Also known as: violations of statute · statutory violation · statutory violations · breach of statute
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A breach of a legislative enactment that, standing alone, fails to establish the concrete and particularized injury in fact required for Article III standing.
Vaughn Valentine sued a data processor after discovering that his account information was shared without the disclosure required by a federal privacy statute. He alleged no fraudulent charges, identity theft, or other tangible harm. The court dismissed the claim because the bare violation of the statute did not establish the concrete and particularized injury required for Article III standing.
Victoria Vernon, a therapist, learned that her patient planned to harm Valerie Viera but did not warn the intended victim. The patient later attacked Viera. Viera sued Vernon for negligence, relying on the violation of a state statute requiring disclosure of serious threats to establish breach of duty.
On October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff. Two months earlier, Poddar, a voluntary outpatient receiving therapy at Cowell Memorial Hospital at the University of California at Berkeley, confided his intention to kill an unnamed girl, readily identifiable as Tatiana, to his therapist Dr. Lawrence Moore. Moore, with the concurrence of Dr. Gold who had initially examined Poddar and Dr. Yandell, assistant to the director of the department of psychiatry, decided that Poddar should be committed for observation in a mental hospital. Moore orally notified Officers Atkinson and Teel of the campus police that he would request commitment. He then sent a letter to Police Chief William Beall requesting assistance in securing Poddar's confinement. Officers Atkinson, Brownrigg, and Halleran took Poddar into custody but released him after determining he was rational on his promise to stay away from Tatiana. Dr. Harvey Powelson, director of the department of psychiatry at Cowell Memorial Hospital, then asked the police to return Moore's letter, directed that all copies of the letter and notes Moore had taken as therapist be destroyed, and ordered no action to place Poddar in a 72-hour treatment and evaluation facility. Poddar persuaded Tatiana's brother to share an apartment with him near Tatiana's residence. Shortly after her return from spending the summer in Brazil, Poddar went to her residence and killed her. Plaintiffs, Tatiana's mother and father, filed separate but virtually identical second amended complaints against the therapists Moore, Powelson, Gold, and Yandell, the police defendants Atkinson, Beall, Brownrigg, Halleran, and Teel, and the Regents of the University of California as their employer. The first cause of action alleged failure to detain a dangerous patient. The second cause of action alleged failure to warn on a dangerous patient. The third cause of action sought punitive damages against Powelson for abandonment of a dangerous patient. The fourth cause of action alleged breach of primary duty to patient and the public. The superior court sustained defendants' demurrers to the second amended complaints without leave to amend. The case reached the Supreme Court of California on appeal from the judgment of the superior court.
View caseVanessa Vega, a white applicant, was denied admission to a state medical school under a special admissions program that reserved spots for minority applicants. She sued, alleging that the program's violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI established the necessary breach for her claim of unlawful discrimination.
The Medical School of the University of California at Davis opened in 1968 with an entering class of 50 students. In 1971 the size of the entering class was increased to 100 students, a level at which it remains. The first class contained three Asians but no blacks, no Mexican-Americans, and no American Indians. Over the next two years the faculty devised a special admissions program to increase the representation of disadvantaged students in each Medical School class. The special program consisted of a separate admissions system operating in coordination with the regular admissions process. Under the regular admissions procedure candidates whose overall undergraduate grade point averages fell below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 were summarily rejected. About one out of six applicants was invited for a personal interview. Following the interviews each candidate was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by his interviewers and four other members of the admissions committee. The ratings were added together to arrive at each candidate's benchmark score. Since five committee members rated each candidate in 1973 a perfect score was 500. In 1974 six members rated each candidate so that a perfect score was 600. The full committee then reviewed the file and scores of each applicant and made offers of admission on a rolling basis. The special admissions program operated with a separate committee a majority of whom were members of minority groups. Special candidates did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point average cutoff applied to regular applicants. The special committee continued to recommend special applicants until a number prescribed by faculty vote were admitted. While the overall class size was still 50 the prescribed number was 8. In 1973 and 1974 when the class size had doubled to 100 the prescribed number of special admissions also doubled to 16. From the year of the increase in class size through 1974 the special program resulted in the admission of 21 black students 30 Mexican-Americans and 12 Asians for a total of 63 minority students. Over the same period the regular admissions program produced 1 black 6 Mexican-Americans and 37 Asians for a total of 44 minority students. Although disadvantaged whites applied to the special program in large numbers none received an offer of admission through that process. Allan Bakke is a white male who applied to the Davis Medical School in both 1973 and 1974. Despite a strong benchmark score of 468 out of 500 Bakke was rejected. His total was 549 out of 600. Again Bakke's application was rejected. In both years applicants were admitted under the special program with grade point averages MCAT scores and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's. After the second rejection Bakke filed the instant suit in the Superior Court of California. He sought mandatory injunctive and declaratory relief compelling his admission to the Medical School. He alleged that the Medical School's special admissions program operated to exclude him from the school on the basis of his race in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Art. I § 21 of the California Constitution and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The trial court found that the special program operated as a racial quota because minority applicants in the special program were rated only against one another and 16 places in the class of 100 were reserved for them. The court refused to order Bakke's admission however holding that he had failed to carry his burden of proving that he would have been admitted but for the existence of the special program. The California court accepted the findings of the trial court with respect to the University's program. On this basis the court initially ordered a remand for the purpose of determining whether under the newly allocated burden of proof Bakke would have been admitted to either the 1973 or the 1974 entering class in the absence of the special admissions program. In its petition for rehearing below however the University conceded its inability to carry that burden. The California court thereupon amended its opinion to direct that the trial court enter judgment ordering Bakke's admission to the Medical School. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the important constitutional issue.
