendered deed was presented to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, where Holmes, J., considered the matter and issued the court's opinion.
View caseA decedent died intestate leaving real property. The slayer claimed the property as an heir under the statute of descent. The court held that legal title passed to the slayer by operation of the statute but imposed a constructive trust for the benefit of the decedent's other heirs. Equity prevented the slayer from retaining beneficial ownership despite the statutory designation.
Howard Mahoney died intestate on May 6, 1961, of gunshot wounds. His wife, Charlotte Mahoney, was tried for the murder of Howard Mahoney in the Addison County Court and was convicted by jury of the crime of manslaughter in March, 1962. She is presently serving a sentence of not less than 12 nor more than 15 years at the Women’s Reformatory in Rutland. Howard Mahoney left no issue, and was survived by his wife and his father and mother. His father, Mark Mahoney, was appointed administrator of his estate which at the present time amounts to $3,885.89. After due notice and hearing, the Probate Court for the District of Franklin entered a judgment order decreeing the residue of the Estate of Howard Mahoney, in equal shares, to the father and mother of the decedent. An appeal from the judgment order and decree has been taken here by the appellant widow. The cause now before us is here on a direct appeal from the Probate Court. Findings of fact were made below from which it appears that the judgment of the probate court decreeing the estate of Howard Mahoney to his parents, rather than to his widow, was based upon a finding of the felonious killing of her husband by Mrs. Mahoney. The Probate Court used the record of the conviction of the appellant for manslaughter for its determination that the appellant had feloniously killed her husband. In Vermont, an indictment for murder can result in a jury conviction on either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. The legislature has provided the sentences that may be passed upon a person convicted of manslaughter, but provides no definition of that offense, nor any statutory distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
View caseThe statute of descent supplies the default distribution of real property when a person dies without a valid will. A devise transfers the same property by the terms of a will admitted to probate. Both mechanisms pass title by operation of law without a deed from the decedent.
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Yes. When an owner dies intestate, the statute of descent vests legal title in the heirs at the moment of death subject only to administration of the estate. No deed or court order is required for the initial vesting.
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Yes. Transfers by operation of law such as tax sales and foreclosures are independent of intestate succession. A completed tax sale or foreclosure passes clear title even when the decedent died intestate and heirs have not yet received distribution.
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The personal representative may execute a confirmatory deed to perfect record title but does not create the heir's ownership. Title already vested in the heirs by operation of the statute at the decedent's death.
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…spite of his crime. The reasoning for so deciding is that devolution of the property of a decedent is controlled entirely by the statutes of descent and distribution; further, that denial of the inheritance to the slayer because of his crime would be imposing an additional punishment for his crime not provided by statute, and would…