Concept
How Far the Exceptions Power Reaches
Congressional power to define and limit
How Far the Exceptions Power Reaches
Article III, Section 2 gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over every case outside its original categories “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”1 Ex parte McCardle read that language to let Congress repeal one statutory route to the Court, even as to an appeal already argued. It did not say how much more the language allows. The 1868 act left the Court’s earlier habeas jurisdiction in place, so the Court never had to decide whether Congress may remove an entire subject from its appellate docket, or whether Article III itself requires some federal court to remain open to claims under the Constitution. The clause grants a power to make exceptions and gives no measure of how large an exception may be. That silence is the subject of this section.
The silence matters because Congress keeps proposing statutes that test it. Since the 1940s, more than 100 bills have sought to restrict federal jurisdiction over particular topics, among them bills in the 1980s aimed at state school prayer laws and state abortion restrictions, and bills in 2004 aimed at the Defense of Marriage Act and the Pledge of Allegiance.2 Whether any of them could survive depends on how much room the Exceptions Clause leaves, and after more than two centuries there is no consensus about what the clause means. The dispute centers on two questions: what the exceptions and regulations language allows, and whether the separation of powers independently limits Congress.3 This section takes up the first question. The structural question comes later in the chapter.
One set of facts will carry each reading through the subsections that follow.
This statute goes where McCardle did not. The 1868 act closed one federal route; this statute closes every federal route to a class of constitutional claims. Its validity turns on how the clause is read. A reading that treats the words as a broad grant of discretion sustains the statute as an exception Congress was free to make. A reading that treats Article III’s extension of the judicial power to cases arising under the Constitution as a limit on the exceptions power puts the statute in serious doubt. A third approach asks whether a court can avoid the choice by construing the statute to reach less far. The subsections below take the readings in that order: the traditional, plenary view; the mandatory interpretations that contest it; and the construction rule that usually lets courts sidestep both. Because no text, history, or precedent has settled the dispute, a strong answer argues the statute’s validity under each reading and says plainly that the Court has chosen none.
The Plenary Power View
Read in isolation, the clause appears to give Congress virtually unlimited discretion, because the Court’s appellate jurisdiction runs “with such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make.”4 On that traditional or plenary reading (plenary meaning full and unqualified), the only question about a jurisdictional limit is whether it counts as an “exception” to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.5 If it does, the clause supplies the authority, and nothing else in Article III needs consulting. A statute withdrawing from the Court’s appellate jurisdiction every case arising under the First Amendment is the standard illustration. That limit is, quite literally, an exception to the jurisdiction, so the Exceptions Clause provides a textual basis for it.6
The reading draws its force from what the clause leaves unsaid. The text empowers Congress to make exceptions and names no limit on their number or size. The orthodox account accordingly describes Congress’s power over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction as essentially unrestricted, and it pairs that power with complete control over the inferior federal courts.7 A long list of distinguished observers has aligned itself with that view of relatively unlimited congressional power.8
Ex parte McCardle is the leading precedent for the plenary reading. The Court there took the clause at face value, observing that the power to make exceptions to its appellate jurisdiction is “given by express words,” and concluded that, once Congress had exercised the power, nothing remained but to dismiss the case.9 Taken at face value, the decision means that Congress may keep the Court from hearing cases on a particular topic by excluding them from the appellate jurisdiction.10 On that reading, the school prayer statute is an easy case on the definitional question. The Exceptions Clause authorizes the Supreme Court half of the statute, and Congress’s discretion over what the lower federal courts may decide, taught earlier in this chapter, covers the rest.11
History supplies a second support. The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not expressly bar the Court from any subject Article III lists. It described the Court’s appellate jurisdiction affirmatively and incompletely, and the omissions operated as exceptions.12 Congress gave the Court review of state-court decisions that denied a federal claim and, by inference, excepted those that upheld one. Because the Act gave the lower federal courts no general federal-question jurisdiction, the federal judicial power did not reach every constitutional case. Many of the Act’s authors had helped draft the Constitution, so their choice to leave part of the Article III list unvested reads as an early adoption of the plenary view, and supporters add that the Framers wanted such control as a check on the judiciary.13 The practice never changed: Congress has never conferred the full appellate range, and it has never authorized Supreme Court review of state-court diversity decisions even though Article III lists diversity controversies.14 The evidence is suggestive but not conclusive. The Act’s gaps were never directly challenged, the Act was not free of constitutional defect in other respects, and current statutes come very close to conferring the full federal-question range, which opponents treat as evidence of a congressional duty.15
