Also known as: triers of fact · trier-of-fact · finder of fact · fact finder · fact-finder
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The person or group responsible for determining the facts in a legal proceeding. This role belongs to a jury when one is empaneled or to a judge in a bench trial. The trier of fact weighs evidence, assesses credibility, and resolves disputed issues of fact.
Tessa Takahashi sued Titan Industries after a workplace accident. An engineer offered testimony about the machine's design tolerances. The testimony supplied specialized knowledge that allowed the jury to understand the mechanical evidence and decide whether the design was defective.
Tobias Thomas faced theft charges in a non-jury trial. After hearing all the evidence the judge found the prosecution had not proved every element. The judge's not-guilty finding constituted an acquittal that barred a second prosecution on the same facts.
Tiana Tan prevailed on a fraud claim against Terra Financial. The jury reviewed the defendant's deliberate misrepresentations, the extent of the plaintiff's losses, and the company's substantial net worth before setting the punitive award.
Theo Thomas stood trial for embezzlement. A psychiatrist attempted to testify that the defendant lacked the intent to defraud. The court excluded the opinion because the question of mens rea belonged exclusively to the jury.
Tiffany Torres's family sought to discontinue life support. The court examined written statements and prior conversations to decide whether clear and convincing evidence showed the patient's wishes. The judge's factual determination controlled the outcome.
On the night of January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan lost control of her car as she traveled down Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri. The vehicle overturned, and Cruzan was discovered lying face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or cardiac function. Paramedics were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat at the accident site, and she was transported to a hospital in an unconscious state. An attending neurosurgeon diagnosed her as having sustained probable cerebral contusions compounded by significant anoxia. The Missouri trial court found that permanent brain damage generally results after six minutes in an anoxic state, and it was estimated that Cruzan was deprived of oxygen from twelve to fourteen minutes. She remained in a coma for approximately three weeks and then progressed to an unconscious state in which she was able to orally ingest some nutrition. Surgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan with the consent of her then husband. Subsequent rehabilitative efforts proved unavailing. She now lies in a Missouri state hospital in what is commonly referred to as a persistent vegetative state in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. The State of Missouri is bearing the cost of her care. After it had become apparent that Nancy Cruzan had virtually no chance of regaining her mental faculties, her parents Lester and Joyce Cruzan, who serve as coguardians, asked hospital employees to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures. All agree that such a removal would cause her death. The employees refused to honor the request without court approval. The parents then sought and received authorization from the state trial court for termination. The trial court found that a person in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions to refuse or direct the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures. The court also found that Nancy's expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in conversation with a housemate friend suggested that given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed by a divided vote. The court recognized a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent but expressed skepticism about the application of that doctrine in the circumstances of this case. The court found that Cruzan's statements to her roommate regarding her desire to live or die under those conditions were unreliable for determining her intent and thus insufficient to support the coguardians' claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's behalf. It rejected the argument that Cruzan's parents were entitled to order the termination of her medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing inherently reliable evidence absent here. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circumstances.
View caseTori Taylor faced juvenile delinquency charges. The court instructed the fact finder that the prosecution must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction shaped how the judge evaluated the evidence before reaching a verdict.
During a 1967 adjudicatory hearing conducted pursuant to section 742 of the New York Family Court Act, a judge in New York Family Court found that the twelve-year-old appellant had entered a locker and stolen one hundred twelve dollars from a woman's pocketbook. The petition which charged appellant with delinquency alleged that his act, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime or crimes of larceny. The judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but relied on section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provides that any determination at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing that a juvenile did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. After a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of eighteen months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment until his eighteenth birthday, six years in appellant's case. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed by a four-to-three vote, expressly sustaining the constitutionality of section 744(b). The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseIn a bench trial the judge alone serves as the trier of fact. The judge must assess witness credibility, weigh conflicting evidence, and resolve all factual disputes before applying the law.
The trier of fact decides only factual issues. The judge decides questions of law such as the admissibility of evidence, the elements of a claim, and the proper legal standard to apply.
An expert may not state an opinion on an ultimate issue that the trier of fact must decide, such as whether a criminal defendant possessed the required mental state. Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) expressly reserves that determination for the trier of fact alone.
The trier of fact must be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard impresses upon the fact finder the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude before convicting the defendant.
Interpretation of an integrated written agreement is normally a question of law for the court. When interpretation depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or a choice among reasonable inferences, the issue becomes one for the trier of fact.
…"preponderance of the evidence" and "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" are quantitatively imprecise, they do communicate to the finder of fact different notions concerning the degree of confidence he is expected to have in the correctness of his factual conclusions. A second proposition, which is really nothing more than a…