View caseValerie Voss, a property owner, sued a federal contractor in state court over a tax lien arising from a federal statute. The contractor removed the case to federal court, arguing that the claim necessarily raised a substantial federal issue because resolution depended on whether the contractor had violated the federal statute governing the lien.
In 1994, the Internal Revenue Service seized real property in Michigan belonging to Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc., to satisfy the company's federal tax delinquency. The IRS provided notice of the seizure to Grable by certified mail, which Grable received before selling the property to Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. Grable did not redeem the property within the 180-day statutory period following the sale. After that period had passed, the Government gave Darue a quitclaim deed. Five years later, Grable brought a quiet title action in Michigan state court against Darue. Grable claimed that Darue’s record title was invalid because the IRS had failed to notify Grable of its seizure of the property in the exact manner required by federal statute. Grable asserted that the statute required personal service rather than service by certified mail. Darue removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The district court declined to remand after finding that the claim posed a significant question of federal law and granted summary judgment to Darue. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the jurisdictional question alone.
View caseVeronica Villanueva challenged her state's congressional district map, alleging that the legislature had drawn the lines predominantly on the basis of race. She introduced evidence that the irregular boundaries could not be explained by traditional districting principles and therefore constituted an unconstitutional violation supporting her equal-protection claim.
After the 1990 census showed that Georgia's population entitled it to an eleventh congressional seat, the General Assembly adopted redistricting guidelines requiring equal population, contiguity, nondilution of minority voting strength, and compliance with sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act before considering other factors such as preserving political subdivisions. The legislature submitted an initial plan creating two majority-minority districts and one additional district with a 35 percent black voting-age population, but the Department of Justice refused preclearance on January 21, 1992, stating that the plan failed to recognize certain minority populations. The General Assembly enacted a second plan that increased black populations in three districts, yet the Department of Justice again refused preclearance, pointing to alternative plans that created three majority-minority districts through a Macon/Savannah trade. Using the ACLU's max-black plan as a benchmark, the legislature then passed a final plan that created the Eleventh District by transferring black populations from Macon to the Second District and extending the Eleventh to include Savannah, resulting in a district that split twenty-six counties. On January 13, 1994, five white voters registered in the Eleventh District filed suit against state officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, alleging that the district was a racial gerrymander. A three-judge panel received evidence including the Justice Department's objection letters, testimony from the operator of Georgia's reapportionment computer, the State's admissions that portions of Effingham and Chatham Counties were added solely to increase the black population, and expert reports showing fractured political and economic interests within the district. The District Court found that race was the overriding and predominant factor explaining the Eleventh District's irregular boundaries and invalidated the plan. Appellants appealed, the Supreme Court granted a stay, and later noted probable jurisdiction over the direct appeal.
View caseValdez Steel hired a portable toilet company that used the name and likeness of a famous entertainer without permission in its advertising. The entertainer sued for violation of his right of publicity. The court held that the unauthorized commercial use constituted a statutory violation supporting the entertainer's claim for damages.
John W. Carson has hosted “The Tonight Show” on NBC five nights a week since 1962 and appears as an entertainer in night clubs and theaters around the country. From the time he began hosting the program, he has been introduced each night with the phrase “Here’s Johnny,” a method of introduction first used for him in 1957 when he hosted a daily television program for ABC. The phrase “Here’s Johnny” is generally associated with Carson by a substantial segment of the television viewing public. In 1967 Carson first authorized use of the phrase by an outside business venture, permitting it to be used by a chain of restaurants called “Here’s Johnny Restaurants.” In 1970 Johnny Carson Apparel, Inc. was formed to manufacture and market men’s clothing to retail stores. Carson, who serves as president and owns twenty percent of its stock, licensed the company to use his name and picture, which appear on virtually all of its products and promotional material. He also consented to use of the phrase “Here’s Johnny” on labels and in advertising. In 1977 Apparel granted a license to Marcy Laboratories to use the phrase as the name of a line of men’s toiletries. The phrase has never been registered by appellants as a trademark or service mark. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., a Michigan corporation engaged in renting and selling portable toilets, began operations in 1976. Its founder was aware at the time he formed the corporation that “Here’s Johnny” was the introductory slogan for Carson on “The Tonight Show.” He coupled the phrase with a second slogan, “The World’s Foremost Commodian,” to make a play on words. Shortly after appellee went into business, Carson and Apparel brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan alleging unfair competition, trademark infringement under federal and state law, and invasion of privacy and publicity rights, seeking damages and an injunction. After a bench trial the district court issued a memorandum opinion and order in 1980 that served as its findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered dismissal of the complaint.
View caseNo. A statutory violation establishes negligence per se only when the plaintiff belongs to the class the statute was designed to protect and the harm is of the type the statute sought to prevent. Otherwise the violation may be relevant evidence of negligence but does not automatically satisfy the breach element.
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No. A plaintiff must show a concrete and particularized injury in fact. Alleging only that a defendant violated a statute, without any actual or threatened harm, is insufficient to satisfy the injury requirement.
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A statutory violation creates a concrete injury when it creates a real risk of harm or when Congress has elevated a concrete de facto injury to the status of a legally cognizable injury. A purely procedural violation divorced from any actual or threatened harm is insufficient.
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…or involuntary recipients of services shall be confidential." (Italics added.) Further, a patient may enjoin disclosure in violation of statute and may recover the greater of $500 or three times the amount of actual damage for unlawful disclosure. (§ 5330.) However, recognizing that some private and public interests must override…