Also known as: suspect classification · suspect classifications · suspect class doctrine · suspect class
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional doctrine identifying classifications that trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because they rest on immutable characteristics or a history of purposeful discrimination.
Spencer Silver, a physically fit fifty-two-year-old officer, challenged the department's mandatory retirement rule at age fifty. The court applied rational basis review after finding age is not a suspect classification. The rule survived because it rationally advanced the legitimate goal of maintaining a capable force.
Sylvia Santos, a white applicant denied admission, sued after the university reserved spots for minority candidates. The court applied strict scrutiny because race is a suspect classification. The program failed because it used rigid quotas rather than individualized consideration.
The Medical School of the University of California at Davis opened in 1968 with an entering class of 50 students. In 1971 the size of the entering class was increased to 100 students, a level at which it remains. The first class contained three Asians but no blacks, no Mexican-Americans, and no American Indians. Over the next two years the faculty devised a special admissions program to increase the representation of disadvantaged students in each Medical School class. The special program consisted of a separate admissions system operating in coordination with the regular admissions process. Under the regular admissions procedure candidates whose overall undergraduate grade point averages fell below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 were summarily rejected. About one out of six applicants was invited for a personal interview. Following the interviews each candidate was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by his interviewers and four other members of the admissions committee. The ratings were added together to arrive at each candidate's benchmark score. Since five committee members rated each candidate in 1973 a perfect score was 500. In 1974 six members rated each candidate so that a perfect score was 600. The full committee then reviewed the file and scores of each applicant and made offers of admission on a rolling basis. The special admissions program operated with a separate committee a majority of whom were members of minority groups. Special candidates did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point average cutoff applied to regular applicants. The special committee continued to recommend special applicants until a number prescribed by faculty vote were admitted. While the overall class size was still 50 the prescribed number was 8. In 1973 and 1974 when the class size had doubled to 100 the prescribed number of special admissions also doubled to 16. From the year of the increase in class size through 1974 the special program resulted in the admission of 21 black students 30 Mexican-Americans and 12 Asians for a total of 63 minority students. Over the same period the regular admissions program produced 1 black 6 Mexican-Americans and 37 Asians for a total of 44 minority students. Although disadvantaged whites applied to the special program in large numbers none received an offer of admission through that process. Allan Bakke is a white male who applied to the Davis Medical School in both 1973 and 1974. Despite a strong benchmark score of 468 out of 500 Bakke was rejected. His total was 549 out of 600. Again Bakke's application was rejected. In both years applicants were admitted under the special program with grade point averages MCAT scores and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's. After the second rejection Bakke filed the instant suit in the Superior Court of California. He sought mandatory injunctive and declaratory relief compelling his admission to the Medical School. He alleged that the Medical School's special admissions program operated to exclude him from the school on the basis of his race in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Art. I § 21 of the California Constitution and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The trial court found that the special program operated as a racial quota because minority applicants in the special program were rated only against one another and 16 places in the class of 100 were reserved for them. The court refused to order Bakke's admission however holding that he had failed to carry his burden of proving that he would have been admitted but for the existence of the special program. The California court accepted the findings of the trial court with respect to the University's program. On this basis the court initially ordered a remand for the purpose of determining whether under the newly allocated burden of proof Bakke would have been admitted to either the 1973 or the 1974 entering class in the absence of the special admissions program. In its petition for rehearing below however the University conceded its inability to carry that burden. The California court thereupon amended its opinion to direct that the trial court enter judgment ordering Bakke's admission to the Medical School. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the important constitutional issue.
View caseSeth Shapiro, a student in a low-wealth district, challenged the state's property-tax funding system that produced unequal resources. The court applied rational basis review after finding wealth is not a suspect classification. The system survived because it rationally advanced local control of schools.
In the summer of 1968 Mexican-American parents whose children attended elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School District in San Antonio Texas brought a class action. They sued on behalf of schoolchildren throughout the state who were members of minority groups or who were poor and resided in school districts having a low property tax base. Named as defendants were the State Board of Education the Commissioner of Education the State Attorney General and the Bexar County Board of Trustees. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. A three-judge court was impaneled in January 1969. The Texas system of financing public education originated with the state's first constitution in 1845. It evolved through constitutional amendments permitting local school districts to levy ad valorem taxes for school buildings and maintenance. These local revenues were supplemented by distributions from the state's Permanent School Fund established in 1854 and the Available School Fund. In the late 1940s the legislature enacted the Minimum Foundation School Program. Under the program the state supplies approximately 80 percent of the cost of teacher salaries operating expenses and transportation. Each district contributes the remaining 20 percent through a Local Fund Assignment. The assignment is calculated by an economic index reflecting relative taxpaying ability. Every district also levies additional local property taxes beyond the assignment to supplement its foundation grant. For the 1967-1968 school year the Edgewood Independent School District had an average assessed property value of $5960 per pupil and a median family income of $4686. It raised $26 per pupil through local taxation at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed valuation. It received $222 per pupil from the Foundation Program and obtained $108 in federal funds for a total of $356 per pupil. By comparison the Alamo Heights Independent School District had an assessed property value exceeding $49000 per pupil and a median family income of $8001. It raised $333 per pupil locally at a rate of $0.85 per $100 received $225 from the Foundation Program and $36 in federal funds for a total of $594 per pupil. Similar disparities in per-pupil expenditures existed throughout the state. They were largely attributable to differences in the amount of taxable property within each district. In December 1971 the three-judge District Court rendered judgment holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State appealed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1972 to consider the constitutional questions presented.
