Concept
Advisory Opinions and State Judgments
Case or Controversy and Advisory Opinions
Advisory Opinions and State Judgments
The ban on advisory opinions limits the Supreme Court's review of state-court judgments, just as it limits the Court's answers to requests from the President and Congress. The Court's power to hear appeals from state courts was itself once contested. In Cohens v. Virginia, an appeal from a criminal prosecution that Virginia had brought, the state argued that Article III's grant of original jurisdiction over cases "in which a State shall be party" implicitly forbade the Court from exercising appellate jurisdiction in state-party cases.1 This unit concerns a narrower limit on how far review reaches once the Court may hear a case. The Court will not review a state judgment that rests on an adequate and independent state ground. Justice Jackson explained why in Herb v. Pitcairn: "[o]ur only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights," and "our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions."2 If the state court would render the same judgment after the Court corrected its view of federal law, the review "could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion."3
The rule applies Article III directly. Article III, § 2 limits the judicial power to actual cases and controversies, so if nothing more is at stake than an abstract question of law, the Court cannot hear the matter.4 A federal ruling that cannot change what the state court did settles only an abstract question, because the parties leave with the judgment they already had. Two requirements keep the Court from issuing such a ruling. The state ground must be adequate, meaning it supports the judgment standing alone, and it must be independent, meaning it rests on state law and not on the state court's view of federal law.
The order of inquiry has reversed over time. Under the older sequence, associated with Murdock v. City of Memphis, the Court reached the federal question before asking whether state law could dispose of the case on its own. Later Courts inverted that sequence to avoid advisory opinions on federal law, and today the Court dismisses for lack of jurisdiction if an adequate and independent state ground exists.5 The hard work lies in deciding whether the ground is both adequate and independent, and the next two subsections take up each requirement in turn.
Whether Article III compels the doctrine is less settled. The Court has been uncertain whether it is a prudential limit on appellate jurisdiction or a firm statutory or constitutional restriction. The early cases seem to have treated it as prudential, a way to control a docket that parties could invoke as a matter of right, while later cases such as Herb treat it as compelled by the ban on advisory opinions.6 The constitutional footing also draws doubt. There is historical evidence that Congress intended review of the whole case, the Court has sometimes found it unnecessary to decide whether the rule is constitutional because a statutory basis suffices, and a federal ruling issued despite an alternative state ground looks more like a moot decision than an advisory one, since the case remains a concrete controversy.7 Even mootness, which the Court calls a constitutional requirement, it has been willing to relax in the public interest.8
Adequate State Grounds
A state ground is adequate when it fully sustains the result and does not itself violate the Constitution or federal law.9 The test follows from Herb: remove the federal question from the case and see whether the state judgment survives. If it does, a ruling on the federal question would be advisory, because by definition it could not alter the result.10
Both halves of the definition do work. A ground that supports only part of the judgment leaves room for a federal ruling to change the outcome. A ground that itself violates federal law is a different matter, because the litigant attacks that very ground and the Court's answer can alter the judgment.
A ground of substantive state law shows the rule at its simplest. Suppose a state supreme court holds that a defendant cannot be prosecuted for a state-law crime because the state criminal statute does not cover the conduct, and adds that the statute is in any event invalid under the federal Constitution. The statutory holding is an adequate and independent ground for the dismissal. The defendant goes free whether the Supreme Court agrees or disagrees with the constitutional holding, so nothing the Court says could bear on the result.11
Procedural grounds raise harder questions. A substantive ground decides what state law means or how it resolves the merits, while a procedural ground decides how and when a claim must be raised. The standard example is a contemporaneous objection rule, which bars a litigant from raising a federal constitutional claim because the objection was not made in a timely manner.12 Because such a rule disposes of the federal claim without reaching its merits, the Court asks whether the rule deserves to carry that weight.
The first question screens out a rule that is itself unconstitutional. The second asks what the rule is for, and a contemporaneous objection rule plausibly has a purpose, since it lets the trial judge correct an error while correction is still possible. The third asks whether the state treats the rule as a rule. A procedure enforced against some litigants and excused for others has not been applied in a consistent fashion.
