substantial performance

Salve Regina College is an institution of higher education located in Newport, Rhode Island. Sharon L. Russell was admitted to the college and began her studies as a freshman in 1982. The following year, Russell sought admission to the college’s nursing department to pursue a bachelor of science degree in nursing. She was accepted by the department and began her nursing studies in the fall of 1983. Russell was five feet six inches tall and weighed in excess of 300 pounds when she was accepted in the nursing program. Her weight became a topic of commentary and concern by officials of the nursing program immediately after the 1983 school year began. Her first year in the program was marked by a series of confrontations and negotiations concerning her obesity and its effect upon her ability to complete the clinical requirements safely and satisfactorily. During her junior year, Russell signed a document that was designated as a contract. The contract conditioned her further participation in the nursing program upon weekly attendance at a weight-loss seminar and a realized average loss of two pounds per week. When she failed to meet these commitments, she was asked to withdraw from the program and did so. Russell transferred to a nursing program at another college but had to repeat her junior year in order to satisfy the transferee institution’s two-year residency requirement. She also underwent surgery for her obesity. In 1987, Russell successfully completed her nursing education and is now a registered nurse. Soon after leaving Salve Regina College, Russell filed this civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. She asserted claims based on intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and nonperformance by the college of its implied agreement to educate her. Subject-matter jurisdiction in the District Court was based on diversity of citizenship. The parties agree that the law of Rhode Island applies to all substantive aspects of the action. At the close of plaintiff-respondent’s case in chief, the District Court directed a verdict for the individual defendants on all three of the remaining claims and for the college on the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. The court denied the college’s motion for a directed verdict on the breach-of-contract claim. At the close of all the evidence, the college renewed its motion for a directed verdict on the contract claim. The District Court denied the motion and submitted the breach-of-contract claim to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for Russell and determined that the damages were $30,513.40. Judgment was entered. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits concerning the appropriate standard of appellate review.

Jacob & Youngs built a country residence for Kent at a cost of upwards of $77,000 and sued to recover a balance of $3,483.46 remaining unpaid. The work of construction ceased in June, 1914, and Kent then began to occupy the dwelling. There was no complaint of defective performance until March, 1915. One of the specifications for the plumbing work provided that all wrought iron pipe must be well, galvanized, lap welded pipe of the grade known as standard pipe of Reading manufacture. Kent learned in March, 1915, that some of the pipe, instead of being made in Reading, was the product of other factories. The architect directed the plaintiff to do the work anew. The plumbing was encased within the walls except in a few places where it had to be exposed. Obedience to the order would have meant the demolition at great expense of substantial parts of the completed structure. The plaintiff left the work untouched and asked for a certificate that the final payment was due. Refusal of the certificate was followed by this suit. The evidence showed that the omission of the prescribed brand of pipe was neither fraudulent nor willful but the result of the oversight and inattention of the plaintiff’s subcontractor. Reading pipe is distinguished from other brands only by the name of the manufacturer stamped upon it at intervals of between six and seven feet. Even the defendant’s architect failed to notice the discrepancy upon inspection. The plaintiff tried to show that the brands installed were the same in quality, in appearance, in market value and in cost as the brand stated in the contract. This evidence was excluded, and a verdict was directed for the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed and granted a new trial.

Several tenants rented apartments in Clifton Terrace, a three-building apartment complex in Northwest Washington, by separate written leases with First National Realty Corporation. On April 8, 1968, the landlord filed separate actions in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Court of General Sessions seeking possession on the ground that each tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent due for the month of April. The tenants admitted that they had not paid the landlord any rent for April but alleged numerous violations of the Housing Regulations as an equitable defense or claim by way of recoupment or set-off. The tenants offered to prove that there are approximately 1500 violations of the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia in the building at Clifton Terrace, where the defendant resides, some affecting the premises of the defendant directly, others indirectly, and all tending to establish a course of conduct of violation of the Housing Regulations to the damage of defendants. They conceded at trial that this offer of proof reached only violations which had arisen since the term of the lease had commenced. The Court of General Sessions refused the offer of proof and entered judgment for the landlord. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the argument that the landlord was under a contractual duty to maintain the premises in compliance with the Housing Regulations. Because of the importance of the question presented, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the tenants' petitions for leave to appeal.