Also known as: supreme law of the land · supremacy clause
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional command designating the Constitution, federal statutes enacted pursuant to it, and treaties as the highest law. It binds state judges and displaces any conflicting state constitutional or statutory provisions.
Sierra Santos, an out-of-state renewable generator, sought grid access in Mississippi under a federal program requiring nondiscriminatory treatment for all qualifying producers. The state commission denied priority to out-of-state projects in favor of local ones. The federal requirement controlled the outcome because it directly conflicted with the state order.
Stephen Shaw sought to reopen his state criminal case after a Vienna Convention violation. The President issued a memorandum directing state courts to give effect to the treaty. The memorandum had no force because Congress had never enacted implementing legislation.
Stella Shapiro managed a federally chartered bank in Maryland. State officials imposed a tax solely on that institution. The federal charter prevailed over the state tax because the bank operated as a means to execute national powers.
In April 1816, Congress passed an act entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States." The Bank organized in Philadelphia pursuant to the act and in 1817 established a branch in the City of Baltimore that from that time until May 1, 1818, transacted business by issuing bank notes, discounting promissory notes, and performing other customary operations under the authority of the corporate body established at Philadelphia. On February 11, 1818, the General Assembly of Maryland passed an act entitled "An act to impose a tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature." The Maryland statute provided that any such branch could not lawfully issue notes except upon stamped paper of specified denominations furnished by the Treasurer of the Western Shore, or could relieve itself from that requirement by paying annually in advance to the Treasurer the sum of $15,000. Officers offending against the provisions forfeited $500 for each offense, and persons circulating unstamped notes forfeited up to $100, with penalties recoverable by indictment or action of debt. James W. McCulloch, cashier of the Baltimore branch, on the days set forth in the declaration issued bank notes to George Williams in Baltimore in part payment of a promissory note discounted by the branch, and those notes were not issued on stamped paper as prescribed by the Maryland act; neither the bank nor its branch had paid the $15,000 in advance before or since the issuance of those notes. John James, who sued as well for himself as for the State of Maryland, brought an action of debt against McCulloch in the County Court of Baltimore County to recover the penalties. The parties submitted a statement of agreed facts to the court, which rendered judgment against McCulloch; the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed that judgment, and McCulloch brought the cause to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error.
View caseScott Summers operated steel mills during a labor dispute. The President directed seizure of the mills without statutory authorization. The order lacked effect because it exceeded the President's independent constitutional authority.
In the latter part of 1951, a dispute arose between steel companies including Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. and their employees represented by the United Steelworkers of America, C.I.O., over terms and conditions to be included in new collective bargaining agreements. Long-continued conferences failed to resolve the dispute. On December 18, 1951, the union gave notice of an intention to strike when the existing agreements expired on December 31. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service intervened without success. On December 22, 1951, President Truman referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board to investigate and make recommendations for fair and equitable terms of settlement. The Board's report resulted in no settlement. On April 4, 1952, the union gave notice of a nationwide strike to begin at 12:01 a.m. on April 9. The President believed that the proposed work stoppage would immediately jeopardize national defense because steel is an indispensable component of substantially all weapons and other war materials. A few hours before the strike was to begin, on April 8, 1952, the President issued Executive Order 10340 directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the steel mills and keep them running. The Secretary immediately issued possessory orders calling upon the presidents of the seized companies to serve as operating managers for the United States. Obeying the Secretary's orders under protest, the companies brought proceedings against him in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Their complaints charged that the seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provision and asked the court to declare the orders invalid and to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions. The Government opposed the motion for a preliminary injunction, asserting that the President had inherent power supported by the Constitution, historical precedent, and court decisions. On April 30, 1952, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from continuing the seizure and possession of the plants. On the same day the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court's injunction. Deeming it best that the issues be promptly decided by the Supreme Court, the Court granted certiorari on May 3, 1952, and set the cause for argument on May 12.
View caseSantiago Sanchez claimed land under a state court judgment. The opposing party invoked a federal treaty and Supreme Court precedent. The state judgment yielded because federal law controlled the title question.
In April 1791 an action of ejectment was commenced in a Virginia district court held at Winchester for recovery of land within the Northern Neck tract. Denny Fairfax, a British subject holding under the devise of Thomas Lord Fairfax, was admitted to defend upon the usual terms of confessing lease, entry and ouster. The facts were reduced to a case agreed and treated as a special verdict. On 24 April 1794 the district court entered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, the highest court of law in the state. At its April term in 1810 that court reversed the district court judgment and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The case was then removed into the Supreme Court of the United States. At February term 1813 the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment and issued a mandate directing that its judgment be carried into execution. The Court of Appeals unanimously declined to obey the mandate. It entered judgment declaring that the Supreme Court's appellate power did not extend to it under the Constitution, that section 25 of the Judiciary Act was not in pursuance of the Constitution, that the writ of error had been improvidently allowed, and that proceedings in the Supreme Court were coram non judice. A second writ of error was brought to the Supreme Court. The underlying facts agreed by the parties show that Lord Fairfax, a citizen and inhabitant of Virginia, died in December 1781 seized of approximately 300,000 acres in the Northern Neck. By his will he devised the lands in fee to his nephew Denny Martin, later Denny Fairfax, a native-born British subject who resided in England until his death between 1796 and 1803 and who never became a citizen of the United States. In 1789 the Governor of Virginia issued a patent granting a portion of the land, described as waste and ungranted and never escheated, to David Hunter, a Virginia citizen, pursuant to a treasury warrant dated 23 January 1788. The case agreed also incorporates the definitive treaty of peace of 1783, the treaty of amity of 1794, and the several Virginia statutes concerning land grants and escheats.
View caseSpencer Silver sued Maine in its own courts for overtime under federal law. The state asserted sovereign immunity. The claim could not proceed because Congress had not validly abrogated the state's immunity in its own courts.
In 1992, petitioners, a group of probation officers, filed suit against their employer, the State of Maine, in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The officers alleged the State had violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and sought compensation and liquidated damages. While the suit was pending, the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida in 1996. Upon consideration of that decision, the District Court dismissed petitioners' action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioners then filed the same action in state court. The state trial court dismissed the suit on the basis of sovereign immunity, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in 1998. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision conflicted with the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education. In light of the importance of the question presented and the conflict between the courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1998. The United States intervened as a petitioner to defend the statute. Petitioners are a group of probation officers who alleged violations of federal overtime requirements by their state employer. The procedural path moved from federal district court through dismissal after Seminole Tribe, to refiling in Maine state court, dismissal there, affirmance by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, and finally review by the United States Supreme Court.
View caseNo. Such a treaty has no domestic legal effect until Congress passes implementing legislation. The President cannot enforce it through a memorandum directing state compliance.
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Federal law preempts when a valid federal program directly conflicts with state action. Conflict preemption applies without any requirement of express congressional intent to preempt.
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No. Treaties and executive agreements cannot authorize conduct that violates constitutional guarantees. The Constitution remains the supreme law even when an agreement purports to override it.
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No. A non-self-executing treaty creates no enforceable rights in state proceedings. State agencies have no obligation to apply its terms until Congress acts.
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