Concept
Fourteenth Amendment Abrogation
Has the state waived immunity or has Congress validly abrogated it?
Fourteenth Amendment Abrogation
The Eleventh Amendment overruled Chisholm two years after that decision, and it withdrew from the federal judicial power "any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."1 On that text the Court has built an immunity that yields when a state consents or Congress validly abrogates it.
Seminole Tribe held that Article I powers, including the Indian Commerce Clause, cannot support abrogation, so the question for any statute is narrow: did Congress pass it under a constitutional provision that grants the power to abrogate?2 The Fourteenth Amendment is the principal such provision.
The Fourteenth Amendment can do what Article I cannot for two reasons: it came later, and it speaks to the states directly. Section 1 contains prohibitions expressly directed at the States, and Section 5 expressly gives Congress power to enforce them.3 A power to enforce limits on state conduct must operate on states, and requiring a state to answer a private suit for violating a guarantee is one way of enforcing it. The Article I powers entered the Constitution together with Article III, while the Fourteenth Amendment arrived well after the Eleventh Amendment and after ratification of the original Constitution.4
The first subsection below states the rule and traces it to Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. The second states the rule's limit: Section 5 authorizes enforcement of rights as the Court defines them, so a statute must fit the violations it targets, and a statute that satisfies the clear statement requirement can still fail there.
Section 5 and Fitzpatrick
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article,"5 and legislation under that grant may authorize private suits against nonconsenting states.6 The rule comes from Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. Seminole Tribe counts Fitzpatrick as one of only two decisions that had upheld abrogation; the other, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., rested on the Interstate Commerce Clause, and Seminole Tribe overruled it as wrongly decided.7
Fitzpatrick concerned the application of Title VII to state employers. Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, three of the four statutes at the core of federal employment discrimination law, all recur in the cases below.8 The Court upheld Title VII's extension to state employers as a proper exercise of power under the Fourteenth Amendment and held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an award of back pay and attorneys' fees against them.9
That result needed an explanation. Hans had established that individuals' suits against states fall outside Article III, and Congress cannot give federal courts jurisdiction beyond what Article III defines.10 Fitzpatrick answered that the Eleventh Amendment and "the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies" are "necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Congress acts under Section 5 with plenary legislative authority, and it acts under an amendment whose other sections "embody limitations on state authority," so it may "provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts."11
Two considerations support that reasoning. The text of Section 1 restrains the states, and Section 5 empowers Congress to enforce the restraint, so the enforcement power aims at the very entities the Eleventh Amendment protects.12 The chronology carries more weight. Alden v. Maine describes the point as a surrender: in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people required the States to give up a portion of the sovereignty the original Constitution had preserved to them, and the Amendment "fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution."13 The text alone does not set the Fourteenth Amendment apart, since the Impairments Clause also limits the states and the Court had long held that sovereign immunity limits it. The later date, in the Court's view, made all the difference.14
Seminole Tribe used that chronology to confine Fitzpatrick. The Court explained that Fitzpatrick rested on a rationale "wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause": the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the Eleventh, altered the balance between state and federal power that Article III and the Eleventh Amendment had achieved.15 Fitzpatrick therefore cannot justify limiting the Eleventh Amendment principle "through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution."16 The Commerce Clause is such an antecedent provision, and a power that arrived with the limit cannot be the lever that overrides it. The Union Gas plurality had thought otherwise, reasoning that the power to regulate interstate commerce would be "incomplete without the authority to render States liable in damages."17
The Title VII extension in Fitzpatrick and this statute share a prohibition on employment discrimination, a clear authorization of suits against state employers, and a damages remedy. They differ in the power behind them, and that difference decides the outcome: a Section 5 statute can lift the immunity, subject to the limit discussed next, and a Commerce Clause statute cannot.
Because the abrogation comes from the statute, a claim that rests on the Fourteenth Amendment alone leaves the immunity intact. Fitzpatrick did not hold that the Amendment itself negates state sovereign immunity; the decision rested on Congress's express abrogation under Section 5. In the absence of a statute, the state is immune even when the case rests on the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1983 does not lift the immunity, because it does not expressly authorize suits against states, and states and their officials acting in their official capacity are not "person[s]" within its meaning.19
The logic is not peculiar to the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress may abrogate under its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power as well, and the same reasoning appears to reach the Thirteenth Amendment and the enforcement powers of the Nineteenth and Twenty-sixth Amendments.20 What these provisions share is a later date, limits on state action, and an enforcement grant to Congress. The Court sorts powers by when and why they were granted, not by how weighty the regulated subject is. Section 5 authorizes only "appropriate legislation," however, and the next subsection takes up what that requires.
Congruence and Proportionality
Section 5 does not rescue every abrogation, because it grants a power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and no more. The Court fixed that limit in City of Boerne v. Flores. It described the Section 5 power as "remedial," and it held that "[t]he design of the Amendment and the text of §5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States."22 In the Court's words, "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is."23 Boerne thereby rejected an expansive reading of Section 5 built on Katzenbach v. Morgan, and the history of the Amendment shows that the Enforcement Clause is remedial rather than substantive.24 Congress holds the power to enforce, and the courts keep the power to say what counts as a violation.
