Also known as: toll the statute of limitations · tolling statute of limitations · tolled statute of limitations · tolling · equitable tolling
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A legal mechanism that suspends or extends the period within which a claim must be brought. The mechanism prevents the limitations period from running during periods of incapacity, concealment, discovery delays, or other specified equitable circumstances.
Tanner Thompson, a citizen of State A, slipped at a resort owned by an out-of-state corporation and filed a diversity action in federal court in State B after the normal personal-injury period expired. State B tolls limitations while a plaintiff is incapacitated. The federal court applies the state tolling rule because ignoring it would produce a different outcome than in state court.
Tobias Thomas, an art collector, sues to recover a painting stolen decades earlier and held by a gallery. The owner had searched diligently but could not locate the work or identify the possessor. Under the discovery rule the limitations period does not begin until the owner reasonably discovers the possessor's identity, so the action proceeds.
Georgia O'Keeffe, a renowned artist, had three paintings stolen from An American Place gallery in New York in March 1946. The gallery was operated by her husband Alfred Stieglitz. The paintings subject to this action are "Seaweed" and "Cliffs," with a third painting "Fragments" also missing. O'Keeffe did not report the theft to the police or advertise the loss, though she discussed it with associates. Stieglitz died in the summer of 1946. In 1947 O'Keeffe retained Doris Bry to help settle the estate. Bry urged reporting the loss, but O'Keeffe declined. In 1972, O'Keeffe authorized Bry to report the theft to the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc., which maintains a registry of stolen paintings. In September 1975, O'Keeffe learned that the paintings were in the Andrew Crispo Gallery in New York on consignment from Bernard Danenberg Galleries. On February 11, 1976, O'Keeffe discovered that Ulrich A. Frank had sold the paintings to Barry Snyder for $35,000. She demanded their return, but Snyder refused. O'Keeffe filed her complaint for replevin in March 1976 against Snyder, who impleaded Frank as a third-party defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment to Snyder on the ground that the action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed and entered judgment for O'Keeffe. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification to consider the issues. Frank traces his possession of the paintings to his father, Dr. Frank, who died in 1968, claiming to have seen them in his father's apartment as early as 1941-1943. Snyder purchased the paintings from Frank in 1975. There are factual disputes regarding the circumstances of the paintings' disappearance and acquisition.
View caseTalia Torres challenges a state toll schedule in federal court on constitutional grounds. While administrative proceedings concerning the same schedule remain pending, the limitations period for her federal claim is suspended. The court treats the tolling as preserving the claim until the administrative process concludes.
During the period of World War II a housing shortage developed in many areas. Heavy demobilization of veterans after the war and the allocation of building materials to military projects during hostilities contributed to a continuing deficit in housing. On December 31, 1946, the President issued a proclamation that terminated hostilities though it recognized that a state of war still existed. Congress responded by enacting the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 which became effective on July 1, 1947. The following day the appellee Cloyd W. Miller Co. demanded increases of 40% and 60% for rental accommodations in the Cleveland Defense-Rental Area. This action violated the maximum rent provisions of the Act and the regulations adopted under it. Appellant Woods as Housing Expediter instituted this proceeding under section 206(b) of the Act to enjoin the violations. A preliminary injunction was granted but after a hearing it was dissolved and a permanent injunction was denied. The district court was of the view that the authority of Congress to regulate rents by virtue of the war power ended with the Presidential Proclamation terminating hostilities on December 31, 1946. It also concluded that Congress did not act under the war power because it did not say so. It also held that the Act lacks in uniformity of application and distinctly constitutes a delegation of legislative power not within the grant of Congress because of the authorization to the Housing Expediter to lift controls in any area before the Act's expiration. The district court expressed the view that rent control is not within the war power because the emergency created by housing shortage came into existence long before the war. The case came before the Supreme Court on direct appeal under the Act of August 24, 1937 from the judgment of the district court holding Title II of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 unconstitutional.
View caseTrevor Tate receives written assurances during settlement talks that a contract nonrenewal will be reconsidered. Relying on those assurances, he delays filing until after the general limitations period has run but within the time permitted by the state's reliance-tolling rule. The court applies the tolling provision and treats the action as timely.
On June 2, 1980, Robert Thomas filed a complaint for divorce based upon indignities. On July 22, 1980, Ruth Thomas filed an application to proceed under the new Divorce Code, which the trial court granted. On December 19, 1980, she filed a petition for counseling, and the trial court ordered the parties to participate in counseling sessions, which they completed. Robert Thomas moved out of the marital residence on March 1, 1980. On May 6, 1983, he filed an amended complaint and affidavit pursuant to Section 201(d) alleging that the parties had lived separate and apart for three years and that their marriage was irretrievably broken. On May 20, 1983, Ruth Thomas filed a counter-affidavit denying that the parties had lived separate and apart for three years. A hearing was held before the trial court on August 15, 1983. At the hearing, Robert Thomas testified that he returned to the marital residence numerous times to visit his son and that the parties engaged in sexual intercourse approximately a dozen times during the separation period. He stated that his visits were prompted by suggestions of the marriage counselor and his wife's threats to curtail his visits with their son. Ruth Thomas testified that the parties engaged in sexual intercourse approximately 33 times during the separation and that it was her feeling that the sexual activities were attempts at making the marriage work. She stated that her husband told her that he was mixed up and that she initiated a few of his visits. Both parties testified that the last sexual encounter occurred in December of 1982. On August 22, 1983, the trial court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the divorce. Appellant's exceptions to the order were dismissed by the court en banc, and the order denying the divorce was approved on October 17, 1983. This appeal timely followed.
View caseState statutes of limitations and their associated tolling rules are treated as substantive for Erie purposes. A federal court sitting in diversity must apply them when ignoring the state rule would materially change the outcome of the litigation.
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Yes. When the state rule defines when the limitations period begins or is tolled, the federal court must apply it because the rule is outcome-determinative and therefore substantive under Erie.
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The period is tolled while the claim is pending in federal court and for thirty days after dismissal unless state law provides a longer period.
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No. Rule 3 addresses only when an action is commenced and does not govern tolling. The federal court must look to state law on that question.
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