Also known as: vexatious delays · unreasonable delay
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An unreasonable delay by a plaintiff in commencing suit or by a buyer in effecting cover after breach.
After Vertex Pharmaceuticals failed to deliver contracted chemicals, buyer Velocity Logistics waited six weeks before purchasing replacements at a higher price. The delay prevented Velocity from mitigating damages promptly. The court treated the postponement as vexatious because it lacked any commercial justification and increased the seller's exposure.
After Villanueva Construction's excavation caused ongoing flooding on adjacent property, owner Vivian Velez waited eighteen months before seeking an injunction. The court weighed the extended inaction as vexatious delay when deciding whether equitable relief remained appropriate.
Viola Volkov discovered toxic runoff from Vortex Energy's facility but filed for injunctive relief only after three years. The court considered the prolonged inaction as vexatious delay when balancing equities for the requested injunction.
After charging Vincente Vukovic with negligence, the state continued the case for four years to let related civil suits finish first. The court found the pattern constituted vexatious delay that prejudiced the defense and violated speedy-trial rights.
On July 20, 1958, in Christian County, Kentucky, an elderly couple was beaten to death by intruders wielding an iron tire tool. Two suspects, Silas Manning and Willie Barker, the petitioner, were arrested shortly thereafter. The grand jury indicted them on September 15. Counsel was appointed on September 17, and Barker’s trial was set for October 21. The Commonwealth had a stronger case against Manning and believed that Barker could not be convicted unless Manning testified against him. Accordingly, on October 23, the day Silas Manning was brought to trial, the Commonwealth sought and obtained the first of what was to be a series of 16 continuances of Barker’s trial. Barker made no objection. Manning’s first trial ended in a hung jury. A second trial resulted in a conviction that the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed because of evidence obtained by an illegal search. At his third trial Manning was again convicted, and the Court of Appeals again reversed because the trial court had not granted a change of venue. A fourth trial resulted in a hung jury. After five trials Manning was convicted in March 1962 of murdering one victim, and after a sixth trial in December 1962 he was convicted of murdering the other. The Christian County Circuit Court holds three terms each year in February, June, and September. Barker’s initial trial was to take place in the September term of 1958. The first continuance postponed it until the February 1959 term. Every term thereafter for as long as the Manning prosecutions were in process, the Commonwealth routinely moved to continue Barker’s case to the next term. Barker spent 10 months in jail before obtaining his release by posting a $5,000 bond in September 1959. He thereafter remained free in the community until his trial. Barker made no objection through counsel to the first 11 continuances. When on February 12, 1962, the Commonwealth moved for the twelfth time to continue the case, Barker’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The motion was denied and the continuance was granted. The Commonwealth was granted further continuances in June and September 1962 to which Barker did not object. In February 1963 the Commonwealth moved to set Barker’s trial for March 19. On the scheduled date it moved for a continuance until the June term because of the illness of the ex-sheriff who was the chief investigating officer. Barker objected unsuccessfully. The witness remained unable to testify in June, and the trial was continued until the September term over Barker’s objection. The final trial date was set for October 9, 1963. On that date Barker again moved to dismiss the indictment, specifying that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The motion was denied, the trial commenced with Manning as the chief prosecution witness, and Barker was convicted and given a life sentence. Barker appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which affirmed. In February 1970 Barker petitioned for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The District Court rejected the petition. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Barker’s petition for certiorari.
View caseIllinois blocked Edgar v. MITE Corp.'s tender offer for sixty days under its takeover statute. The Supreme Court viewed the extended state-imposed waiting period as vexatious delay that unduly burdened interstate commerce.
MITE Corp. and its wholly owned subsidiary MITE Holdings, Inc., both Delaware corporations with principal executive offices in Connecticut, initiated a cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., a publicly held Illinois corporation, on January 19, 1979, by filing a Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. MITE offered $28 per share, approximately $4 above the prevailing market price, but did not register the offer under the Illinois Business Take-Over Act. On the same day MITE filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Illinois Secretary of State James Edgar, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and violated the Commerce Clause, together with temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief. Chicago Rivet responded three days later by suing in Pennsylvania to enjoin the offer under that state's takeover disclosure law, but its efforts there proved unsuccessful. On February 1, 1979, the Illinois Secretary of State notified MITE of his intent to issue a cease-and-desist order. The following day Chicago Rivet informed MITE it would file suit in Illinois state court, and the district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Secretary from enforcing the Illinois Act against MITE's tender offer. MITE published its nationwide tender offer in the February 5, 1979, edition of the Wall Street Journal. Chicago Rivet simultaneously offered to purchase approximately 40 percent of its own shares at $30 per share. On February 9 the district court entered final judgment declaring the Illinois Act preempted by the Williams Act and violative of the Commerce Clause, and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The parties then entered an agreement withdrawing both offers and granting MITE thirty days to examine Chicago Rivet's books and records. On March 2, 1979, MITE announced it would not proceed with any tender offer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseRiverside County detained arrestees for up to ten days before providing probable-cause determinations. The Supreme Court held that such systematic postponement amounted to vexatious delay violating the Fourth Amendment.
In August 1985 the Riverside County Sheriff's Department arrested Donald Lee McLaughlin on a warrant for driving under the influence of alcohol and arraigned him the next day. On the same day the department arrested Florine Heard on charges of possession of narcotics for sale and arraigned her on August 6. The following day the department arrested Michael Scott McLaughlin on a similar warrant and arraigned him on August 7. On August 7, 1985, the three arrestees filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against the County of Riverside and certain of its officers. The certified class included all persons arrested without a warrant in Riverside County who did not receive a probable cause determination within 36 hours of arrest. The complaint alleged that the county's policy of combining probable cause determinations with arraignment proceedings, which under Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 825 had to occur without unnecessary delay and within two days excluding weekends and holidays, violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the county to provide probable cause determinations within 36 hours of arrest. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, adopting a flexible standard under which the determination must be made as soon as reasonably feasible after arrest and concluding that the county's policy did not satisfy that standard. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the case with a parallel challenge to an identical injunction issued against San Bernardino County. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. At the time the second amended complaint was filed the named plaintiffs remained in custody without probable cause determinations, though their individual claims later became moot after they received determinations or were released. Class certification preserved the controversy for review. The county represented that its policy provided probable cause determinations at arraignment for all warrantless arrestees regardless of charge.
View caseVexatious delay requires unjustified refusal or postponement without factual basis or legitimate purpose. Courts examine whether the actor had any reasonable ground for the inaction and whether the delay caused concrete prejudice.
The concept surfaces in contract cover rules, tort injunction balancing, and constitutional speedy-trial or probable-cause cases whenever a party or government imposes unjustified postponement that harms the opposing side.
A buyer who waits unreasonably long before covering may lose the right to recover the full price differential. The statute requires good-faith substitute purchases made without unreasonable delay after the seller's breach.
Dismissal of the charges with prejudice is the usual remedy when the government bears responsibility for unjustified, prejudicial delay that violates the defendant's constitutional right to a prompt trial.
Supporting sources
…if the arrested individual can prove that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably. Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake. In evaluating…