Also known as:symbolic speeches · expressive conduct
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Nonverbal conduct that conveys a particularized message likely to be understood by viewers. Such conduct receives First Amendment protection when government regulation targets its communicative element rather than a separate nonspeech interest.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Flag Burning at Political Rally
Sebastian Santos burned an American flag on a public sidewalk during a protest against federal policies. City police arrested him under a local ordinance that banned flag desecration. The arrest targeted the political message conveyed by the burning rather than any risk of violence or property damage.
Armbands in Public School
Sylvia Santos and her classmates wore black armbands to school to protest a war. School administrators suspended the students under a policy that prohibited all armbands. The policy singled out the students' antiwar message without evidence of substantial disruption to classes.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
In December 1965, petitioners John F. Tinker, a 15-year-old high school student, his 13-year-old sister Mary Beth Tinker, a junior high school student, and Christopher Eckhardt, a 16-year-old high school student, all attending schools in Des Moines, Iowa, participated in a plan developed at a meeting at the Eckhardt home to wear black armbands during the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve to publicize their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce.
The principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of the plan and on December 14, 1965, met and adopted a policy under which any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove it and, if refusing, would be suspended until returning without the armband. The petitioners were aware of this regulation.
On December 16, 1965, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore black armbands to their schools and were sent home and suspended. John Tinker wore his armband the next day and was similarly suspended. The petitioners did not return to school until after New Year's Day, when the planned period for wearing armbands had expired.
Through their fathers, the petitioners filed a complaint in the United States District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking an injunction restraining the respondent school officials and board members from disciplining them and seeking nominal damages. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the dismissal by an equally divided court without opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Sabrina Shah joined the Boy Scouts as an adult leader to advocate for inclusive policies. The organization revoked her membership upon learning of her advocacy efforts. The revocation rested on the message her continued participation would send rather than any conduct unrelated to expression.
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale530 U.S. 640 (2000)
James Dale entered scouting in 1978 at the age of eight by joining Monmouth Council’s Cub Scout Pack 142. He became a Boy Scout in 1981. Dale achieved the rank of Eagle Scout in 1988 after earning 25 merit badges and being inducted into the Order of the Arrow.
In 1989, Dale applied for and received approval for adult membership in the Boy Scouts. He served as an assistant scoutmaster for Troop 73 in Matawan, New Jersey.
Around the same time, Dale’s position as co-president of the Lesbian/Gay Alliance at Rutgers University was publicized in a July 1990 newspaper interview. Later that month, the Boy Scouts sent Dale a letter revoking his adult membership. The letter stated that his membership was inconsistent with the values and standards of the Boy Scouts of America. It explained that the organization specifically forbids membership to homosexuals.
Dale responded by filing a complaint in New Jersey Superior Court against the Boy Scouts and the Monmouth Council. He alleged that the revocation violated the New Jersey public accommodations statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts.
The New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately held that the Boy Scouts is a place of public accommodation subject to the law and that Dale’s expulsion violated the statute. The Boy Scouts petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted the petition to determine whether the application of New Jersey’s public accommodations law in this case violates the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association.
Steven Silva handed out pamphlets describing birth control methods at a public lecture. State officials prosecuted him under a statute that restricted distribution of such materials. The prosecution focused on the ideas conveyed by the pamphlets rather than any separate health or safety concern.
Eisenstadt v. Baird405 U.S. 438 (1972)
On April 6, 1967, William R. Baird delivered a lecture on birth control at Boston University. As part of the presentation, he showed a film, displayed contraceptive devices in their original packages, and at the conclusion invited members of the audience to take contraceptive articles from the stage. A young woman requested and received a package of Emko vaginal foam from Baird, after which he was arrested and charged with exhibiting and giving away a contraceptive device in violation of Massachusetts General Laws, c. 272, § 21.
Baird was convicted following a bench trial in the Massachusetts Superior Court. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts set aside the conviction for exhibiting the contraceptives on First Amendment grounds but upheld the conviction for giving away the foam by a four-to-three vote. Baird then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded with directions to grant the writ discharging Baird. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the appeal brought by the Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts.
The Massachusetts statute, as interpreted by the state courts, makes it a felony for anyone other than a registered physician or pharmacist to dispense contraceptives intended for the prevention of pregnancy, with distribution authorized only to married persons upon prescription.
