Also known as: zones of danger · zone-of-danger · zone of danger rule · zone-of-danger rule
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A geographic or relational area within which a person faces a foreseeable risk of physical injury from a defendant's negligent conduct. The concept determines whether the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff in negligence actions, including claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. A plaintiff outside that area ordinarily cannot recover for emotional harm caused solely by witnessing peril to another.
Zoya Zamorano stood twenty yards from a tree that Zephyr Dynamics negligently failed to secure. When the tree toppled, Zoya feared only for her parked car and suffered no personal physical risk. A court applying the zone-of-danger rule would deny her recovery for resulting emotional distress because she was never placed in immediate danger of bodily harm.
Zola Zanders stood on the curb holding her child's hand when a car driven by Zachary Zimmerman sped through the crosswalk. The vehicle narrowly missed both Zola and her child, causing Zola to fear for her own safety before she suffered severe insomnia. Under the zone-of-danger test she may recover for the resulting physical manifestations because she was personally endangered by the same negligent act.
On September 27, 1964, at approximately 4:30 p.m., at the intersection of Blue Ridge Road and Chenango Avenue in Sacramento County, defendant David Legg operated his motor vehicle in such a manner that it struck and killed two-year-old Erin Lee Dillon. Plaintiff Cheryl Dillon, the mother of the deceased child, was a pedestrian at or near the intersection in close proximity to the accident and actually witnessed the impact and death of her daughter. Plaintiff Robert Dillon, the minor brother of the deceased, was also a pedestrian in close proximity to the accident and witnessed the impact and death of his sister. The complaint set forth three separate counts seeking recovery for the resulting injuries. In the first count, Cheryl Dillon alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negligence she suffered fright, shock, and mental anguish and sustained physical injuries along with great emotional and physical pain and suffering. The second count alleged that Robert Dillon suffered great emotional and physical pain and suffering as a direct and proximate result of witnessing the accident. The third count alleged that Clyde Dillon, the father of the deceased minor, sustained a loss of the affection, society, and companionship of his daughter and incurred funeral and burial expenses. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed from that judgment to the Supreme Court of California. In related proceedings, the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings against the mother's cause of action but denied a similar motion as to the sister's cause of action, and later denied a motion for summary judgment on the sister's claim. The case thus presented claims by a mother who was not within the zone of danger and by a sibling who may have been within it.
View caseZuniga Freight's train derailed and released toxic fumes near Zephyr Zola's terminal gate. Zephyr, a passenger waiting to board, stood close enough that the fumes placed him in immediate risk of physical harm though he escaped without contact. The zone-of-danger rule permits him to pursue emotional-distress damages because the defendant's negligence created a direct threat to his own bodily safety.
On July 22, 1981, a fire began in the Port Newark freight yard of defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation when ethylene oxide manufactured by defendant BASF Wyandotte Company escaped from a tank car owned by defendant Union Tank Car Company and leased to BASF. The tank car was punctured during a coupling operation with another rail car and ignited. The municipal authorities evacuated the area within a one-mile radius surrounding the fire, which included the North Terminal building of Newark International Airport where plaintiff People Express Airlines’ business operations are based. People Express employees were prohibited from using the North Terminal for twelve hours, although the feared explosion never occurred. The plaintiff contends that it suffered business-interruption losses as a result of the evacuation. These losses consisted of cancelled scheduled flights and lost reservations because employees were unable to answer the telephones to accept bookings. Fixed operating expenses allocable to the evacuation period were incurred and paid despite the offices being closed. No physical damage to airline property and no personal injury occurred. According to the original complaint, each defendant acted negligently and these acts proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm. An amended complaint alleged additional counts of nuisance and strict liability. Conrail moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that absent property damage or personal injury economic loss was not recoverable in tort. The trial court also granted summary judgment motions by BASF and Union Car on the same reasoning. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court. This Court granted defendant Union Car’s petition for certification, in which Conrail and BASF joined. Plaintiff asserted at oral argument that at least some of the defendants were aware from prior experiences that ethylene oxide is a highly volatile substance. Further, emergency response plans in case of an accident had been prepared. When the fire occurred that gave rise to this lawsuit, some of the defendants’ consultants helped determine how much of the surrounding area to evacuate.
View caseNo. Most courts allow recovery when the plaintiff is placed in immediate risk of physical harm and suffers emotional distress that produces physical symptoms, even without actual contact.
The zone-of-danger test requires the plaintiff to have been personally threatened with bodily harm. The Dillon approach permits recovery for close relatives who witness injury to another without themselves being endangered.
Supporting sources
Primarily yes. It limits duty in ordinary negligence when the only claimed injury is emotional harm arising from fear for one's own safety or from witnessing harm to another while personally endangered.
Generally no under the traditional rule, although some jurisdictions relax the requirement when a special relationship or other exception exists.
…not in the zone of danger. The Amaya case has been the subject of much criticism. The commentators have pointed out that the zone of danger rule is artificial and arbitrary. (See, e.g., 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1956) § 18.4, p. 1034; Prosser, Torts (3d ed. 1964) § 55, p. 354; Comment (1964) 15 Hastings L.J. 578; Note…