Also known as: 21st Amendment · Twenty First Amendment · Amendment XXI · XXI Amendment
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional amendment that repealed nationwide prohibition and authorizes states to regulate the transportation or importation of intoxicating liquors for delivery or use within their borders. The amendment does not grant states unlimited power to enact laws that discriminate against out-of-state economic actors or regulate commerce occurring wholly outside their borders. Limits from the dormant Commerce Clause and other constitutional provisions continue to apply to state alcohol regulations.
Thomas Thompson, an out-of-state beer distributor, challenges a state law requiring him to certify that his in-state prices are no higher than those charged elsewhere. The law forces Thompson to adjust pricing decisions made entirely in other states to maintain access to the local market. The Twenty-First Amendment does not shield the statute because it reaches extraterritorial commerce and violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
Tanya Tang, a state transportation official, seeks federal highway grants that require her state to raise the minimum drinking age to twenty-one. The state legislature enacts the change to receive the funds even though it prefers a lower age. The Twenty-First Amendment does not prevent Congress from using the spending power to attach the alcohol-related condition because the condition relates directly to highway safety.
Talia Torres owns an out-of-state winery that cannot ship directly to consumers under a state statute allowing only in-state wineries that privilege. Torres must route all orders through a local distributor that adds substantial fees. The Twenty-First Amendment does not justify the origin-based distinction because the law discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Tyrone Tran, a state legislator, debates whether to ratify a proposed constitutional amendment repealing prohibition. The legislature completes ratification within months, following the pattern of prior successful amendments. The Twenty-First Amendment takes effect once the required number of states approve it, restoring state authority over liquor regulation.
Tiffany Torres, owner of a liquor store chain, attacks a state ban on price advertising for alcoholic beverages on First Amendment grounds. The state defends the ban by invoking its power under the Twenty-First Amendment to promote temperance. The amendment does not insulate the restriction from ordinary commercial-speech scrutiny when the ban fails to advance the asserted interest in reduced consumption.
In 1956, the Rhode Island Legislature enacted two separate prohibitions against advertising in any manner the price of alcoholic beverages offered for sale in the state. The first prohibition applied to vendors licensed in Rhode Island and to out-of-state manufacturers, wholesalers, and shippers. The second applied to the Rhode Island news media. In 1985 the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed and upheld the constitutionality of the first ban in two separate cases. Petitioners 44 Liquormart, Inc. and Peoples Super Liquor Stores, Inc. are licensed retailers of alcoholic beverages. 44 Liquormart operates a store in Rhode Island. Peoples operates stores in Massachusetts that Rhode Island residents frequent. In 1991, 44 Liquormart placed an advertisement in a Rhode Island newspaper. The ad stated that state law prohibited advertising liquor prices. It displayed the word WOW next to pictures of vodka and rum bottles along with low prices for peanuts, potato chips, and Schweppes mixers. The Rhode Island Liquor Control Administrator assessed a four-hundred-dollar fine against 44 Liquormart. After paying the fine, 44 Liquormart and Peoples filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the two statutes and the administrator's implementing Regulation 34 violated the First Amendment. It also asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties stipulated that the price advertising ban was vigorously enforced. Rhode Island permitted all advertising of alcoholic beverages except price references outside licensed premises. The proposed advertisements concerned lawful activity and would not be false or misleading. The district court heard conflicting expert testimony and reviewed multiple studies. It found as a fact that the ban had no significant impact on levels of alcohol consumption in Rhode Island. The district court held the statutes unconstitutional in 1993. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district court judgment. The full court sitting en banc later affirmed the result after rehearing in 1995. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1995 because of the importance of the questions presented.
View caseTobias Thomas, a male under twenty-one, seeks to purchase 3.2 percent beer that state law permits only for females of the same age. The state claims the Twenty-First Amendment authorizes gender distinctions in alcohol regulation. The amendment does not override equal-protection requirements when the gender classification lacks a substantial relation to traffic-safety objectives.
In December 1972, appellant Craig, a male between the ages of 18 and 21, was arrested in Oklahoma for possessing and consuming 3.2% beer while under the age of 21. Subsequently, Craig and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer in Oklahoma City, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Oklahoma statute at issue, Okla. Stat., Tit. 37, §§ 241 and 245, prohibited the sale of nonintoxicating 3.2% beer to males under 21 years of age and to females under 18 years of age. Prior to 1972, Oklahoma had set different ages of majority and criminal responsibility for males and females. After a 1972 court decision, the legislature adjusted most age distinctions to 18 for both sexes while retaining the gender differential in the beer statute. A three-judge District Court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 heard the case and upheld the constitutionality of the statutory differential, dismissing the action in 1975. Craig attained the age of 21 after the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, rendering his personal claim moot. The State of Oklahoma introduced statistical surveys of arrest data for driving under the influence and drunkenness, traffic accident statistics, and roadside surveys to support the gender distinction. Whitener, as the vendor subject to sanctions for violations, asserted economic injury from the restriction on her customer base and sought to challenge the law on equal protection grounds on behalf of the affected males.
View caseNo. The amendment authorizes state regulation of liquor importation and use but does not shield laws that discriminate against out-of-state sellers or regulate extraterritorial commerce. Courts continue to apply dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny to such measures.
Yes. Congress may condition federal funds on state adoption of alcohol-related measures such as minimum drinking ages when the conditions relate to the federal interest in the funded program. The amendment does not bar this indirect approach.
No. The amendment does not override equal-protection requirements. Gender classifications in liquor regulations remain subject to intermediate scrutiny and must be substantially related to important governmental objectives.
…important, the statistical surveys offered by the State do not adequately justify the gender distinction. Pp. 197-204. 3. The Twenty-first Amendment does not save the statute from invalidity under the Equal Protection Clause. That Amendment does not allow states to enact gender-discriminatory regulations that would otherwise violate the…