Also known as: transitory action
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A quality of gestures or confinements that are brief or passing in nature. Publication by such gestures constitutes slander rather than libel. A merely transitory confinement does not create liability without the requisite intent.
A quality of gestures or confinements that are brief or passing in nature. Publication by such gestures constitutes slander rather than libel. A merely transitory confinement does not create liability without the requisite intent.
A characteristic of actions or causes of action that follow the defendant and may be brought in any forum where the defendant is found. Venue statutes determine proper forum without regard to whether an action is local or transitory in nature.
A characteristic of actions or causes of action that follow the defendant and may be brought in any forum where the defendant is found. Venue statutes determine proper forum without regard to whether an action is local or transitory in nature.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Tori Taylor stood on a public sidewalk and shouted false accusations that Tiffany Torres had stolen client funds. The statements reached several bystanders who repeated them to others in the community. Because the defamatory matter was conveyed by spoken words and transitory gestures rather than written form, the court classified the claim as slander.
Trevor Tate ordered orderlies to wheel Thaddeus Tran into a supply room and close the door for twenty minutes while a supervisor reviewed paperwork. Tran remained awake and aware of the restraint but suffered no physical harm. The court held that the brief, transitory confinement did not support false imprisonment liability absent intent to impose a more serious restraint.
2 common questions
A publication made by spoken words or transitory gestures is classified as slander under the Restatement rule. The classification turns on the form of communication rather than the content alone. Written or embodied forms with lasting qualities are treated as libel instead.
Supporting sources
A merely transitory or harmless confinement does not create liability unless the actor intended the confinement. The plaintiff must also be conscious of the restraint or suffer harm from it. Brief duration alone is not dispositive if intent is present.
Supporting sources
Tonya Takahashi was served with process while attending a one-day conference in California. The plaintiff sued on a contract claim that arose entirely in New York. The court upheld personal jurisdiction because the cause of action was transitory and followed the defendant into the forum where she was found.
Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia. In 1977 the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two children were born. In July 1987 the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to California, was visiting her parents in that State when she filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking spousal and child support, custody of the children, and possession of the family home. In early August 1987 petitioner visited Mrs. Burnham in California to discuss the children and the separation. He took the children to San Francisco for a few days. Upon returning the children to Mrs. Burnham, petitioner was served with a summons and complaint for divorce filed in California Superior Court that also sought custody of the children. After being served, petitioner returned to New Jersey. In January 1988 petitioner made a special appearance in the California action and moved to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the State Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts.
View caseTristan Thompson, a resident of State A, was sued in State B on a debt incurred in State A. The court in State B entertained the transitory cause of action because the obligation created by the law of State A was enforceable wherever the defendant could be found.
In 1993 Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by enacting the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which directed the Attorney General to create a national instant background-check system by November 30, 1998, and imposed interim requirements on firearms dealers and chief law enforcement officers until that system became operational. Under the interim scheme a dealer proposing to transfer a handgun had to obtain a sworn Brady Form from the purchaser, verify the purchaser's identity, forward notice and a copy of the form to the CLEO of the purchaser's residence, and wait five business days before completing the sale unless the CLEO notified the dealer that the transfer would not violate the law. Jay Printz, CLEO for Ravalli County, Montana, and Richard Mack, CLEO for Graham County, Arizona, filed separate federal actions challenging the constitutionality of the interim provisions that required CLEOs to perform background checks and related tasks. In each case the district court held that the obligation imposed on CLEOs was unconstitutional but severable from the remainder of the Act, leaving in place a voluntary background-check system. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act's interim provisions violated the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
True North Logistics challenged the admissibility of an identification made after its employee was placed in a lineup without counsel. The court rejected the argument that fleeting, transitory notions of fairness could override the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at that critical stage.
On September 21, 1964, a federally insured bank in Eustace, Texas, was robbed when a man wearing a small strip of tape on each side of his face entered the bank, pointed a pistol at the female cashier and the vice president, and forced them to fill a pillowcase with the bank's money before driving away with an accomplice waiting in a stolen car outside. On March 23, 1965, an indictment was returned charging respondent Billy Joe Wade with conspiring to rob the bank and with the robbery itself. Wade was arrested on April 2, 1965, and counsel was appointed to represent him on April 26, 1965. Fifteen days later, on May 11, 1965, an FBI agent arranged a lineup at the local county courthouse without notifying Wade's counsel; Wade stood with five or six other prisoners, each wearing strips of tape on his face, and each was directed to say words such as "put the money in the bag." Both bank employees identified Wade at the lineup. At Wade's subsequent trial in federal district court, the two employees identified him in the courtroom on direct examination; on cross-examination they testified about their prior lineup identifications, and an FBI agent who observed the lineup also testified. Wade's counsel moved to strike the courtroom identifications on Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds, but the motion was denied and Wade was convicted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the lineup violated Wade's Sixth Amendment rights, and ordered a new trial at which the in-court identification evidence would be excluded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Torchlight Media argued that a newly elected school board could reverse a prior compulsory flag-salute policy. The court explained that the board's authority derived from the continuous legislative body rather than from the transitory individuals who happened to hold office at any given moment.
Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require all schools in the state to conduct courses of instruction in history, civics, and the Constitutions of the United States and West Virginia for the purpose of teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the ideals, principles, and spirit of Americanism. The State Board of Education was directed to prescribe the courses of study covering these subjects for public schools. Private, parochial, and denominational schools were required to prescribe similar courses. On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution ordering that the salute to the flag become a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools, with all teachers and pupils required to participate. The resolution specified the stiff-arm salute with the right hand raised and palm turned up while repeating the pledge: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Refusal to salute was defined as an act of insubordination to be dealt with by expulsion. Readmission was denied by statute until compliance. The expelled child was treated as unlawfully absent. Parents or guardians faced prosecution with fines not exceeding $50 and jail terms not exceeding thirty days. The appellees are citizens of the United States and West Virginia who are Jehovah's Witnesses, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which prohibits making or bowing down to any graven image or likeness. They consider the flag an image within this command, leading them to refuse to salute it on religious grounds. Children of the appellees who were pupils in the public schools were expelled for their refusal to salute the flag and take the pledge of allegiance. Their parents were prosecuted for causing delinquency. Officials threatened to send the children to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles. The appellees brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated to enjoin enforcement of the laws and regulations against them. The Board of Education moved to dismiss the complaint setting forth these facts. The complaint alleged that the law and regulations denied religious freedom and freedom of speech and were invalid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Court of three judges, which restrained enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class. The Board of Education brought the case to the Supreme Court by direct appeal.
2 common questions
A transitory cause of action may be brought in any forum where the defendant is found and properly served. This principle allows suit on personal claims even when the underlying events occurred elsewhere. It contrasts with local actions tied to specific property.
Supporting sources
The statute provides that venue is determined without regard to whether the action is local or transitory. This eliminates any distinction based on the nature of the claim for venue purposes. Proper venue is instead based on residence, events, or property location.
Supporting sources
…198 U. S. 215 (1905), that the interest of a creditor in a debt could be extinguished or otherwise affected by any State having transitory jurisdiction over the debtor. Shaffer v. Heitner , 433 U. S. 186 (1977). Having interred the mechanical rule that a creditor's amenability to a quasi in rem action travels with his…