traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
/truh-DISH-uh-nuhl NOH-shuhns uv FAIR PLAY and sub-STAN-shuhl JUS-tis/
Also known as:fair play and substantial justice · traditional notions of fair play · Int'l Shoe standard · due process jurisdiction test
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional standard requiring that a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum such that the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The standard evaluates the quality and nature of the defendant's contacts, the burden on the defendant, the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute, and the plaintiff's interest in convenient relief.
See Our Sources· 2 primary sources
Cases
Restatements
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Indemnity Claim Against Foreign Manufacturer
SuriHeat, a Malaysian company, sells deep fryers only to a Canadian distributor that resells them nationwide. After a fryer explodes in a Midwestern restaurant, the restaurant sues the distributor in state court. The distributor then brings a third-party indemnity claim against SuriHeat. The court dismisses the indemnity claim because SuriHeat's mere awareness that its products might reach the forum through an independent distributor does not create minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy fair play and substantial justice when the forum's interest in the foreign-to-foreign reimbursement dispute is minimal.
Sales Representatives Creating Contacts
International Shoe sends sales representatives into Washington to solicit orders for shoes. The representatives take samples and travel throughout the state, though contracts are accepted only in Missouri. When Washington sues the company for unemployment contributions, the Court holds that the repeated solicitation activities establish minimum contacts with the forum so that requiring the company to defend there does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Child Support Action Against Out-of-State Father
Kulko, a New York resident, allows his children to live with their mother in California after she moves there. The mother later sues Kulko in California for increased child support. The Court concludes that Kulko's consent to the children's relocation does not constitute purposeful availment of California benefits sufficient to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, so California lacks personal jurisdiction over him.
Kulko v. Superior Courtsupra, 436 U.S., at 94-95
Ezra Kulko married Sharon Kulko Horn in 1959 during a three-day stopover in California while en route from a military base in Texas to Korea. Both parties were New York domiciliaries who returned to New York after the marriage and Ezra's service. Their children Darwin and Ilsa were born in New York in 1961 and 1962. The family lived together in New York City until their separation in March 1972.
Following the separation, Sharon moved to San Francisco, California. In September 1972, Sharon flew to New York to sign a separation agreement providing that the children would spend school years with their father and vacations with their mother in exchange for $3,000 annual child support payments during her custody periods. Sharon obtained a Haitian divorce incorporating the agreement and returned to California, where she remarried.
The children resided with their father during the school year until December 1973, when Ilsa remained in California after her father bought her a one-way ticket. In January 1976 Darwin flew to California using a ticket sent by his mother.
Less than one month after Darwin's arrival, Sharon commenced an action in California Superior Court to establish the Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment, modify it to award her full custody, and increase the father's child-support obligations. Ezra appeared specially and moved to quash service on the ground that he lacked sufficient minimum contacts with California. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court sustained the rulings in a 4-2 decision before Ezra appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Stock Ownership Alone Insufficient
Heitner brings a shareholder derivative suit in Delaware against officers and directors of a Delaware corporation. The defendants own stock in the corporation but have no other contacts with Delaware. The Court holds that the mere presence of the defendants' stock in Delaware does not create minimum contacts with the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Shaffer v. Heitner433 U.S. 186 (1977)
On May 22, 1974, appellee Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware who owned one share of stock in the Greyhound Corporation, filed a shareholder's derivative suit in the Court of Chancery for New Castle County, Delaware. The complaint named as defendants Greyhound Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight present or former officers and directors of one or both corporations. Heitner alleged that the individual defendants had violated their fiduciary duties by causing the corporations to engage in activities that resulted in a private antitrust judgment of over thirteen million dollars and a criminal contempt fine of six hundred thousand dollars, both arising from events in Oregon. The individual defendants resided primarily in Arizona and conducted their business there.
Simultaneously with the complaint, Heitner filed a motion for sequestration of the Delaware property of the individual defendants pursuant to Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, § 366. The Court of Chancery granted the motion the same day and appointed a sequestrator who seized approximately eighty-two thousand shares of Greyhound common stock belonging to nineteen defendants, along with options belonging to two others and certain debentures, warrants, and stock unit credits. The stock certificates were not physically present in Delaware, but Del. Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 169 deemed the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations to be in the state, allowing the sequestrator to place stop-transfer orders on the corporation's books. The value of the sequestered stock was approximately one point two million dollars.
All twenty-eight defendants received notice of the suit by certified mail to their last known addresses and by publication in a New Castle County newspaper. The twenty-one defendants whose property had been seized entered special appearances and moved to quash service of process and vacate the sequestration order. They argued that the ex parte sequestration procedure violated due process and that they lacked sufficient contacts with Delaware to sustain jurisdiction. The Court of Chancery rejected these arguments in a letter opinion, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A. 2d 225 (1976).
