Also known as: unjustly · unjustness · inequitable
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An adjective characterizing a result or enrichment that contravenes principles of fairness and equity. It identifies circumstances in which one party obtains a benefit at another's expense without legal or moral justification, triggering restitutionary remedies to restore balance.
Ulysses Ulrich and Umeko Uchida were both held liable in tort for the same injury to a third party. Ulysses paid the full judgment. Because Umeko would retain the benefit of that payment without contributing, equity requires her to indemnify Ulysses to avoid unjust enrichment at his expense.
Ursula Ung and Ulysses Usher held their home as tenants by the entirety. While divorce proceedings were pending, Ursula executed a will devising the house to a third party. Upon Ursula's death the title passed by operation of law to Ulysses. Equity refused to impose a constructive trust because no wrongful conduct or unjust enrichment occurred.
Ugo Uberti obtained a permit and spent substantial sums constructing a commercial building in reliance on existing zoning. The municipality later rezoned the parcel to residential use. Depriving Ugo of the right to complete the project would be inequitable, so the vested-rights doctrine protects the development against the new restriction.
Una Unger discovered that Ultimate Solutions had used her name and life story in an advertising campaign without permission. The company profited from the unauthorized exploitation. The court held that the commercial use unjustly exploited Una's identity and imposed liability for misappropriation.
Ulysses Ulrich offered scientific evidence linking a pharmaceutical product to birth defects. The court applied reliability standards to determine whether admitting the testimony would produce unjust results by allowing recovery without adequate proof of causation.
Two minors brought suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, claiming they suffered limb reduction birth defects because their mothers had taken Bendectin, a drug prescribed for morning sickness to about 17.5 million pregnant women in the United States between 1957 and 1982. Limb reduction defects occur in fewer than one birth out of every 1000. Scientists do not know the mechanism by which any teratogen causes such defects. The plaintiffs offered testimony from three groups of experts. One group proposed to testify to a statistical link between Bendectin ingestion during pregnancy and limb reduction defects based on reanalyses of published studies that had reported no such association. A second group proposed to testify that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects in humans because it causes such defects in laboratory animals. A third group proposed to testify based on the similarity of Bendectin's chemical structure to other drugs suspected of causing birth defects. The district court granted summary judgment to Merrell Dow after excluding the plaintiffs' expert testimony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded for consideration under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. On remand, the Ninth Circuit examined the affidavits and prior trial testimony of the plaintiffs' experts. None of the experts had studied the effect of Bendectin on limb reduction defects before being hired to testify in this or related cases. None had published his work on Bendectin in a scientific journal. The only review their work had received was by judges and juries. Plaintiffs' epidemiological experts made vague assertions of a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and birth defects but did not state that the relative risk exceeded two. With the exception of Dr. Palmer, the remaining experts were willing to testify only that Bendectin is capable of causing birth defects. Dr. Palmer alone was willing to testify that Bendectin did cause the limb defects in each of the children, based on his review of the plaintiffs' medical records and his conclusion that Bendectin is a teratogen.
View caseUmeko Uchida challenged a state statute restricting access to contraceptives. The Court recognized that laws may be unjust or unwise yet still constitutional, and therefore declined to invalidate the measure solely on grounds of perceived unfairness.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961. At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free. The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
View caseThe discharging tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from the other when the discharge prevents unjust enrichment at the indemnitee's expense.
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No. Title passes by operation of law to the surviving spouse absent wrongful conduct or unjust enrichment that would justify a constructive trust.
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A landowner acquires a vested right when substantial expenditures are made in good-faith reliance on a permit or existing zoning such that depriving the right would be inequitable.
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Unauthorized commercial use of a person's identity that unjustly exploits the plaintiff's name or life story creates liability even without defamation.
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Courts apply reliability standards to avoid unjust results that would permit recovery without adequate proof of causation.
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No. Laws may be unjust or unwise yet remain constitutional. Invalidation requires a showing that the measure violates a constitutional provision.
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…constitutional rights. There was weight in this observation; but this power of the Judges did not go far enough. Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect. Let them have a share in the Revisionary…