The limit matters because Seminole Tribe left Section 5 as Congress's route to abrogation. If Congress could decide for itself what the Amendment forbids, it could label any Article I regulation of state conduct a due process or equal protection remedy, and the rule of Seminole Tribe would bind only a Congress that forgot the label. The Court recognized that "[t]he distinction between remedial and substantive legislation is one of degree rather than of kind," that "[t]he line is a fine one," and that Congress must have wide latitude in drawing it. But the distinction "exists and must be observed," and it is policed by a standard of fit: "There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." Without such a connection, legislation "may become substantive in operation and effect."25
Applied to abrogation, the Boerne test has two parts. Congress may act only to prevent or remedy violations of rights the Fourteenth Amendment protects, and the abrogation must be congruent and proportionate to the injurious conduct identified.26 The first part fails when the interest the statute protects is not one the Amendment covers. The second fails when Congress made too little a finding of unconstitutional state conduct to justify the remedy.27 Congress must show a pattern of state constitutional violations, and the showing comes more easily when the state conduct draws heightened scrutiny.28 A remedy that reaches every state needs evidence that states generally violate the right.
The second step usually decides the case, because the level of scrutiny fixes how much state conduct is unconstitutional to begin with. Age-based and disability-based classifications draw only rational-basis review and pass if a rational basis supports them at a class-based level.29 The Constitution forbids little there, so a statute that reaches broadly sweeps in much lawful conduct, and Congress needs a record of discrimination so irrational and pervasive as to justify remedial legislation.30 Sex-based classifications must serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to them, so more state conduct is unconstitutional and it is "easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations."31 The Court's results track that line. When the state conduct draws deferential review, the Court tends to find abrogation neither congruent nor proportional, and when it draws intermediate or strict scrutiny, the Court more readily finds abrogation congruent and proportionate.32
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents shows a statute that was clear in every other respect failing at the second part. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act stated plainly that it reached the states, so it satisfied the clear statement requirement. But age is not a suspect class, and an age classification passes if it is rational, so the Act prohibited far more state conduct than the Constitution does.33 The abrogation failed.
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs came out the other way for another employment statute with unmistakable abrogation language. The family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act targets sex discrimination, which draws heightened scrutiny, so Congress had an easier time showing a pattern of state violations.34 Congress had evidence that leave for fathers is rare, that men "receive notoriously discriminatory treatment in their requests for such leave," and that differential leave policies rested on the "pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women's work."35 The Court accepted an across-the-board, routine benefit for all eligible employees, because it keeps family-care leave from being stigmatized as a drain caused by female employees and keeps employers from evading leave obligations by hiring men.36 Kimel and Hibbs both involved state employers, and what separates them most is the tier of scrutiny, which determined how much of each statute's reach the Constitution already covered and how readily Congress could document violations.
The same Act can produce both results, as Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland shows. Coleman tested the self-care provision, which gives leave for the employee's own illness, and the abrogation failed. When the Act passed, nothing suggested that states had facially discriminatory self-care leave policies or administered such policies in a discriminatory way. The provision's legislative history speaks of the economic burden of illness-related job loss and of discrimination based on illness, not sex. The petitioner argued that the provision helps single parents keep their jobs and, because most single parents are women, remedies neutral leave restrictions with a disparate impact on women.37 That argument did not save the abrogation. Provisions of the same statute therefore stand or fall separately: the family-care provision answered documented sex stereotyping, while the self-care provision answered illness-related hardship that Congress never tied to a pattern of unconstitutional state conduct.
The Americans with Disabilities Act yields both outcomes, and the difference tracks the right at stake. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court considered the Act's employment provisions in Title I. People with disabilities are not a suspect class, so state treatment of them draws only rational-basis review. Abrogation therefore required a showing that states had followed a pattern of discrimination against the disabled so irrational and pervasive as to justify remedial legislation, and the Court concluded the showing had not been made.38
Tennessee v. Lane reached the opposite result for another title of the same Act. The plaintiff, a disabled litigant, claimed denial of access to a state court. The Court found that he had stated a claim for violation of his right of access to the courts, a right rooted in the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and it held that the ADA had properly abrogated state immunity at least as applied to constitutional claims for denial of court access.39 United States v. Georgia applied the same approach to a disabled prisoner who alleged confinement in conditions that violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The complaint alleged serious mistreatment, and the Court reiterated that state conduct violating the Fourteenth Amendment may justify abrogation.40 Prisoner plaintiffs of this kind are often indigent and cannot afford lawyers; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) authorizes courts to ask attorneys to represent indigent parties in federal lawsuits, but courts use that authority in only a small fraction of cases.41 Disability is the classification in all three cases, so it does not explain the split. In Garrett the claims drew only rational-basis review and Congress had not shown a sufficient pattern; in Lane and Georgia the abrogation reached conduct that itself violated the Fourteenth Amendment or denied a constitutional right of court access.
The patent and trademark cases show the first part and the pattern requirement at work without any dispute about scrutiny. In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, Congress could not abrogate to protect either "a right to be free from a business competitor's false advertising about its own product" or "a more generalized right to be secure in one's business interests," because neither is a property right that the Due Process Clause protects.42 Congress cannot enforce a right the Amendment does not protect, so that statute failed the first part.
Florida Prepaid failed at the second part. The Patent Remedy Act's "indiscriminate scope" was "particularly incongruous in light of the scant support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that Congress intended to remedy."43 A simple infringement by a state is not a constitutional violation, because a due process violation arises only when a state infringes and fails to provide an adequate remedy, and Congress had documented little of either. Congress had aimed to give inventors a uniform procedural remedy and to put states on the same footing as private parties. Those are proper Article I concerns, but Article I does not authorize abrogation and cannot justify action under the Fourteenth Amendment.44
Where abrogation failed, the flaw was often the same: Congress had not connected the remedy it created to the protection of a judicially recognized constitutional right.45 The cases sort as follows:
- The abrogation was upheld in Hibbs (family-care leave, a sex classification, documented stereotyping), in Lane (access to the courts), and in Georgia (conduct that itself violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
- The abrogation failed in Kimel (age), Garrett (employment disability), Coleman (self-care leave), College Savings (false advertising, no protected property interest), and Florida Prepaid (patents, scant evidence of unconstitutional state conduct).