Also known as: substantial change in circumstances · substantially changed circumstances · substantial change of circumstances · changed circumstances · material change in circumstances
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A material alteration in facts or conditions arising after formation of an agreement or entry of a decree or trust instrument that may justify modification, nonenforcement, or removal of a fiduciary.
Stella Shapiro and her spouse signed a premarital agreement waiving spousal support. Years later Stella lost her job and developed a chronic illness that exhausted her savings. She petitions the court to refuse enforcement of the waiver because the post-agreement events have created substantial hardship.
Serena Soto was ordered to pay monthly maintenance after divorce. She later suffers a permanent disability that eliminates her earning capacity while the recipient spouse receives a large inheritance. Serena moves to modify the decree on the ground of substantial changed circumstances.
Spencer Silver serves as trustee of a family trust whose primary asset has lost nearly all value because of unforeseen market shifts. All qualified beneficiaries petition for removal, arguing that the substantial change in circumstances requires appointment of a successor trustee to protect the trust purposes.
Sophia Singh challenges a state statute previously upheld under earlier precedent. She presents new empirical data showing that the statute now imposes burdens far greater than those considered when the precedent was decided. The court must decide whether the substantial change in factual understanding warrants reexamination of the prior ruling.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseSydney Santos sues to enjoin enforcement of clinic regulations that were upheld years earlier. Fresh evidence demonstrates that the rules now force multiple clinics to close, producing a dramatically different practical effect. The court evaluates whether these substantial changed circumstances require fresh constitutional scrutiny.
In July 2013 the Texas Legislature enacted House Bill 2. The bill contained an admitting-privileges requirement for physicians performing abortions and a surgical-center requirement for abortion facilities. Before the law took effect a group of Texas abortion providers filed the Abbott case seeking facial invalidation of the admitting-privileges provision. The district court initially enjoined the provision but the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction and later upheld the requirement on the basis of evidence presented before enforcement. On April 6 2014 petitioners a group of abortion providers that included some Abbott plaintiffs filed this suit in federal district court. They sought as-applied relief against the admitting-privileges requirement for facilities in McAllen and El Paso and a statewide injunction against the surgical-center requirement claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held a four-day bench trial and received stipulations expert depositions and testimony. It found that the number of facilities providing abortions dropped in half from about 40 to about 20 after the admitting-privileges requirement began to be enforced. It found that the number of women of reproductive age living more than 50 miles from a clinic doubled. The number living more than 100 miles away increased by 150 percent. The number living more than 150 miles away increased by more than 350 percent. The number living more than 200 miles away increased by about 2,800 percent. It found that the number of facilities would drop to seven or eight if the surgical-center provision took effect. It found that before H. B. 2's passage abortion was an extremely safe procedure with very low rates of complications and virtually no deaths. It found that abortion was safer than many more common procedures not subject to the same level of regulation. It found that the cost of compliance with the surgical-center requirement would most likely exceed 1.5 million dollars to 3 million dollars per clinic. On the basis of these findings the district court enjoined enforcement of both provisions. The Fifth Circuit reversed in significant part holding that res judicata barred the challenges and that both requirements were constitutional. The case reached the Supreme Court.
View caseSofia Stern, a fit parent, objects to a grandparent visitation petition filed under a broad best-interests statute. The grandparents rely on the child's current living arrangements, but no showing is made that circumstances have changed since the parent's original decision. The court must determine whether the absence of substantial changed circumstances defeats the petition.
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel never married but had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad's parents and the paternal grandparents of the children. After Granville and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought Isabelle and Natalie to their home for weekend visitation. Brad Troxel committed suicide in May 1993. The Troxels continued to see the children on a regular basis after his death. In October 1993 Granville informed the Troxels that she wished to limit their visitation to one short visit per month. In December 1993 the Troxels filed a petition in Washington Superior Court for Skagit County under Rev. Code Wash. § 26.10.160(3) seeking visitation rights. The statute provides that any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time. The court may order visitation when it may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances. The Troxels requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks each summer. Granville proposed one day of visitation per month with no overnight stay. In 1995 the Superior Court ordered visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on both grandparents' birthdays. Granville appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that nonparents lack standing to seek visitation under the statute unless a custody action is pending. The Washington Supreme Court granted review, held that the Troxels had standing, but affirmed on the ground that the statute unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment.
View caseThe moving party must demonstrate changed circumstances that are both substantial and continuing and that render the original terms unconscionable. Mere fluctuations in income or ordinary life events are ordinarily insufficient.
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No. The court may refuse enforcement only when the change produces substantial hardship for a party when the agreement is viewed as a whole. The statute requires a judicial determination rather than automatic relief.
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Removal is permitted when a substantial change of circumstances has occurred, removal best serves the beneficiaries' interests, removal is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and a suitable successor is available.
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When new facts or understandings demonstrate that an earlier decision was based on assumptions now shown to be incorrect, the court may reexamine the precedent even if the legal rule itself remains sound.
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…principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before. In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court's constitutional duty. Because the cases…