The plenary position appears in its starkest form in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., where Justice Frankfurter wrote: “Congress need not give this Court any appellate power; it may withdraw appellate jurisdiction once conferred and it may do so even while a case is sub judice.”16 Sub judice means still under the court’s consideration, and the phrase describes McCardle’s own posture: Congress repealed the appellate statute after briefing and argument and before decision, leaving the Court only the power to dismiss.17 That breadth explains the view’s appeal to critics of the Court’s decisions. Proposals to eliminate appellate jurisdiction over busing, abortion, and school prayer rested on it, though they failed in the 1970s and 1980s.18
Plenary describes the power inside the clause’s defined scope and does not extend past it. The exceptions language qualifies the appellate sentence only, so Congress cannot use it to make exceptions to the Court’s original jurisdiction, and a limit does not become an exception because Congress calls it one.19
The consul statute differs from the First Amendment example only in the category its cases occupy, which is why an exam answer begins by placing the case in the original or the appellate category before it applies the clause. Plenary also does not mean unconstrained by the rest of the Constitution. An answer that equates the two overstates the position, because even those who accept the traditional reading may conclude that Congress cannot violate other provisions of the Constitution in controlling appellate jurisdiction. A statute that arbitrarily excluded a class of litigants, or blocked review of constitutional-rights cases because Congress disliked the Court’s decisions in that field, would be vulnerable on that ground.21 Later sections take up those structural and external limits.
The status of the view also needs accurate statement. The scope of Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping power remains unresolved: McCardle is subject to a narrow reading, and the modern Court appears divided on the decision’s bottom line.22 Justice Douglas, dissenting in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, doubted that McCardle could command a majority today.23 The plenary view is therefore the traditional position, which the Court has never formally rejected, and the next subsection takes up the readings that contest it.
The Mandatory Interpretations
The plenary view reads the Exceptions Clause in isolation. The mandatory interpretations read it as one clause of a larger article, and they begin with a different sentence: the judicial power “shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.”25 The modifier “all” attaches to three of the subjects Article III lists, including cases arising under the Constitution and federal law.26 On the most modest version of the argument, that word requires that some Article III court, Supreme or inferior, be available to hear every such case.27
Stated as a limit on the Exceptions Clause, the minimal mandatory view holds that Congress may not use its exceptions power to remove the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution unless it vests jurisdiction over those cases in an inferior Article III court.28 The reason lies in what happens to “all” otherwise. If Congress could except a constitutional case from the Supreme Court and withhold it from every lower federal court too, no Article III court would remain for a category of cases the judicial power is said to reach in full, and the textual command would depend on legislative goodwill. The minimal view prevents that result and asks little in return: one forum must remain, and Congress may choose which.
The two versions of the school prayer statute show how little and how much the minimal view demands. The statute in the lead-in withdrew the claim from the Supreme Court and from every lower federal court, which eliminates Article III jurisdiction over a whole category of constitutional cases, so on this reading it exceeds the exceptions power.29 A statute drawn around the Supreme Court alone produces the opposite result.
The narrower statute survives because even a wholesale removal of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction would make the lower federal courts the final decision makers without ousting federal courts from judicial review itself. That arrangement is less unusual than it sounds. The original Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court no direct review of federal criminal cases, and because certiorari review is limited, the courts of appeals are in practice the last word in most cases today.30 The single fact that separates the two statutes is whether any Article III court is left, and the minimal view looks at nothing else.
The proviso in the McCardle holding has two clauses, and they line up with two different mandatory ideas. The Court allowed Congress to repeal a particular statutory avenue of Supreme Court review so long as it did not eliminate all avenues of Supreme Court review or all federal judicial review of constitutional claims. The second clause matches the minimal view, which asks only whether some federal court remains. The first clause points toward the stronger readings below, which care about what the Supreme Court itself retains. Whether either clause states a binding constitutional limit has never been squarely decided, so the proviso marks the open question and does not answer it.
