uncontrollable impulse

In 1984, Terry Foucha was charged by Louisiana authorities with aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm. Two medical doctors were appointed to conduct a pretrial examination of Foucha. The doctors initially reported that Foucha lacked mental capacity to proceed, but four months later the trial court found Foucha competent to stand trial. The doctors reported that Foucha was unable to distinguish right from wrong and was insane at the time of the offense. On October 12, 1984, the trial court ruled that Foucha was not guilty by reason of insanity. The court found that Foucha was unable to appreciate the usual, natural and probable consequences of his acts, that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong, that he was a menace to himself and others, and that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crimes and presently insane. Foucha was committed to the East Feliciana Forensic Facility until such time as doctors recommend that he be released and until further order of the court. In 1988, the superintendent of Feliciana recommended that Foucha be discharged or released. A three-member panel was convened at the institution to determine Foucha's current condition and whether he could be released or placed on probation without being a danger to others or himself. On March 21, 1988, the panel reported that there had been no evidence of mental illness since admission and recommended that Foucha be conditionally discharged. The trial judge appointed a two-member sanity commission made up of the same two doctors who had conducted the pretrial examination. Their written report stated that Foucha is presently in remission from mental illness but that they cannot certify that he would not constitute a menace to himself or others if released. One of the doctors testified at a hearing that upon commitment Foucha probably suffered from a drug induced psychosis but that he had recovered from that temporary condition. The doctor testified that Foucha evidenced no signs of psychosis or neurosis and was in good shape mentally. The doctor also testified that Foucha had an antisocial personality, a condition that is not a mental disease and that is untreatable. The doctor further testified that Foucha had been involved in several altercations at Feliciana and that he would not feel comfortable in certifying that Foucha would not be a danger to himself or to other people. After it was stipulated that the other doctor would give essentially the same testimony, the court ruled that Foucha was dangerous to himself and others and ordered him returned to the mental institution. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Foucha had not carried the burden placed upon him by statute to prove that he was not dangerous. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the case presents an important issue and was decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in a manner arguably at odds with prior decisions of this Court.

In 1968, Chicago police officer Richard Nuccio shot and killed a youth named Nelson. State authorities prosecuted Nuccio and obtained a conviction for second-degree murder. The Nelson family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a Chicago attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against Nuccio. Respondent Robert Welch, Inc., publishes American Opinion, a monthly magazine expressing the views of the John Birch Society. In March 1969, the magazine published an article titled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On Police." The article accused Gertz of participating in a Communist conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement, described him as a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter," and claimed he had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, which it portrayed as a Communist organization involved in planning attacks on Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention. The article contained numerous inaccuracies, including the false implication that Gertz had a criminal record. Gertz had served as an officer of the National Lawyers Guild approximately fifteen years earlier but had no involvement in planning the 1968 demonstrations. He had never been a member of the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy or the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. The managing editor of American Opinion made no effort to verify the charges against Gertz before publication and appended an editorial introduction stating that the author had conducted extensive research. Gertz filed a diversity action for libel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court ruled that the statements constituted libel per se under Illinois law. After a trial, the jury awarded Gertz $50,000 in compensatory damages. The district court later entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, applying the New York Times standard. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the application of constitutional standards to defamation of a private individual.

In the predawn hours of June 21, 1990, petitioner R.A.V., then a juvenile, and several other teenagers assembled a crudely made cross by taping together broken chair legs and burned the cross inside the fenced yard of a black family that lived across the street from the house where R.A.V. was staying. Although this conduct could have been punished under several Minnesota statutes carrying significant penalties, the City of St. Paul chose to charge R.A.V. under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance. The ordinance provides that whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. R.A.V. moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that the ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content-based and therefore facially invalid under the First Amendment, and the trial court granted the motion. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, construing the ordinance to reach only fighting words and concluding that it was not impermissibly content-based. This Court granted certiorari.

Leland was charged with murder in the first degree in the Circuit Court of Multnomah County, Oregon. He pleaded not guilty and gave notice of his intention to prove insanity. The jury found him guilty of first degree murder. Because the jury did not recommend life imprisonment, he received a death sentence. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The facts emerged from Leland's confessions corroborated by other evidence. He killed a fifteen-year-old girl by striking her over the head several times with a steel bar and stabbing her twice with a hunting knife. Five days after the crime, after his arrest for automobile theft, Leland asked to speak with a homicide officer. He voluntarily confessed and directed police to the body. That same day he signed a full confession and, at his own request, wrote out another confession by hand. Counsel were appointed after indictment. Oregon law required a defendant pleading insanity to prove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The statute also provided that a morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts formed no defense. The specific statute stated that when the commission of the act charged as a crime is proven, the defense of insanity must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge instructed the jury on lesser included offenses. The jury could return verdicts of guilty of first degree murder, guilty of second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity. A first degree murder verdict required unanimous agreement of all twelve jurors, while an insanity acquittal required only ten. The prosecution bore the burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt throughout the trial. The confession was produced in court five days before the defense rested its case. Counsel and expert witnesses had ample time to study it. The trial judge offered additional time for review, but the offer was refused. The record showed no prejudice from the delayed access. No assignment of error was made on this ground in the motion for a new trial.