Also known as: Sullivan rules · actual malice standard · NY Times v. Sullivan
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A constitutional standard requiring a public official or public figure plaintiff in a defamation action to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the statement with actual malice. Actual malice exists when the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Scott Summers, a nationally known sports commissioner, sued a sports blog after it published an accusation that he fixed playoff schedules. The blog relied on an unverified leaked thread and refused to disclose its source. Summers must show the publisher knew the charge was false or published it despite serious doubts about its accuracy.
Selena Singh, a state transportation secretary, sued a television network that broadcast claims she concealed train safety defects. The network's producers noted an unresolved conflict between their source's timeline and public records yet aired the story without further checks. A jury could find actual malice from the conscious avoidance of contradictory information.
Sean Steele, owner of a small construction firm, sued a credit reporting agency for a false report that damaged his business reputation. Because Steele is not a public figure, the Sullivan rule does not apply and he may recover on a showing of negligence rather than actual malice.
Stella Shapiro, a civilian director at a federal agency, sued an aerospace blog that accused her of falsifying safety certifications. The blog relied on a single insider account without independent verification. Shapiro must satisfy the Sullivan rule by proving the publisher acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard.
Simon Stern, a state treasurer, sued a financial newsletter that accused him of diverting pension funds. The publisher relied on unnamed sources and an ambiguous draft document while ignoring readily available official records. Internal notes showing awareness of the discrepancy support a finding that the publisher entertained serious doubts yet published anyway.
Sylvia Santos, a prominent climate scientist, sued a magazine that published an interview containing fabricated quotations accusing her of data manipulation. The magazine altered her statements to create a more damaging impression. Santos must prove the alterations were made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth of the attributed statements.
A public figure must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the defamatory statement with actual malice. Actual malice requires a showing that the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth.
Supporting sources
No. Failure to investigate does not by itself prove reckless disregard. The plaintiff must show the defendant entertained serious doubts about the truth or consciously avoided confirming facts that would have revealed falsity.
…that do not involve matters of public concern. The First Amendment does not require the application of the New York Times actual malice standard in such cases. Dissenting opinions Dissenting — Justice Brennan The Court today holds that a private individual need not show actual malice to recover presumed and punitive…
…judgment in part). Likewise, the possibility that defamation liability would chill even true speech has not led us to require an actual malice standard
…even though she was negligent in failing to use a tape recorder or in double-checking her source. New York Times
…in personal danger by publicly airing the details of the dispute. Because the state court misunderstood and misapplied the actual malice standard
…Id. , at 855. II Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals made two basic errors. First, while correctly stating the actual malice standard
Supporting sources
The rule applies when the plaintiff is a public figure by virtue of pervasive fame or by voluntarily thrusting herself into a particular public controversy. A civilian director with substantial responsibility over governmental affairs may also qualify as a public official subject to the same standard.
Supporting sources
Evidence that the publisher knew of an unresolved conflict between sources and public records, relied on a retracted report, or deliberately avoided verification can support reckless disregard. Internal notes acknowledging doubts yet proceeding with publication are particularly probative.
Supporting sources
No. The Sullivan rule addresses the fault element for public figures. Whether special damages must be shown is governed by common-law slander rules, which permit recovery without special damages when the statement imputes serious sexual misconduct or other per se categories.
Supporting sources