Also known as: substantial change of circumstances · material change of circumstances · substantial material change in circumstances · changed circumstances · material change in circumstances
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A significant alteration in the facts or conditions existing at the time of an agreement or decree that justifies judicial modification or non-enforcement of its terms.
Seth Shapiro and Sylvia Santos signed a premarital agreement waiving spousal support. After the marriage, Sylvia lost her job and developed a chronic illness that required expensive ongoing care. She petitions the court to refuse enforcement of the waiver. The court examines whether the enforcement would impose substantial hardship because of the material change arising after the agreement was signed.
Solomon Silver was ordered to pay maintenance to Samuel Soto after their divorce. Solomon later suffered a permanent disability that eliminated his earning capacity while Samuel obtained a high-paying position. Solomon moves to modify the award. The court considers whether the change is so substantial and continuing that the original terms have become unconscionable.
Santiago Sanchez serves as trustee of a family trust. After several years the trust assets have declined sharply because of market shifts and Sanchez has relocated far from the beneficiaries. The qualified beneficiaries petition for removal. The court evaluates whether a substantial change of circumstances exists that makes removal in the best interests of the beneficiaries and consistent with the trust purposes.
A state enacts a spousal-notification requirement for abortions. After the statute takes effect, evidence shows that many women face increased risks of domestic violence when notification is required. Challengers argue the requirement imposes an undue burden. The court assesses whether the factual understanding underlying the earlier legal framework has been altered by the new evidence of harm.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
A state statute permits any third party to seek visitation whenever it serves the child's best interest. After the statute is applied, a parent demonstrates that the order overrides her reasonable decision about her child's associations. The parent challenges the statute as violating her fundamental rights. The court examines whether the application reflects an improper substitution of judicial judgment for parental authority in light of the family circumstances.
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel never married but had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad's parents and the paternal grandparents of the children. After Granville and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought Isabelle and Natalie to their home for weekend visitation. Brad Troxel committed suicide in May 1993. The Troxels continued to see the children on a regular basis after his death. In October 1993 Granville informed the Troxels that she wished to limit their visitation to one short visit per month. In December 1993 the Troxels filed a petition in Washington Superior Court for Skagit County under Rev. Code Wash. § 26.10.160(3) seeking visitation rights. The statute provides that any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time. The court may order visitation when it may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances. The Troxels requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks each summer. Granville proposed one day of visitation per month with no overnight stay. In 1995 the Superior Court ordered visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on both grandparents' birthdays. Granville appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that nonparents lack standing to seek visitation under the statute unless a custody action is pending. The Washington Supreme Court granted review, held that the Troxels had standing, but affirmed on the ground that the statute unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment.
Steven Silva and Santiago Sanchez obtained a divorce decree dividing their marital assets. Years later Steven discovers that Santiago concealed substantial investment accounts at the time of the decree. Steven seeks to reopen the property division. The court determines whether the newly discovered facts constitute a substantial and material change that justifies revisiting the earlier judgment.
Joseph A. Richardson and Ida Richardson divorced in December 1997. They executed a separation agreement providing that Joseph would pay Ida maintenance of $2,425.00 per month, terminating upon Ida’s remarriage or the death of either party. The agreement stated that its terms would not be subject to modification or change, regardless of the relative circumstances of the parties. The trial court incorporated the agreement into the Judgment and Decree of Dissolution and stated that maintenance was non-modifiable. In 2004 Joseph filed a motion to modify the judgment. In Count II he alleged that Ida sought out persons to burglarize his home, sought out persons to murder him, and attempted to hire a person to murder him. He further alleged that these acts breached the separation agreement, violated public policy, committed criminal acts, and waived any claim to maintenance. The trial court dismissed Count II with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The dismissal order was certified as a final judgment and order under Rule 74.01(b). Joseph appealed the dismissal. The Eastern District Court of Appeals transferred the matter to the Supreme Court of Missouri.
The moving party must demonstrate changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to render the original terms unconscionable. The change must affect installments accruing after the motion is filed. Property divisions are generally not modifiable absent grounds to reopen the judgment.
Supporting sources
…principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before. In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court's constitutional duty. Because the cases…
…allow[s] any person, at any time, to petition for visitation without regard to relationship to the child, without regard to changed circumstances, and without regard to harm"); id. , at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30 ("[The statute] allow[s] any person' to petition for forced visitation of a child at any time' with the only requirement…
…to possession of the children. It does not open the door for the modification of any prior award of custody on a showing of changed circumstances. Nor is it available as a procedure for settling the future custody of children in the first instance. “It is well settled that habeas corpus is not the proper or appropriate action to…
…children's claims for survivor benefits with the Social Security Administration. A New Jersey Superior Court judge held that, in circumstances
…The New York court noted that the wife had not argued that the consent form violated public policy, and suggested that in some circumstances agreements may be unenforceable for that reason. Kass v. Kass , 91 N.Y.2d 554, 565 n.4 (1998). : We have refused to enforce contracts in a variety of contexts because of a…
A court may refuse enforcement if the term would cause substantial hardship to a party because of a material change in circumstances arising after the agreement was signed. The determination is made in the context of the agreement as a whole and decided as a matter of law.
Supporting sources
Removal is permitted when a substantial change of circumstances has occurred, removal serves the interests of all beneficiaries, removal is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and a suitable successor is available. The court may also act when all qualified beneficiaries request removal under the same standards.
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No. A change of circumstances does not revoke a will or any part of it except as provided in specific statutes addressing divorce or homicide. The testator must still comply with formal revocation methods.
Courts may modify or terminate a covenant requiring payment for services when the obligation has become excessive relative to the cost of providing the services or the value received by the burdened estate, taking account of the provider's reasonable reliance.
Supporting sources