Also known as: zones of risk · zone of danger
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrinal limit on the scope of duty in negligence that confines liability to those plaintiffs situated within the range of reasonably foreseeable risk created by the defendant's conduct. A defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff outside that range even if injury occurs in fact.
Liberty Stage placed Yuri's merchandise booth several hundred yards from the main stage in a low-density vendor zone after receiving radio reports of escalating fights. The promoter took no steps to add barriers or redirect paths. When the fights triggered a stampede that surged along the only available routes and knocked Yuri to the ground, the promoter's failure to control the crowd placed Yuri inside the zone of risk created by its own omissions.
Zoya watched from across the street as a negligent driver struck her child in the crosswalk. Although Zoya suffered no physical impact herself, the driver could reasonably have foreseen that a parent would be present and would suffer severe emotional distress from witnessing the injury. Zoya therefore stood within the zone of risk for purposes of recovering for her resulting illness.
On September 27, 1964, at approximately 4:30 p.m., at the intersection of Blue Ridge Road and Chenango Avenue in Sacramento County, defendant David Legg operated his motor vehicle in such a manner that it struck and killed two-year-old Erin Lee Dillon. Plaintiff Cheryl Dillon, the mother of the deceased child, was a pedestrian at or near the intersection in close proximity to the accident and actually witnessed the impact and death of her daughter. Plaintiff Robert Dillon, the minor brother of the deceased, was also a pedestrian in close proximity to the accident and witnessed the impact and death of his sister. The complaint set forth three separate counts seeking recovery for the resulting injuries. In the first count, Cheryl Dillon alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negligence she suffered fright, shock, and mental anguish and sustained physical injuries along with great emotional and physical pain and suffering. The second count alleged that Robert Dillon suffered great emotional and physical pain and suffering as a direct and proximate result of witnessing the accident. The third count alleged that Clyde Dillon, the father of the deceased minor, sustained a loss of the affection, society, and companionship of his daughter and incurred funeral and burial expenses. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed from that judgment to the Supreme Court of California. In related proceedings, the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings against the mother's cause of action but denied a similar motion as to the sister's cause of action, and later denied a motion for summary judgment on the sister's claim. The case thus presented claims by a mother who was not within the zone of danger and by a sibling who may have been within it.
View caseZuniga Freight's negligence caused a chemical fire that forced the temporary closure of a nearby airport terminal. People Express Airlines, operating flights from that terminal, incurred substantial lost profits during the shutdown. Because the airline's operations were located within the zone of risk created by the foreseeable spread of the fire, the carrier could recover its economic losses without physical damage to its own property.
On July 22, 1981, a fire began in the Port Newark freight yard of defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation when ethylene oxide manufactured by defendant BASF Wyandotte Company escaped from a tank car owned by defendant Union Tank Car Company and leased to BASF. The tank car was punctured during a coupling operation with another rail car and ignited. The municipal authorities evacuated the area within a one-mile radius surrounding the fire, which included the North Terminal building of Newark International Airport where plaintiff People Express Airlines’ business operations are based. People Express employees were prohibited from using the North Terminal for twelve hours, although the feared explosion never occurred. The plaintiff contends that it suffered business-interruption losses as a result of the evacuation. These losses consisted of cancelled scheduled flights and lost reservations because employees were unable to answer the telephones to accept bookings. Fixed operating expenses allocable to the evacuation period were incurred and paid despite the offices being closed. No physical damage to airline property and no personal injury occurred. According to the original complaint, each defendant acted negligently and these acts proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm. An amended complaint alleged additional counts of nuisance and strict liability. Conrail moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that absent property damage or personal injury economic loss was not recoverable in tort. The trial court also granted summary judgment motions by BASF and Union Car on the same reasoning. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court. This Court granted defendant Union Car’s petition for certification, in which Conrail and BASF joined. Plaintiff asserted at oral argument that at least some of the defendants were aware from prior experiences that ethylene oxide is a highly volatile substance. Further, emergency response plans in case of an accident had been prepared. When the fire occurred that gave rise to this lawsuit, some of the defendants’ consultants helped determine how much of the surrounding area to evacuate.
View caseThe doctrine originated in physical-injury cases to identify the foreseeable plaintiff but has been extended to certain claims for negligently inflicted emotional distress and pure economic loss when the plaintiff is situated within the foreseeable range of the defendant's conduct.
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When a defendant has actual knowledge of escalating third-party violence on premises it controls, the zone of risk created by its failure to intervene can extend to invitees located along foreseeable escape paths even if they are hundreds of yards away.
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Yes, provided the defendant could reasonably foresee that its conduct would cause severe fright or shock in a person normally constituted who is situated like the plaintiff.
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No. Specific contemporaneous warnings that violence is escalating can render injury to a plaintiff along foreseeable paths reasonably foreseeable even if no identical stampede has occurred before.
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…trauma caused by the defendant's negligence only if the plaintiff were present at the scene of the accident and were in the zone of danger, is an artificial and unrealistically restrictive barrier. We shall explain that the availability of a cause of action for emotional trauma should turn on the defendant's breach of a duty…