Also known as: use under claim of right · claimed use by right · claim of right
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
An element of adverse possession or prescriptive easement requiring that the claimant's use of land occur without permission from the owner and under an assertion of ownership or right. The use must be hostile in the sense that it proceeds from a good-faith belief that the land belongs to the claimant rather than from any grant or license.
A defense negating the intent element of theft offenses or limiting justification for the use of force when the actor honestly believes he or she is entitled to the property or is acting to protect a possessory interest. The belief need not be reasonable so long as it is genuine and held in good faith.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
An element of adverse possession or prescriptive easement requiring that the claimant's use of land occur without permission from the owner and under an assertion of ownership or right. The use must be hostile in the sense that it proceeds from a good-faith belief that the land belongs to the claimant rather than from any grant or license.
Ulysses Usher and his predecessors farmed a narrow strip they believed belonged to their parcel because of a misplaced survey stake. They planted crops, grazed cattle, and maintained an irrigation ditch on the strip each growing season for more than the statutory period. When the true owner objected, the court allowed tacking of the successive periods because each possessor had used the land under a good-faith claim of right.
Ulysses Ulrich purchased a lot believing it included an adjacent strip already occupied by his seller. Both he and the seller had used the strip continuously under the same mistaken belief that it belonged to the purchased parcel. The court permitted tacking of the periods because each successive possessor had occupied the land under a claim of right.
Land surveying errors led to a mismatch between deed descriptions and actual occupations on the shore of Hood Canal in Mason County. As long ago as 1932, McCall resided in the house now occupied by the Kuntos under a deed describing a 50-foot-wide parcel that was adjacent to the lot where the house stood. Several property owners to the west of defendants were similarly situated. Since 1946, several conveyances occurred using the same legal description accompanied by transfer of possession to succeeding occupants. The Kuntos' immediate predecessors, the Millers, had a survey performed to build a dock which indicated conformity between deed and occupation, leading to placement of boundary stakes and construction of improvements. The Kuntos took possession of the disputed property under a deed from the Millers in 1959. In 1960, the Howards, who held land east of the Kuntos, undertook a survey to convey an undivided one-half interest to the Yearlys. The survey revealed that the Howards were record owners of land occupied by the Moyers and the Moyers held record title to land occupied by the Kuntos. In April 1960, Howard obtained a conveyance from Moyer of the land upon which the Kunto house stood in exchange for conveying the land upon which the Moyer house stood. Until that conveyance, neither Moyer nor predecessors asserted any right to the property possessed by Kunto and predecessors. Plaintiffs instituted this action to quiet title on August 19, 1960, when defendants had been in occupancy of the disputed property less than a year. The trial court denied the Kuntos' claim of adverse possession, finding a lack of continuity of possession or estate to permit tacking and that defendants' possession was not continuous because it involved only summer occupancy. Defendants appealed from the decree quieting title in the plaintiffs.
2 common questions
A claim of right exists when the claimant uses the land without permission and under a good-faith belief of ownership. Permission from the owner defeats adversity, while a mistaken boundary belief supports the claim of right and allows tacking of successive periods.
Supporting sources
Yes. Use that is consistent with the nature and character of the property, such as seasonal farming or grazing, satisfies the continuity requirement when the claimant occupies the land under a claim of right.
A defense negating the intent element of theft offenses or limiting justification for the use of force when the actor honestly believes he or she is entitled to the property or is acting to protect a possessory interest. The belief need not be reasonable so long as it is genuine and held in good faith.
Umeko Uchida returned from vacation to find her landlord had changed the locks on her apartment. Believing she had an immediate right to reenter and that delay would cause exceptional hardship, she forced the door open. Because she honestly believed the landlord had no claim of right to keep her out, the force was justified under the statute.
Ugo Ucelli tried to leave a store with unpaid merchandise. The security guard, wearing a marked jacket, blocked her path and grabbed her bag while stating he was detaining her for shoplifting. Knowing the guard was acting under a claim of right to protect store property, Ugo could not claim self-defense when she struck him.
Uliana Ustinova confronted her former employer over tools she believed were owed as back wages. When the employer asserted a claim of right and demanded their return, Uliana knew she could avoid force by simply surrendering the tools. She therefore could not justify using force to retain them.
3 common questions
No. The defense applies when the actor holds an honest belief in entitlement to the property, even if the belief is mistaken or unreasonable. Open and undisguised retention of the property supports the existence of such a belief.
Supporting sources
Force is justified only when the actor believes the other party has no claim of right to possession and the circumstances create exceptional hardship that makes waiting for a court order unreasonable. Immediate or fresh pursuit after dispossession is also required.
…between Stieglitz and Dr. Frank so that the original possession of the paintings by the Frank family may have been under claim of right. III On the limited record before us, we cannot determine now who has title to the paintings. That determination will depend on the evidence adduced at trial. Nonetheless, we believe…
…statute that prevented a landowner from recovering property on which the defendant had resided for more than seven years under a claim of right
…the context of First Amendment rights. It has been suggested that there is state action, not only when an individual asserts a claim of right against a state, but also when he asserts a claim of right
…only the right of government.” Leaming & Spicer 628, sec. 36. Now, unless this court is prepared to pronounce that the claim of right
Supporting sources
Uma Underwood withheld rent after her landlord ignored repair requests. The landlord began eviction proceedings. Because Uma knew the landlord was asserting a claim of right to possession through lawful process, she could not justify resistance by claiming a superior possessory interest.
In March 1965, Mrs. Yvonne Edwards rented housing property from Nathan Habib on a month-to-month basis. Shortly thereafter she complained to the Department of Licenses and Inspections of sanitary code violations which her landlord had failed to remedy. In the course of the ensuing inspection, more than 40 such violations were discovered which the Department ordered the landlord to correct. Habib then gave Mrs. Edwards a 30-day statutory notice to vacate and obtained a default judgment for possession of the premises. Mrs. Edwards promptly moved to reopen this judgment, alleging excusable neglect for the default and also alleging as a defense that the notice to quit was given in retaliation for her complaints to the housing authorities. Judge Greene, sitting on motions in the Court of General Sessions, set aside the default judgment and concluded that a retaliatory motive, if proved, would constitute a defense. At the trial itself, however, a different judge deemed evidence of retaliatory motive irrelevant and directed a verdict for the landlord. Mrs. Edwards then appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. We granted appellant leave to appeal that decision to this court. The case thus presented the question of whether retaliatory eviction could be barred as a defense.
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No. When the actor knows the other person is using force under a claim of right to protect property, such as a mechanic's lien, self-defense is unavailable absent narrow exceptions like threats of death or serious bodily harm.
Supporting sources