The Court tends to uphold procedural forfeitures unless the state court appears to have seized on a pretext to avoid the federal claim. In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, for example, the Court treated as adequate a state forfeiture rule applied to a noncitizen criminal defendant who failed to object in time to a violation of rights under a treaty.14 The opposite extreme is a default so trivial that it cannot be taken at face value, such as dismissing a complaint that states a federal constitutional claim because it contained two misspelled words.15 Even an otherwise adequate procedure can be overcome if the litigant shows cause and prejudice, meaning a good reason for not following the procedure and a resulting harm. The standard is hard to meet.16
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson marks the inadequate side of the line. The Alabama Supreme Court relied on a state-law ground to refuse to adjudicate the NAACP's First Amendment challenge to a contempt-of-court citation, and the Court held that the ground was inadequate.17 The exception exists so that a state's authority over its own law cannot insulate federal claims from review. A ground so ad hoc or unreasonable that it suggests a deliberate attempt to avoid Supreme Court review will not keep the Court out.18
Independent State Grounds
A state ground is independent when the state court's judgment does not depend on that court's view of federal law. A ground that borrows its content from a federal ruling supports the judgment only until the Supreme Court corrects that ruling. Suppose a state court suppresses evidence under its own constitution only because it reads the federal Fourth Amendment cases to require suppression. If the Supreme Court corrects that reading, the state ground falls with it, and the state court may well enter a different judgment. Review of that decision can change an outcome and is therefore not advisory. The advisory-opinion problem arises only when the state court would render the same judgment after the Supreme Court corrected its views of federal law.20 The working question follows from the posture of the appeal: could reversal on the federal ground affect the judgment below?21
Michigan v. Long rests the doctrine on two commitments. One is avoidance of advisory opinions, which reflects "the limitations of our own jurisdiction" and cites Herb. The other is respect for the independence of state courts.22
The difficulty is that opinions do not always say which body of law did the work. Before Long, the Court's options were all unsatisfactory. It could examine state law to decide what the state court had done, and so end up deciding issues of state law that go beyond the opinion under review. It could require state courts to clarify their decisions, an intrusive practice. Or it could dismiss outright, but dismissal leaves federal law uncorrected when an opinion rests primarily on federal grounds and the independence of any state ground is not apparent from the four corners of the opinion, and federal law needs uniformity.23
Long replaced those practices with one presumption. When a state decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with it, and the adequacy and independence of any possible state ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, the Court accepts that the state court decided as it did because it believed federal law required the result, and it takes jurisdiction.24 The state court has two ways to avoid that outcome. If it merely relies on federal precedents as it would on those of any other jurisdiction, it need only state plainly that the federal cases serve as guidance and do not themselves compel the result. If its decision indicates clearly and expressly that it rests alternatively on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, the Court will not undertake review.25
In Long itself, the third step found nothing. The Michigan Supreme Court held a search of a vehicle's passenger compartment unconstitutional, explaining that the Court of Appeals had erroneously applied the principles of Terry v. Ohio to the search of the interior of the vehicle. Apart from two citations to the state constitution, the court relied exclusively on its understanding of Terry and other federal cases, and it cited not a single state case for its holding.26 The Supreme Court concluded that the references to the state constitution in no way indicated an independent ground. Even if Michigan's constitution protects some rights also secured by the Fourth Amendment, the opinion fairly appeared to rest primarily on federal law, and the Court took jurisdiction.27 A passing citation to the state constitution therefore cannot make a ground independent. What counts is what the opinion relied on and what it says about that reliance.
A single sentence from the Michigan court would have changed the result.
The two opinions might discuss nearly identical federal precedents. The difference lies in what each state court says its judgment rests on, and a state judge can supply that difference in one sentence.
Placing the burden of clarity on the state court makes sense on both sides. The state court knows which law it applied and can say so briefly. The Supreme Court could reconstruct the answer only by studying state law or by requiring state courts to clarify their decisions to its satisfaction, which the Court called an unsatisfactory and intrusive practice.28 The presumption favoring review protects the other side of the arrangement. If the Court dismissed on the mere possibility of a state ground, a ruling that actually rests on federal law would escape correction, and federal law would lose its uniformity.29 The approach also avoids advisory opinions and leaves state judges a clearer opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference, since a plain statement is all it takes to place a state-law holding beyond federal review.30
Two features keep the presumption in proportion. It applies only when the opinion fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law and the independence of any state ground is unclear, so an opinion that makes its reliance on state law evident is left alone. And in close and difficult cases the Court may still remand to the state supreme court for a clarification of the basis of its decision.31