View caseStephen Shaw, a seventy-year-old state judge, challenged the constitutional provision requiring retirement at age seventy. The court applied rational basis review after finding age is not a suspect classification. The rule survived because it rationally advanced the goal of ensuring judicial vigor.
Missouri state judges Ellis Gregory, Jr., and Anthony P. Nugent, Jr., were appointed to their positions by the Governor under the state's Non-Partisan Court Plan. Gregory served as an associate circuit judge for the Twenty-first Judicial Circuit, while Nugent sat on the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District. Both judges, along with two others, became subject to a mandatory retirement requirement upon reaching age seventy under Article V, Section 26 of the Missouri Constitution. They had each been retained in office through retention elections in which they ran unopposed. In 1990, the judges filed a lawsuit against Governor John D. Ashcroft in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The complaint alleged that the mandatory retirement provision violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Governor responded with a motion to dismiss the action. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in a 1990 ruling reported at 898 F. 2d 598. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in the case later that year. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act had been amended in 1974 to include states and their political subdivisions as employers. The Act's definition of employee contained exclusions for elected officials, their personal staff, appointees on the policymaking level, and immediate advisers.
View caseSabrina Shah, a voter in a heavily gerrymandered district, alleged the map entrenched one party to dilute her influence. The court declined to apply strict scrutiny because political affiliation is not a suspect classification. The claim was dismissed as a nonjusticiable political question.
The Indiana Legislature consists of a 50-member Senate and a 100-member House of Representatives. In early 1981, following the 1980 census, the Republican-controlled General Assembly initiated reapportionment of the state's legislative districts. The resulting 1981 Reapportionment Act created 50 single-member Senate districts and, for the House, 7 triple-member districts, 9 double-member districts, and 61 single-member districts. The plan was drafted by Republican leadership with the assistance of a private computer firm using precinct-level political data, passed along party lines over unanimous Democratic opposition, and signed into law by the Republican Governor. In early 1982, several Indiana Democrats, including state legislators, local officials, and private citizens, filed suit against state officials alleging that the 1981 plan constituted a political gerrymander intended to disadvantage Democratic voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the claims. In November 1982, the first elections were held under the new districting plan. Democratic candidates received 51.9 percent of the statewide House vote but won only 43 of 100 seats, and 53.1 percent of the Senate vote but won 13 of the 25 seats up for election. In Marion and Allen Counties, which used multimember House districts, Democratic candidates received 46.6 percent of the vote but won only 3 of 21 seats. After trial, the District Court found that the plan intentionally discriminated against Democrats on a statewide basis, that the discrimination was likely to continue throughout the decade, and that it would deny Democrats a fair chance to influence the political process. The court declared the plan unconstitutional, enjoined its enforcement, and ordered the General Assembly to prepare a new plan. The defendants appealed, seeking review of the District Court's rulings on justiciability and the existence of an equal protection violation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseSkyline Construction sought a permit for a home serving adults with intellectual disabilities. The city denied the permit after neighbors objected. The court applied rational basis review after finding mental disability is not a suspect classification. The denial failed because the city's concerns lacked a rational basis.
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas. Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home. The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision. The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded. The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District. The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission. However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded. The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required. After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application. CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials. They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial. It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.
View caseNo. Strict scrutiny applies only when the government acts with a discriminatory purpose that creates a suspect classification. A racially disparate impact alone does not trigger that standard. The plaintiff must first show purposeful discrimination before the court will apply strict scrutiny.
No. Age is not a suspect classification, and thus age-based distinctions are subject only to rational basis review. A mandatory retirement age of fifty for police officers is constitutional even if an individual officer is as physically fit as younger officers, because the law need only be rationally related to legitimate objectives such as ensuring a physically capable police force.
No. Wealth is not a suspect classification. A property-tax-based school financing system that results in disparities in educational funding between rich and poor districts is subject only to rational basis review and is constitutional so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose such as local control of schools.
Only when the plaintiff proves the government adopted or administered the policy with discriminatory purpose. Disparate impact without discriminatory intent is insufficient for a suspect-classification claim.
…protection claim must fail, since it is not to be judged by the strict scrutiny standard employed when a fundamental interest or suspect classification is involved, see, e. g. , Dunn v. Blumstein , 405 U. S. 330 (1972), and Korematsu v. United States , 323 U. S. 214 (1944), or by the somewhat less strict standard of Craig v. Boren ,…