Also known as: substantial justification · EAJA substantial justification
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard requiring that a position, certification, or government action rest on a reasonable basis in both law and fact.
Sasha Stone's counsel signed broad production requests in a contract dispute without checking whether the requested documents existed in the client's files. The opposing party moved for sanctions under the certification rule. The court found the certification lacked a reasonable basis in fact and imposed an award of expenses because the position was not substantially justified.
Summit Bank hired an out-of-state lawyer who sought admission to practice in the state where the bank maintained its headquarters. The state bar denied admission solely because the lawyer resided across the border. The court held the residency requirement violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause because the state offered no substantial justification beyond speculation about availability and competence.
Samantha Stone, licensed in her home state, applied for admission by motion in an adjacent state that required five years of in-state practice for nonresidents. The state offered no evidence that nonresidents posed greater risks to clients or the public. The court struck the requirement because the state failed to supply substantial justification for the discriminatory rule.
Sofia Stern prevailed against the United States in a civil action and sought fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The district court found the government's litigating position substantially justified and denied the fee request. On appeal the circuit court reviewed that determination for abuse of discretion, confirming that the reasonable-basis standard controlled the outcome.
Salve Regina College is an institution of higher education located in Newport, Rhode Island. Sharon L. Russell was admitted to the college and began her studies as a freshman in 1982. The following year, Russell sought admission to the college’s nursing department to pursue a bachelor of science degree in nursing. She was accepted by the department and began her nursing studies in the fall of 1983. Russell was five feet six inches tall and weighed in excess of 300 pounds when she was accepted in the nursing program. Her weight became a topic of commentary and concern by officials of the nursing program immediately after the 1983 school year began. Her first year in the program was marked by a series of confrontations and negotiations concerning her obesity and its effect upon her ability to complete the clinical requirements safely and satisfactorily. During her junior year, Russell signed a document that was designated as a contract. The contract conditioned her further participation in the nursing program upon weekly attendance at a weight-loss seminar and a realized average loss of two pounds per week. When she failed to meet these commitments, she was asked to withdraw from the program and did so. Russell transferred to a nursing program at another college but had to repeat her junior year in order to satisfy the transferee institution’s two-year residency requirement. She also underwent surgery for her obesity. In 1987, Russell successfully completed her nursing education and is now a registered nurse. Soon after leaving Salve Regina College, Russell filed this civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. She asserted claims based on intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and nonperformance by the college of its implied agreement to educate her. Subject-matter jurisdiction in the District Court was based on diversity of citizenship. The parties agree that the law of Rhode Island applies to all substantive aspects of the action. At the close of plaintiff-respondent’s case in chief, the District Court directed a verdict for the individual defendants on all three of the remaining claims and for the college on the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. The court denied the college’s motion for a directed verdict on the breach-of-contract claim. At the close of all the evidence, the college renewed its motion for a directed verdict on the contract claim. The District Court denied the motion and submitted the breach-of-contract claim to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for Russell and determined that the damages were $30,513.40. Judgment was entered. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits concerning the appropriate standard of appellate review.
Silverline Industries challenged an agency rule that imposed new compliance costs. The agency defended its position as substantially justified by the administrative record. The reviewing court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard to the agency's determination that its litigating stance rested on a reasonable basis in law and fact.
