Concept
Hans and Own-Citizen Suits
Does state sovereign immunity bar the suit?
Hans and Own-Citizen Suits
The Eleventh Amendment's words bar suits against a State by citizens of other States and by citizens or subjects of foreign states. A plaintiff who is a citizen of the defendant State fits neither description, and a literal reader would let that plaintiff sue in federal court. Hans v. Louisiana (1890) refused to read the Amendment that way. It held that the Amendment, by implication, also bars a citizen's suit against his own State.1 That is so even when the claim arises under federal law, and it is so unless the State consents or Congress validly abrogates the immunity, two exceptions taken up below. Hans is where the doctrine leaves the Amendment's text behind, so the Court's route matters as much as its result.
Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, sued the State in federal court to recover the value of repudiated state bonds. He argued that the repudiation violated the Constitution's prohibition on state impairments of the obligation of contract.2 The bonds had been issued during Reconstruction.3 Because the claim arose under the Constitution, Hans did not try to enter through either door the Amendment had boarded up, a suit by a citizen of another State or by a foreign citizen. He came in through the federal-question door, and the Court dismissed the action anyway.4
The Court had already met the same Louisiana measure. Earlier cases arose under the Constitution and challenged laws said to impair the obligation of contracts, among them the Louisiana constitutional amendment Hans now complained of, and they sought relief against state officers who professed to act under those laws. The Court held the suits to be virtually against the States themselves and barred by the Eleventh Amendment, though no one denied that they presented cases arising under the Constitution.5
Hans answered with two linked arguments. He was a citizen of Louisiana, and the Amendment prohibits only suits by citizens of other States and by citizens or subjects of foreign states.6 And the jurisdictional clauses covering cases arising under the Constitution and laws make no exception for the character of the parties, so a State has no exemption when a case really arises under federal law.7 The Court accepted part of this. Jurisdiction that depends only on the character of the parties does not embrace a controversy between a State and its own citizens, but jurisdiction can rest on the federal question instead, and "with regard to ordinary parties this is undoubtedly true."8 On the text, the Court also gave ground: "It is true, the amendment does so read: and if there were no other reason or ground for abating his suit, it might be maintainable."9 The case therefore turned on whether another reason existed. The Court found three.
The first reason is the anomaly in Hans's reading. If the Amendment's list of plaintiffs were exhaustive, a State sued on a federal claim could refuse an out-of-state citizen in federal court yet have to answer its own citizen there on the same claim, and it could be sued in federal court although it allowed no such suit in its own courts.10 The Court then asked whether the States would have ratified such an Amendment. Suppose Congress had proposed it with a proviso preserving suits against a State by its own citizens on federal questions. "The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face." States that indignantly repelled suits by outsiders would hardly have left their own citizens free to bring the same suits.11
The second reason is historical. The Court found in the defense of the Constitution an understanding that a sovereign is not suable by individuals without its consent. Hamilton argued that contracts between a nation and individuals "are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretension to a compulsive force." They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will, and a recovery against a State could be enforced only by waging war on it, so the federal courts could not be given such a power by mere implication.12 Marshall, answering the same objection, said that it is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court.13 The Court called these views "most sensible and just." Hans's appeal to the letter of the text was the same appeal the Constitution's opponents had made, and the reason against it, the Court said, "is as strong in this case as it was in that."14
The third reason lies in the fate of Chisholm v. Georgia. Adhering to the mere letter of the clause extending federal judicial power to controversies between a State and citizens of another State, the Court there had held a State suable by such a citizen. Justice Iredell read the clause in light of history and experience and the established order of things, and the Hans Court thought his views "clearly right," as the people confirmed when they adopted the Eleventh Amendment.15 Hans's reading would produce a result, the Court said, "no less startling and unexpected" than Chisholm itself.16 The suability of a State without its consent, the Court added, "was a thing unknown to the law," and reading the Constitution to create it was "an attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of."17
After Hans, then, a plaintiff's citizenship does not decide whether the bar applies. A reader who looks only at the Amendment's words will conclude that a citizen of the defendant State may sue, and Hans rejected that conclusion. Every private plaintiff is subject to the bar, whether a citizen of another State, a foreign national, or the State's own citizen.18
The hypothetical turns on consent, and consent raises a puzzle. The Amendment says that "the Judicial power" does not extend to the suit, so it is not obvious how a State can confer jurisdiction the Constitution withholds. The courts have answered by treating the Amendment as granting a personal immunity founded on sovereign immunity, and a personal immunity can be waived.19 Later courts have found the reasoning adequate, though not everyone finds it logically tidy.
Justice Harlan's concurrence states the holding without the history. He agreed that a suit directly against a State by one of its own citizens is not one to which the judicial power of the United States extends unless the State itself consents to be sued, and on that ground alone he assented to the judgment. He rejected the majority's comments on Chisholm as unnecessary to the decision, and he thought Chisholm rested on a sound interpretation of the Constitution as it then was.20
The Court did not treat a State's default as costless. A departure from the rule that a State honors its obligations, except for reasons most cogent, "never fails in the end to incur the odium of the world, and to bring lasting injury upon the State itself." But the legislature, and not the courts, is the judge of those reasons, and to deprive the legislature of the power of judging what the State's honor and safety require, even at the expense of a temporary failure to discharge the public debts, would bring greater evils than the failure itself.21
The bar also reaches beyond the federal-claim setting of Hans. A narrow majority later held that the Eleventh Amendment bars even prospective relief against a state official if the legal basis for the relief is state rather than federal law, and that it does so even when the official acts contrary to state law.22 Suits against state officers receive full treatment below.
Later decisions have refused to confine the principle to the Amendment's words. The Court has held nonconsenting States immune from suits by federal corporations, foreign nations, and Indian tribes, though none of those plaintiffs appears in the text, and it has held sovereign immunity a defense in admiralty, though the Amendment addresses only suits "in law or equity."23 In the Court's words, the States are protected "by the same fundamental principle" from suits by their own citizens or by federal corporations, although such suits are not within the Amendment's explicit prohibitions.24
The Court has also declined invitations to return to the text. In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, four Justices argued that the Amendment reaches only diversity suits and that Hans should be overruled, and the majority left Hans in place.