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument on February 22, 1977. The individual defendants whose property was seized became the appellants before the Court. Greyhound Corporation and its subsidiary appeared in the action and moved to dismiss on the ground that the sequestration statute was unconstitutional. The sequestration order remained in effect pending resolution of the constitutional questions presented.
Service on Transient Defendant
Burnham, a New Jersey resident, visits California on business and is served with divorce papers while there. He challenges California's jurisdiction, arguing that his brief presence does not satisfy the minimum contacts test. The Court holds that service on a physically present defendant remains a traditional basis for jurisdiction that comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice without further inquiry into contacts.
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin495 U.S. 604, 618, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990)
Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia. In 1977 the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two children were born. In July 1987 the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to California, was visiting her parents in that State when she filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking spousal and child support, custody of the children, and possession of the family home.
In early August 1987 petitioner visited Mrs. Burnham in California to discuss the children and the separation. He took the children to San Francisco for a few days. Upon returning the children to Mrs. Burnham, petitioner was served with a summons and complaint for divorce filed in California Superior Court that also sought custody of the children. After being served, petitioner returned to New Jersey.
In January 1988 petitioner made a special appearance in the California action and moved to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the State Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts.
Libel Suit Against National Magazine
Keeton, a New York resident, sues Hustler Magazine in New Hampshire for libel published nationwide. Hustler has no offices or employees in New Hampshire but distributes thousands of copies there each month. The Court holds that the regular circulation of the magazine in the forum creates minimum contacts with the state so that exercising jurisdiction over the libel claim does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)
Kathy Keeton, a resident of New York who assists in producing a magazine bearing her name in several places crediting her with editorial and other work, sued Hustler Magazine, Inc., an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in California, in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire.
She alleged jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship and claimed to have been libeled in five separate issues of the magazine published between September 1975 and May 1976. Prior to the New Hampshire action, Keeton had initially brought suit for libel and invasion of privacy in Ohio, where the magazine was published, but her libel claim was dismissed as barred by the Ohio statute of limitations and her invasion-of-privacy claim was dismissed as barred by the New York statute of limitations.
Hustler Magazine's contacts with New Hampshire consist of the sale of some 10,000 to 15,000 copies of the magazine in that State each month. Keeton's only connection with New Hampshire is the circulation there of copies of the magazine that she assists in producing. The District Court dismissed her suit because it believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the application of New Hampshire’s long-arm statute to acquire personal jurisdiction over the respondent. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal in 1982.
The Court of Appeals observed that the single publication rule would require awarding damages caused in all states. It also stressed New Hampshire’s unusually long six-year limitations period for libel actions. New Hampshire was the only State where the suit would not have been time-barred when filed in October 1980. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1983.
5 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What role does the fair play and substantial justice standard play in the personal jurisdiction analysis?
The standard supplies the ultimate constitutional limit on a state's exercise of personal jurisdiction. Even when minimum contacts exist, a court must still determine whether requiring the defendant to litigate in the forum would be reasonable in light of the burden on the defendant, the forum's interest, and the plaintiff's interest in convenient relief.
Does placing a product into the stream of commerce automatically satisfy the fair play and substantial justice standard?
No. Mere awareness that a product may reach the forum through an independent distributor is not alone sufficient to establish minimum contacts. In addition, even if contacts are found, the fairness factors may render jurisdiction unreasonable when the forum's interest is slight and the burden on a foreign defendant is severe.
Supporting sources
How does the standard differ from the old territorial power approach?
The standard replaced rigid territorial rules based on physical presence with a flexible inquiry into the defendant's contacts with the forum and the reasonableness of requiring defense there. The focus shifted from whether the defendant could be served inside the state to whether the contacts make jurisdiction fair and just.
Supporting sources
When may a court still exercise jurisdiction even without extensive forum contacts?
Jurisdiction remains proper when the defendant is physically present in the forum and served there, because that traditional basis of jurisdiction continues to satisfy due process without further minimum-contacts analysis.
Supporting sources
What factors does a court weigh under the fair play and substantial justice inquiry?
A court considers the burden on the defendant of litigating in the forum, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in efficient resolution, and the shared interest of the states in fundamental substantive social policies.
Supporting sources
. The mere presence of property in a state does not automatically confer
jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant. The defendant must…
." The distinction between
jurisdiction
over absent defendants and
jurisdiction
over defendants who are present in the forum at the time of service has been preserved in our jurisprudence.…
.’” International
Shoe
Co. v. Washington , 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer , 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940). I On September 23, 1978, on Interstate Highway 80 in…
Civil ProcedureJurisdiction and venue · Personal jurisdictionUBEFoundational