In 1967 the Atomic Energy Commission granted Vermont Yankee a construction permit for a nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vermont, after the required adjudicatory hearing and reviews. Vermont Yankee later applied for an operating license; NRDC intervened and objected to exclusion of fuel-reprocessing and waste-disposal impacts from the hearing. In November 1972 the Commission opened a separate rulemaking proceeding on those fuel-cycle issues, noticed two alternative approaches based on its Environmental Survey, and conducted a February 1973 hearing at which more than forty participants submitted comments but no discovery or cross-examination occurred. In April 1974 the Commission adopted a rule assigning numerical values to fuel-cycle impacts and applied it prospectively. In January 1969 Consumers Power applied for permits to build two nuclear reactors in Midland, Michigan. After staff and ACRS review, Saginaw and Mapleton intervened and raised 119 environmental contentions, including seventeen on energy conservation. The Licensing Board held hearings on radiological issues, the staff issued a final environmental impact statement in March 1972, and further hearings occurred in May and June 1972; Saginaw declined to participate in the later hearings or submit proposed findings. The Licensing Board granted the construction permit, the Appeal Board affirmed, and the Commission declined further review. In November 1973 the Commission ruled in another case that energy-conservation evidence meeting threshold tests could be considered, but it later refused Saginaw's motion to reopen the Consumers Power record. NRDC appealed the Vermont Yankee license and rule to the D.C. Circuit; Saginaw and others appealed the Consumers Power permit. In 1976 the Court of Appeals remanded both matters, holding the fuel-cycle rulemaking procedures inadequate, the Consumers Power environmental impact statement defective for omitting energy conservation, and the ACRS report insufficiently explained. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1977. The Commission is the successor agency to the Atomic Energy Commission under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. All licensing proceedings followed the two-stage process of construction permit followed by operating license under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with NEPA environmental reviews added after 1969.
Solomon Silver's union sued to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement in federal court. The employer argued that state law alone governed the claim and that federal jurisdiction lacked substantial justification. The court rejected the argument because the federal statute supplied an independent basis for treating the contract as enforceable in federal court.
In 1953 the Textile Workers Union of America entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Lincoln Mills of Alabama. The agreement was to run for one year and from year to year thereafter unless terminated on specified notices. It contained a no-strike clause and established a multi-step grievance procedure whose final step, available to either party, was arbitration. Several grievances concerning work loads and work assignments arose under the agreement. The union processed the grievances through every step of the contractual procedure, after which the employer denied them. The union then requested arbitration, but the employer refused. The union filed suit in federal district court seeking an order compelling the employer to arbitrate the grievances. The district court held that it possessed jurisdiction and directed the employer to comply with the arbitration provisions of the agreement. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed by a divided vote, concluding that the district court lacked authority under either federal or state law to grant the requested relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. After the Court of Appeals decision but before oral argument, Lincoln Mills terminated its operations, ceased all work at the mill in March 1957, and contracted to sell its mill properties. Some of the grievances sought back pay for increased workloads, and the collective bargaining agreement authorized the arbitration board to adjust compensation retroactively.
A certification lacks substantial justification when the signer fails to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis for the request, response, or objection. Blanket burden objections signed without checking readily available company records or prior compilations of the same data illustrate the violation. The court must impose sanctions once it finds the certification improper and without substantial justification.
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…That this "protective" theory was not adopted by Chief Justice Marshall at a time when conditions might have presented more substantial justification strongly suggests its lack of constitutional merit. Moreover, Congress in its consideration of § 301 nowhere suggested dissatisfaction with the ability of state courts to administer state…
…of the evidence. Here, the Court of Appeals determined that the District Court "applied the correct legal standard and offered substantial justification for its finding of a Rule 11 violation." 277 U. S. App. D. C., at 339, 875 F. 2d, at 896. Its affirmance of the District Court's liability determination is consistent with the deferential…
…mandated by Rule 11”); Pierce , 487 U. S., at 562 (“[T]he question whether the Government’s litigating position has been ‘substantially justified’ is . . . a multifarious and novel question, little susceptible, for the time being at least, of useful generalization”). Nothing about the exercise of diversity jurisdiction alters these…
No. The standard asks only whether the position has a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it is taken. A colorable argument supported by the record satisfies the test even if the court later rejects the argument on the merits.
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The government bears the burden of proving that its position was substantially justified. The prevailing party need only allege that the position lacked substantial justification. The government must then demonstrate a reasonable basis in law and fact on the record of the civil action.
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Speculative assertions that nonresidents will not keep abreast of local rules or perform pro bono work do not supply substantial justification. The state must show a concrete, evidence-based reason why the discriminatory rule is necessary to protect clients or the public.
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No. Courts review the determination for abuse of discretion because the inquiry is fact-bound and little susceptible to useful generalization. The district court is better positioned to marshal the record and apply the reasonable-basis standard.
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