Concept
Suits in the State's Own Courts
Does state sovereign immunity bar the suit?
Suits in the State's Own Courts
The Eleventh Amendment withdraws from “the Judicial power of the United States” any suit against a State brought by citizens of another State or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state, and it says nothing about a State’s own courts.1 That silence invites a workaround. Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction,2 but a state court is not a federal court, so Congress might direct it to hear the damages claim that a federal court may not. Alden v. Maine (1999) closed that route. The States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond Congress’s power to abrogate by Article I legislation, so no clear statement can overcome it.3 Read together, Seminole Tribe and Alden mean that Commerce Clause-based statutes may not be enforced by private parties seeking damages against unwilling States and their agencies in either federal or state court.4
Alden began as a wage dispute. Private plaintiffs invoked the Fair Labor Standards Act against Maine, and Maine’s courts refused to hear the claim, treating sovereign immunity as a bar.5 The same five Justices who had come together in Seminole Tribe sustained that refusal over the dissenters’ objection.6
The argument for letting the suit proceed seemed to take three easy steps. The Eleventh Amendment by its terms limits only the “Judicial power of the United States.” Testa v. Katt held that Congress may force state courts to hear federal claims. And Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority left no doubt that the FLSA applies to state employers as fully as to private ones.7 The majority conceded the first step as a truism about the Amendment’s literal terms. But the bare text is not an exhaustive description of the States’ constitutional immunity, and the cases did not decide whether the States keep that immunity in their own courts when Congress attempts to abrogate it.8
The dissent put the same argument in constitutional terms. Once Maine created state courts of general jurisdiction, the Supremacy Clause required those courts to entertain the federal cause of action, and Maine had offered no valid excuse for refusing. Sovereign immunity could not be that excuse, the dissent said, because a State is not sovereign with respect to the subject of the claim against it. Nor could dignity justify the immunity, since republican government rests on the understanding that the government is not above its citizens but of them, and is governed by law as they are.9
The majority could concede the first step because the Court had long treated the immunity as wider than the Amendment’s words. The Court’s departure from the text began in Hans v. Louisiana (1890), where a Louisiana resident sued his own State on repudiated bonds, relied on federal law, and argued that the Amendment did not embarrass him because he was not among the plaintiffs its text names.10 Hans itself called it “clearly established” by recent decisions that a State cannot be sued by a citizen of another State or of a foreign state on the mere ground that the case arises under the Constitution or federal law, and those earlier suits were held barred although no one denied that they arose under the Constitution.11 Neither a federal question nor a gap in the Amendment’s wording had opened the courthouse to such suits. Alden asked whether a change of courtroom would.
The Amendment’s wording is narrow because it answered specific provisions of the constitutional text. Hamilton, defending the Constitution, wrote that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent,” and that unless the plan of the convention surrendered the immunity, it would remain with the States.12 Article III expressly contemplated jurisdiction over suits between States and individuals, and the Amendment was directed at those provisions, the only ones believed to call the States’ immunity into question. Nothing in Article III or elsewhere suggested that a State could not assert immunity in its own courts or that Congress could abrogate it there.13 The Congress that endorsed the Amendment also rejected language that would have limited it to cases where the States had made a remedy available in their own courts. Implicit in that rejection was the premise that the States kept their immunity and the authority to decide whether to allow private suits against themselves in their own courts.14
Practice and precedent point the same way. The FLSA provisions at issue in Alden are among the first statutes to subject nonconsenting States to private suits in express terms, and similar statutes, however numerous in the last generation, are “of such recent vintage” that their force is “far outweighed by almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice.”15 The Court’s earlier cases, for their part, suggest that the States retain a constitutional immunity from suit in their own courts, and they often described the immunity in sweeping terms without reference to whether the suit was prosecuted in state or federal court.16
