Concept
Working the Problem
Has the state waived immunity or has Congress validly abrogated it?
Working the Problem
Every damages claim against a state starts at the Eleventh Amendment, which withdraws from the federal judicial power any suit against one of the United States by citizens of another state or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state.1 The text names only those two kinds of plaintiff, yet the immunity built on it also protects a state from its own citizens, so the analysis begins with the defendant and not with where the plaintiff lives.
Two decisions mark where the analysis can end. Seminole Tribe holds that Congress's Article I powers, such as the Indian Commerce Clause, cannot abrogate state immunity from private suit in federal court, so outside bankruptcy a valid abrogation must rest on the enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment. Alden carries the Article I limit into the state's own courts. The earlier sections taught these pieces one at a time; this section puts them into one sequence of questions that you can run on any fact pattern. The sequence assumes that the defendant is the state itself or an arm of the state, and a suit against a state officer for prospective relief takes the route in the last step.
The questions run in this order because each one can end the analysis before the next is reached. Consent comes first: a state that has consented has no immunity left to override, so the statute and Congress's power never matter. The clear statement question comes second because it requires only a reading of the enacted text, and a plaintiff whose statute does not name the states loses without any constitutional question being reached. Power comes third, and within it congruence and proportionality keep Section 5 from becoming a label that Congress could attach to any regulation of state conduct. Only when those routes close does the analysis turn to remedies that do not depend on a private damages suit against the state.
The path is the same in either forum, because Alden carries the Article I limit into the state's own courts; a plaintiff who loses at the fourth step gains nothing by refiling the same federal claim in state court. The sixth step exists because the immunity does not shut every door. Individual victims can still seek injunctions against state officials, the United States can still sue nonconsenting states, and Fitzpatrick still permits Congress to authorize some suits against states under the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.6 The Alden majority leaned on those routes to soften the decision's impact, and the dissenters were unimpressed by the effort.7 A plaintiff who ends at the sixth step has lost the private damages claim against the state, but federal law remains enforceable through the other routes.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act shows how the third and fifth steps come apart. A state university professor suing the state for damages has no consent to point to, but the Act speaks plainly about the states, so the third step favors her. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents the Court nonetheless held the abrogation invalid, because age is not a suspect classification and Congress identified no pattern of unconstitutional age discrimination by the states that could justify a remedy so broad. Clarity at the third step therefore decided nothing at the fifth. The damages claim fails, yet the Act still reaches state employers: the immunity runs against private plaintiffs and not against the federal government, so the EEOC may still bring ADEA claims against state and local governments.8
The Family and Medical Leave Act shows the fifth step turning on a single provision of one statute. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs the Court held that Congress validly used Section 5 to subject states to damages suits under the family-care provision, because that provision answers gender-based discrimination in the workplace, state sex-based distinctions draw heightened scrutiny, and Congress could therefore more readily show a pattern of constitutional violations. In Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland the Court agreed with every court of appeals to consider the question and held that suits for money damages against states under the self-care provision are barred; a plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy distinguished Hibbs.9 The plurality saw no sign that states maintained discriminatory self-care leave policies, and it found the provision out of proportion to any remedial purpose. An answer that says the Act does, or does not, abrogate state immunity is therefore incomplete: the same Act, the same state, and the same clear statement produce opposite results depending on the provision the plaintiff invokes. The statute's recital of Section 5 does no work in either case; the right being enforced and the evidence connecting the remedy to violations of it separate the two outcomes.
An essay may ask why a bankruptcy trustee can reach a nonconsenting state when a copyright owner cannot, since both statutes rest on Article I. In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz the Court held that Congress, under its bankruptcy power, may let the federal courts proceed against nonconsenting states in bankruptcy cases, as when a trustee sues state colleges to recover preferential transfers.10 The Court's reasons were that bankruptcy jurisdiction is principally in rem over the debtor's estate and that the states agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert immunity against orders ancillary to it. Allen v. Cooper then refused to carry that reasoning to the copyright power: a videographer who sued North Carolina for infringing his shipwreck footage could not rely on the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, and the Court called Katz a "good-for-one-clause-only" holding.11 The Court did not fully foreclose the possibility that sovereign immunity might not apply in march-step fashion across every Article I power, but for now bankruptcy is the only Article I power outside the Seminole Tribe rule. If the state is immune, the merits never arrive, not even a fair-use defense, which copyright courts now decide chiefly by asking whether the use is transformative.12 The resulting rule of thumb is that Congress may abrogate when it exercises power under the post-Civil War amendments or the Bankruptcy Clause, and may not abrogate when it exercises the other powers granted by the original Constitution.13
The two suits show why the second step must be asked about the forum as well as the claim. Consent is measured by what the state unequivocally declared, so a declaration that opens the state's own courts leaves the federal courts closed.14
A strong exam answer names the step at which the damages claim stops and then lists the routes that remain open.