Sierra Santos and fellow activists erected tents on the National Mall to highlight the lack of shelter for homeless persons. Park officials enforced a camping ban that applied only to overnight stays in that location. The enforcement singled out the protesters' intended message about government housing policy.
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence468 U.S. 288 (*1984*)
In 1982, the Community for Creative Non-Violence, a group dedicated to eliminating homelessness, and several of its adherents applied to the National Park Service for a permit to erect a symbolic tent city in Lafayette Park, across from the White House, and on the Mall as part of a wintertime demonstration intended to call attention to the plight of the homeless.
The Park Service issued a renewable permit authorizing the erection of 20 tents in Lafayette Park that would accommodate 50 people and 40 tents on the Mall with a capacity of up to 100 people. The Park Service specifically denied the request that demonstrators be permitted to sleep in the tents.
Lafayette Park is a roughly 7-acre square located across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House. It is a garden park with formal landscaping of flowers and trees, with fountains, walks and benches. The Mall is a stretch of land running westward from the Capitol to the Lincoln Memorial some two miles away. It includes the Washington Monument, a series of reflecting pools, trees, lawns, and other greenery.
Both areas were included in Major Pierre L'Enfant's original plan for the Capital. They are visited by vast numbers of visitors from around the country, as well as by large numbers of residents of the Washington metropolitan area.
Under the regulations involved in this case, camping in National Parks is permitted only in campgrounds designated for that purpose. No such campgrounds have ever been designated in Lafayette Park or the Mall. Camping is defined as the use of park land for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping activities, or making preparations to sleep, or storing personal belongings, or making any fire, or using any tents or other structure for sleeping or doing any digging or earth breaking or carrying on cooking activities. CCNV and several individuals filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Park Service, its Director, and the Secretary of the Interior, alleging that the regulations violated the First Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Government. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed. The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for certiorari.
Stephen Shaw performed a dance without clothing at a licensed nightclub. City regulators applied a public nudity ordinance that required dancers to wear pasties and a G-string. The ordinance advanced interests in reducing secondary effects of adult businesses without suppressing the erotic message itself.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.501 U.S. 560 (1991)
Respondents Glen Theatre, Inc. and Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc. operate establishments in South Bend, Indiana, that provide adult entertainment including live performances by nude or seminude dancers viewed through glass panels or on stage.
Darlene Miller worked at the Kitty Kat Lounge on commission and sought to dance totally nude to increase her earnings. Gayle Ann Marie Sutro performed at Glen Theatre after a professional career in dancing and modeling. In 1985 the city enacted an ordinance banning public nudity, defined as the showing of genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female nipples with less than full opaque covering, which required dancers to wear pasties and G-strings.
Respondents filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana alleging that the ordinance violated the First Amendment by prohibiting totally nude dancing. The District Court originally granted respondents' prayer for an injunction, finding that the statute was facially overbroad. On remand after the Seventh Circuit's initial reversal, the District Court concluded that the type of dancing these plaintiffs wish to perform is not expressive activity protected by the Constitution of the United States. It rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. The case was again appealed to the Seventh Circuit, and a panel of that court reversed the District Court, holding that the nude dancing involved here was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether nude dancing is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.
How does symbolic speech differ from pure speech under the First Amendment?
Pure speech consists of words or printed communications that receive the strongest protection. Symbolic speech involves nonverbal conduct that conveys a message and receives protection only when the government targets the communicative aspect rather than an independent nonspeech interest.
What test applies when a regulation burdens symbolic speech?
A regulation survives if it lies within the government's constitutional power, furthers an important or substantial interest unrelated to suppressing expression, and restricts speech no more than essential to that interest.
Does flag burning qualify as protected symbolic speech?
Flag burning receives protection when performed as political expression. A statute aimed at the communicative impact of the act is unconstitutional absent an imminent breach of the peace or another compelling nonspeech interest.
When may schools restrict student symbolic speech?
Schools may prohibit symbolic expression only upon a showing that the conduct would materially and substantially disrupt school operations or invade the rights of others. A policy whose sole purpose is to suppress the message is invalid.
Is nude dancing protected as symbolic speech?
Nude dancing lies within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment though only marginally so. A generally applicable public nudity law that furthers interests in combating secondary effects unrelated to the erotic message may be enforced.
505 U.S. 377 (1992)
…granted certiorari. 501 U.S. 1203 (1991). The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Texas v. Johnson , 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); United States v. Eichman , 496 U.S. 310, 318–319 (1990). Content-based regulations are…