Also known as: tack · tacks · tacked
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A doctrine permitting successive periods of adverse possession or prescriptive use to be combined when the possessors are in privity. Privity exists through a direct relationship such as a conveyance of the benefited estate. The combined periods satisfy the statutory requirement of continuous possession or use.
A doctrine permitting successive periods of adverse possession or prescriptive use to be combined when the possessors are in privity. Privity exists through a direct relationship such as a conveyance of the benefited estate. The combined periods satisfy the statutory requirement of continuous possession or use.
A doctrine allowing a trademark owner to claim the priority date of an earlier mark when the later mark is the legal equivalent and consumers regard the two as essentially the same. The new mark must serve the same identificatory function without creating a gap in use.
1 common questions
A doctrine allowing a trademark owner to claim the priority date of an earlier mark when the later mark is the legal equivalent and consumers regard the two as essentially the same. The new mark must serve the same identificatory function without creating a gap in use.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Tanner Thompson bought lakeside property believing the fence marked the true boundary. His predecessor had occupied the disputed strip for twelve years under the same mistaken belief. When Tobias Thomas challenged the claim after ten more years, the periods combined because the successive owners were in privity through the deed transfer.
Thomas Thompson used a trail across neighboring land for nine years. He then conveyed his parcel to Tessa Takahashi, who continued the identical use for another six years. Because the transfer conveyed the benefited estate, the periods tacked to establish a prescriptive servitude.
Taliah Tang acquired a painting from a seller who had held it adversely for seven years. She maintained possession for another eight years before the original owner sued. The consecutive periods combined through privity created by the sale, satisfying the limitations period for title.
Georgia O'Keeffe, a renowned artist, had three paintings stolen from An American Place gallery in New York in March 1946. The gallery was operated by her husband Alfred Stieglitz. The paintings subject to this action are "Seaweed" and "Cliffs," with a third painting "Fragments" also missing. O'Keeffe did not report the theft to the police or advertise the loss, though she discussed it with associates. Stieglitz died in the summer of 1946. In 1947 O'Keeffe retained Doris Bry to help settle the estate. Bry urged reporting the loss, but O'Keeffe declined. In 1972, O'Keeffe authorized Bry to report the theft to the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc., which maintains a registry of stolen paintings. In September 1975, O'Keeffe learned that the paintings were in the Andrew Crispo Gallery in New York on consignment from Bernard Danenberg Galleries. On February 11, 1976, O'Keeffe discovered that Ulrich A. Frank had sold the paintings to Barry Snyder for $35,000. She demanded their return, but Snyder refused. O'Keeffe filed her complaint for replevin in March 1976 against Snyder, who impleaded Frank as a third-party defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment to Snyder on the ground that the action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed and entered judgment for O'Keeffe. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification to consider the issues. Frank traces his possession of the paintings to his father, Dr. Frank, who died in 1968, claiming to have seen them in his father's apartment as early as 1941-1943. Snyder purchased the paintings from Frank in 1975. There are factual disputes regarding the circumstances of the paintings' disappearance and acquisition.
View caseTalia Torres crossed a private road on adjacent property for eight years while operating her store. After selling the store to Thunderbolt Motors, the company continued the identical crossing for seven more years. The successive uses by parties in privity satisfied the prescriptive period for an easement.
Tobias Thomas occupied a shoreline cabin each summer for fourteen years under a mistaken deed description. He sold the cabin to Trinity Pharmaceuticals, whose officers continued the seasonal use for six additional years. The combined periods met the statutory requirement because the parties shared privity through the conveyance.
Land surveying errors led to a mismatch between deed descriptions and actual occupations on the shore of Hood Canal in Mason County. As long ago as 1932, McCall resided in the house now occupied by the Kuntos under a deed describing a 50-foot-wide parcel that was adjacent to the lot where the house stood. Several property owners to the west of defendants were similarly situated. Since 1946, several conveyances occurred using the same legal description accompanied by transfer of possession to succeeding occupants. The Kuntos' immediate predecessors, the Millers, had a survey performed to build a dock which indicated conformity between deed and occupation, leading to placement of boundary stakes and construction of improvements. The Kuntos took possession of the disputed property under a deed from the Millers in 1959. In 1960, the Howards, who held land east of the Kuntos, undertook a survey to convey an undivided one-half interest to the Yearlys. The survey revealed that the Howards were record owners of land occupied by the Moyers and the Moyers held record title to land occupied by the Kuntos. In April 1960, Howard obtained a conveyance from Moyer of the land upon which the Kunto house stood in exchange for conveying the land upon which the Moyer house stood. Until that conveyance, neither Moyer nor predecessors asserted any right to the property possessed by Kunto and predecessors. Plaintiffs instituted this action to quiet title on August 19, 1960, when defendants had been in occupancy of the disputed property less than a year. The trial court denied the Kuntos' claim of adverse possession, finding a lack of continuity of possession or estate to permit tacking and that defendants' possession was not continuous because it involved only summer occupancy. Defendants appealed from the decree quieting title in the plaintiffs.
Tessa Takahashi maintained a fence enclosing extra acreage for eleven years. After conveying the parcel to Triumph Manufacturing, the company continued the identical enclosure and use for nine more years. The successive adverse periods combined through the deed transfer to quiet title in the company.
3 common questions
Privity exists when one possessor transfers the benefited estate to the next by deed, will, or intestacy. The doctrine then combines the periods to meet the statutory requirement. Without such a relationship, an interruption resets the clock.
Supporting sources
Seasonal use consistent with the nature of the property satisfies continuity. Courts treat summer occupancy of recreational land the same as year-round use of other parcels. The periods still tack when privity exists.
Supporting sources
Yes. Successive users may tack periods when a transfer conveys either the inchoate servitude or the benefited estate. The use must remain open and without effective interruption throughout the combined period.
Supporting sources
Trademark tacking requires the marks to be legal equivalents that consumers view as the same. Property tacking requires privity between successive possessors. Both doctrines preserve priority or time already accrued but operate under distinct tests.
Supporting sources
…question because the law’s breadth made it unconstitutional under any standard. The majority could easily have taken Ladue ’s tack here. The Town of Gilbert’s defense of its sign ordinance—most notably, the law’s distinctions between directional signs and others—does not pass strict scrutiny, or intermediate scrutiny,…