Structure supplies the rest of the reasoning. The immunity of one sovereign in the courts of another has often depended in part on comity or agreement, which is why a suit like the one in Hall, where the Court held Nevada subject to an unconsented tort suit in a California court, raises a separate question taken up in the next section.17 A sovereign’s immunity in its own courts, by contrast, has always been understood to be within the sovereign’s sole control.18 A power to press a State’s own courts into federal service to coerce the State’s other branches would be “the power first to turn the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of the State against its will.”19 Money makes the point concrete. A judgment creditor of a State may have a legitimate claim, but other needs compete for the public fisc, and if representative government is to be preserved to the States, the balance must be struck “after deliberation by the political process established by the citizens of the State, not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the private citizen.”20 The comparison with federal courts completes the argument. Congress cannot abrogate a State’s immunity in federal court, and if it could do so in state court, “the National Government would wield greater power in the state courts than in its own judicial instrumentalities.”21
The remaining steps of the plaintiffs’ argument fail for separate reasons. Congress may require state courts to hear only “matters appropriate for the judicial power,” and the Court’s sovereign immunity precedents establish that suits against nonconsenting States are not “properly susceptible of litigation in courts.”22 The dissent’s Supremacy Clause argument fails because the Clause makes supreme only those federal acts that accord with the constitutional design, so an appeal to the Clause alone merely raises the question whether Congress validly exercised national power.23 And Garcia proves less than it seems. That the FLSA binds the States answers a question about duty, and the Court agreed that States and their officers must obey the Constitution and valid federal statutes. Their privilege to assert immunity in their own courts confers no right to disregard those obligations; it decides only whether a private plaintiff may force the State to answer for a breach.24
Every fact in Alden favored the plaintiffs except the identity of the defendant. The statute binds state employers, and the plaintiffs chose a state courthouse. The immunity attaches to the defendant, so neither the strength of the claim nor the choice of forum can displace it. A case with two defendants shows where it stops.
The county escapes the bar because the immunity belongs to States and not to their subdivisions. Local governmental units are “persons” under § 1983 and enjoy no Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Seminole Tribe and Alden leave municipalities unaffected.25 A later section returns to local governments, but the first move on any fact pattern is to identify the defendant: the State, an arm of the State, or something less.
The Court did not treat its holding as the end of federal law’s force against States. A State’s privilege to assert immunity in its own courts confers no right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law, and the opinion identified limits built into the principle itself.26 Four of them keep federal law enforceable, and each has its own section on this page:
- A State may consent to suit: immunity bars suit only in the absence of consent, many States have enacted statutes consenting to a wide variety of suits, and the Federal Government retains the means to seek a State’s voluntary consent to private suits.27
- The United States and other States may sue: in ratifying the Constitution the States consented to such suits, and a suit prosecuted in the name of the United States by officers charged with faithfully executing the laws “differs in kind from the suit of an individual.”28
- Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, because that Amendment required the States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty the original Constitution preserved to them.29
- Individuals may seek declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers under Ex parte Young, a rule premised on the fact that immunity bars relief against States and their officers in both state and federal courts, so that certain officer suits must be allowed if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land.30
Alden itself illustrated the second route: although Maine was shielded from the private suit, the United States could have enforced the Act against it.31 Federal agencies such as the Department of Labor likewise keep the power to enforce commerce-based statutes against States and state agencies.32 The majority counted on the States’ good faith as “an important assurance” that federal law would be obeyed even where a private damages remedy is unavailable.33 The dissenters said the approach “comes perilously close to legitimizing political defiance of valid federal law,”34 and they doubted that enforcement by the Secretary of Labor alone could secure compliance among some 4.7 million employees of the fifty States, noting Congress’s own finding that the Secretary’s enforcement capability is not alone sufficient.35 Those objections measure the rule’s cost. They do not change it.
A comparison with National League of Cities v. Usery shows how much the rule protects, and how little. That decision held that applying the FLSA to states and their subdivisions violated the Tenth Amendment in “areas of traditional governmental functions,” and Garcia later overruled it.36 Seminole Tribe and Alden give States less protection than National League of Cities did in some respects. That decision wholly barred any state or local employee from seeking any remedy of any kind under the FLSA from a public employer whenever the law obstructed “integral” governmental operations, while the later cases block only money-damages actions. Even so, their impact has been profound, because they remove the private damages remedy for Commerce Clause statutes against unwilling States in both court systems.37