A second family of mandatory arguments relies on Article III, Section 1 rather than on the word “all.” In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Justice Story reasoned that the judicial power “shall be vested,” not “may be vested,” in a Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress establishes, so Congress could not lawfully refuse to vest it.31 He then separated cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties, along with ambassador and admiralty cases, from the other enumerated controversies, and concluded that the judicial power must extend to every case in that first group, either originally or on appeal.32 Applied to the Exceptions Clause, that reasoning lets Congress shift such a case from one federal court to another but not remove it from the federal courts altogether, which comes close to the minimal view. Stronger versions treat the whole range of Article III jurisdiction as vested by the Constitution itself and read the exceptions power as authority to regulate only housekeeping matters.33
Neither the whole-range version nor the housekeeping limit has prevailed. Story’s remarks were dictum, and since 1845 the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the judicial power depends for its distribution and organization on Congress, which may withhold jurisdiction from the inferior courts in whatever degree it thinks proper.34 Practice points the same way. Congress has always required a minimum amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction, and it is hard to see why the Framers would have forbidden that way of conserving judicial resources.35 The claim that the exceptions power reaches only housekeeping matters also sits uneasily with history, because the 1789 Act gave the federal courts no general federal-question jurisdiction and no direct Supreme Court appeal in criminal cases.36 Those facts explain why the stronger mandatory readings remain arguments in the literature and have not become law.
A third argument reasons from the Supreme Court’s function in the constitutional plan rather than from a single word. The Convention expected the federal judiciary to maintain the uniformity and supremacy of federal law, and the Supreme Court was the focus of that expectation.37 From that premise the argument concludes that Congress may not exercise the exceptions power in a way that interferes with the Court’s essential or core functions.38 The mechanism is uniformity. Story’s rationale for Supreme Court review of state-court constitutional rulings makes the point: the Constitution must not mean fifty different things in fifty jurisdictions, and the same worry arises if jurisdictional statutes cut the Court off from constitutional questions.39 This essential-role reading differs from the minimal view in what it counts. The minimal view is satisfied by any Article III court, while the essential-role reading asks what the Supreme Court itself must keep. In its modest form the role survives when one means of approach is taken away and another is left open, as the habeas jurisdiction stayed open after McCardle, but depriving litigants of all access to the Supreme Court in cases involving the supremacy of federal law would be invalid.40
That reading has little or no direct authority, though a concurring opinion in Felker v. Turpin observed that stripping appellate jurisdiction could interfere with the Court’s constitutional supremacy.41 Its content is also disputed, because another account holds that even a complete removal of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction would leave the lower federal courts performing the essential role of judicial review.42 The narrower school prayer statute therefore passes the minimal view and the lower-court version of the essential-role view. It is in doubt under the version tied to the Supreme Court’s own supremacy, because it leaves no route to the Court for a class of federal constitutional cases. The same essential-function idea returns later in this chapter in connection with Klein.
Because each reading has support and none has prevailed, an answer needs to place the positions on a spectrum. The long-running debate over whether Congress must vest all of the judicial power defined in Article III, Section 2 in some federal court has produced four positions, and scholarly and judicial support can be found for each.43
- The constitutional grant is self-executing, so the courts can hear any part of the judicial power that Congress has not vested, on the Constitution’s authority alone.
- The constitutional language is mandatory and Congress should vest the whole judicial power, but the duty is unenforceable if Congress fails to act.
- Congress has discretion whether to give the federal courts any part of the judicial power, except that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is self-executing.
- Congress has wide discretion to grant or refuse jurisdiction, but due process limits that discretion.
A federal court of appeals embraced the first position in 1949 but was reversed on other grounds, and nearly two centuries of history stand against the claim that Congress must vest the entire judicial power.44 The fourth position is the one most likely to mark the outer boundary. A Second Circuit decision said that Congress has undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme Court, but may not exercise it so as to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process or to take private property without just compensation, and if any limit binds Congress, this is probably the maximum one.45 The logic is that closing every court to a claim of constitutional violation in effect denies the underlying right.46 A later section develops due process as the limit on lower-court jurisdiction.
On an exam, the mandatory interpretations count as arguments to weigh, not holdings to recite. The Supreme Court has adopted none of them, and it has generally avoided the choice by reading statutes narrowly, because it will not lightly assume that Congress meant to bar constitutional claims, a point the next subsection develops.47 The sorting question for a jurisdiction-stripping fact pattern is how many courts the statute closes. A statute that shuts every federal court to a class of constitutional claims is the case where the plenary and mandatory readings diverge, so the answer should argue it both ways and say plainly that the Court has not chosen. A statute that closes only the Supreme Court’s appellate route leaves an Article III court available and survives the minimal view. It comes into real doubt only under the readings that tie the Constitution’s guarantee to the Supreme Court itself.
