Also known as: zoning ordinance · zoning law · zoning regulation · zoning code
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A municipal regulation that divides land into districts and restricts permissible uses within each district. The regulation is valid when the classification bears a substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Application of the regulation to a specific parcel or group may be invalid if it lacks any legitimate governmental interest or arbitrarily deprives an owner of beneficial use.
Zola Zanders applied for a special use permit to open a group home for adults with intellectual disabilities in a residential district. City officials denied the permit solely because neighbors objected to the residents' mental condition. The denial lacked any legitimate governmental interest and violated equal protection.
Zelda Ziegler petitioned the city council to rezone her single parcel from residential to commercial use. The council granted the change without notice or hearing and without showing any public health or welfare benefit. The amendment constituted invalid spot zoning favoring one owner.
Zuri Zuberi owned land classified residential under a new zoning map even though identical neighboring parcels were zoned commercial. The classification bore no relation to health or safety and prevented any beneficial use of her property. The ordinance as applied was invalid.
Zack Zuniga purchased property in an area newly divided into residential, commercial, and industrial districts. The ordinance prohibited industrial uses on his residential parcel. The classification was reasonable and substantially related to public welfare, so the restrictions were upheld.
Zoe Zanders lived with her grandchildren in a single-family zone that limited occupancy to nuclear families. The ordinance prevented the extended family arrangement without advancing any legitimate interest. The restriction violated substantive due process.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
Zephyr Zola rented a house to three unrelated adults in a district restricted to traditional family units. The ordinance promoted a quiet residential character and survived rational basis review. The restriction on group living was upheld.
Belle Terre is a village on Long Island’s north shore consisting of about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people. Its total land area is less than one square mile. The village has restricted land use to one-family dwellings and excludes lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple-dwelling houses. The ordinance defines “family” as one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. Up to two persons living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family. Appellees the Dickmans own a house in the village. In December 1971 they leased it for an 18-month term to Michael Truman. Bruce Boraas later became a co-lessee. Anne Parish then moved into the house along with three others. These six individuals are students at the nearby State University at Stony Brook, and none is related to the others by blood, adoption, or marriage. When the village served the Dickmans with an Order to Remedy Violations of the ordinance, the owners plus three tenants brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment that the ordinance is unconstitutional. The District Court held the ordinance constitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the litigation the lease expired and was extended. Anne Parish moved out. Thereafter the other five students left, and the owners now hold the home out for sale or rent, including to student groups.
A zoning ordinance violates equal protection when it denies a permit solely because of residents' intellectual disabilities and rests on mere prejudice rather than any legitimate governmental interest. Rational basis review applies, yet the government may not act from bias alone.
Rezoning requires compliance with notice and hearing rules and must bear a substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Spot zoning that singles out one parcel without public purpose is invalid.
…districts, place restrictions on the development of individual historic landmarks—in addition to those imposed by applicable zoning ordinances—without effecting a “taking” requiring the payment of “just compensation.” Specifically, we must decide whether the application of New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law to the parcel…
…in 1928 and the 1974 decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U. S. 1, this Court did not review the substance of any zoning ordinances. The case-by-case development of the constitutional limits on the
…a State extends often to the destruction of property." : That same year, an appeal came to the Court asking "[w]hether zoning ordinances which altogether destroy the worth of valuable land by prohibiting the only economic use of which it is capable effect a taking of real property without compensation." Juris. Statement, O.…
…judgment must be allowed to control.” Id. , at 388. The Court listed as considerations bearing on the constitutionality of zoning ordinances the danger of fire or collapse of buildings, the evils of overcrowding people, and the possibility that “offensive trades, industries, and structures” might “create nuisance” to residential…
A classification is invalid when it has no substantial relation to public health, safety, or welfare and arbitrarily deprives the owner of beneficial use. Courts examine whether the boundary or restriction is reasonable for that specific land.
Comprehensive zoning ordinances that divide a municipality into districts and restrict uses are valid exercises of the police power when the classification is reasonable and substantially related to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
Zoning ordinances that prevent extended family members such as grandparents and grandchildren from living together intrude on family autonomy and violate substantive due process.
A municipality may limit occupancy to traditional family units and exclude groups of three or more unrelated persons when the ordinance promotes a preferred residential environment and survives rational basis review.