Clear Statement and Avoidance
The two readings of the Exceptions Clause leave open whether Congress may close every federal forum to a class of constitutional claims. The plenary view treats the power to make exceptions as unlimited, while the mandatory view reads the judicial power over “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution” as requiring some federal court to remain available.49 Courts seldom have to choose, because a working rule of statutory construction usually removes the need. Whichever reading is correct, a court will not lightly assume that Congress meant to limit the authority of the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts to hear constitutional claims. In Demore v. Kim, quoting Webster v. Doe, the Court put the rule this way: “[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.”50 The rule governs how courts read statutes and decides nothing about what Article III requires, so it lets the choice between the plenary and mandatory views be avoided through statutory construction in case after case.51
The reason for reading this way lies in what the opposite approach would cost. If a preclusion provision were read to reach constitutional claims whenever its words could bear that meaning, every ambiguous statute would force a court to decide at once whether Congress may shut all federal courts to a constitutional claim, a question the plenary and mandatory views answer in opposite ways and no decision has settled. Webster v. Doe shows the alternative. The Court there said that denying all judicial review of a constitutional claim would raise a serious constitutional question, and it held that a statute giving the CIA director broad discretion over employment decisions did not bar a former employee from challenging his discharge on constitutional grounds in federal district court.52 A narrow reading is also cheap for Congress to correct. A legislature that truly wants to bar constitutional claims can say so, and the question then arrives in a case that squarely requires an answer. Ambiguity is thus resolved in favor of review, and the burden of drafting clearly falls on the institution that knows what it intends.
That practice has a name, constitutional doubt: when a statute is open to a fair reading that avoids a serious constitutional question, the Court adopts that reading. The Court has used the doctrine to narrow threatening jurisdiction-stripping statutes.53 A second reason lies in the Court’s own position. When the Court preserves its jurisdiction by construing a statute, it can present itself as exercising authority that Congress conferred. It avoids having to say that its authority comes directly from the Constitution and lies beyond Congress’s control, an announcement that could cost it a measure of legitimacy.54 The narrow reading protects the Court’s role without requiring it to declare a limit on Congress’s power.
The requirement applies with extra force to habeas corpus, the proceeding in which a court tests the lawfulness of a person’s detention. In Demore, a federal statute authorized the Attorney General to detain without bail certain lawful permanent resident aliens during deportation hearings, aliens who were deportable because of convictions for specified crimes, and the statute barred judicial review of the decision to detain them.55 The question was whether that bar also reached claims brought through habeas. The Court held that it did not, because the statute’s text disclosed no clear intention to preclude constitutional claims, and because barring habeas review requires an especially clear statement of congressional intent.56 Flat language forbidding “judicial review” of a decision was therefore insufficient, since a general bar says nothing about whether Congress considered the constitutional claim a prisoner brings through habeas.
Other decisions follow the same habit. In INS v. St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez v. INS, measures aimed at curtailing judicial review of deportation proceedings were construed to leave open the possibility of federal habeas review.57 The Court has generally struggled to avoid the conclusion that Congress has foreclosed all judicial review.58 Felker v. Turpin, discussed earlier in connection with McCardle, applied the technique to the Court’s own docket. Congress had restricted review of a court of appeals’ denial of leave to file a second or successive habeas petition, and the Court emphasized that the original writ remained available, a point that let it avoid the serious constitutional question a repeal of all appellate authority would raise.59 In each case the Court left a route to federal review in place and declined to say whether Congress could have closed it.
Clear text ends that strategy, and the Detainee Treatment Act litigation shows the sequence. The Act restricted the authority of federal courts to entertain habeas petitions from enemy combatants, and Salim Hamdan, who faced trial before a military commission, had a challenge pending in the Supreme Court when it took effect. The government moved to dismiss on the ground that the statute created a lawful exception to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, in a replay of McCardle. The Court held its appellate jurisdiction intact, explaining that ordinary principles of construction were enough to rebut the government’s argument as to pending claims, and it left avoidance principles available for other settings.60 Congress answered in 2006. The Military Commissions Act restated and expanded the habeas restrictions and declared that it applied to “all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act,” dropping any suggestion that some habeas petitions might remain in the federal courts.61 A statute written that plainly satisfies the clear-statement requirement. It leaves a court with nothing to construe and puts the constitutional question directly before it.
The step that does the work is the second, which is why the fourth is so seldom reached in actual cases. An exam answer that jumps to the competing readings of the Exceptions Clause for a statute that never mentions constitutional claims has skipped the step that decides most disputes. The rule also postpones the constitutional question without answering it. Each decision above narrowed a statute and did not test its validity, so no holding says whether Congress could close every federal forum to a constitutional claim, and the plenary and mandatory readings remain competing arguments.