Concept
Poe v. Ullman and Dormant Laws
Ripeness
Poe v. Ullman and Dormant Laws
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), shows what ripeness does to a challenge against a law that sits on the books and is never used. The criminal statute in Poe had gone unenforced for decades, and the Court dismissed the constitutional attack on it. When a statute has never been enforced and carries no realistic threat of enforcement, the dispute is effectively hypothetical, the case-or-controversy requirement is unmet, and federal courts will not issue an advisory opinion on the dormant law, however weighty the constitutional question it raises.
The previous section showed why a plaintiff who has not been threatened cannot sue: the feared injury depends on a future decision by an official who may never make it. A dormant statute presents the same problem on a larger scale. The law exists, and its text forbids the plaintiffs’ conduct, but the prosecution they fear rests on a decision that decades of practice suggest will never be made. A ruling would announce what the Constitution means for a prosecution that may never come, and announcing that is the advisory function the case-or-controversy requirement forbids. Poe therefore takes up the next question: when is a law that undeniably exists still too remote from the plaintiff to adjudicate?
The sections below take the case in three steps. The first is the record that drove the result. The second is the reasoning the Court gave for withholding decision, including why a request for declaratory relief did not help. The third is the disagreement among the Justices, which shows where the doctrine’s edges lie.
The Unenforced Connecticut Statute
Poe v. Ullman dismissed a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute that Connecticut had left unenforced for decades. The Court held the suit unripe: where a statute has never been enforced and no realistic threat of enforcement exists, the dispute is effectively hypothetical, and federal courts will not issue advisory opinions on the dormant law.1 Because the holding rests on the record that Connecticut’s own conduct created, the facts carry the doctrine.
The statute prohibited the use of contraceptives and had been on Connecticut’s books since 1879.2 It reached the Court once before, in Tileston v. Ullman (1943), where a physician argued that it kept him from advising patients whose health pregnancy would endanger. The Court unanimously refused to decide the Fourteenth Amendment question, because the doctor alleged no injury to himself and could not enter court by asserting harm to his patients.3 The Poe suits added patients, who could assert stakes of their own. Dr. C. Lee Buxton, a Yale professor of obstetrics and gynecology and medical director of the Planned Parenthood Center in New Haven, joined married patients Paul and Pauline Poe and Jane Doe in actions seeking declaratory relief, meaning a ruling on the parties’ legal rights without damages. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors sustained demurrers (motions asserting that the complaint fails to state a claim) and dismissed the actions, and two appeals reached the Supreme Court in 1961.4
What the plaintiffs could not overcome was Connecticut’s enforcement record. In more than three-quarters of a century, a prosecution under the statute seems never to have been initiated except in State v. Nelson, which began when doctors and a nurse at a birth-control clinic were arrested and charged with advising married women on the use of contraceptives.5 Even that single prosecution went nowhere, because the prosecutor eventually refused to proceed.6 Meanwhile contraceptives were sold openly in Connecticut drug stores, and no prosecutions were recorded for those sales either.7
Those open sales say something about the plaintiffs’ own position. Public commercial sales would draw an enforcer’s attention sooner than a doctor’s private advice to individual patients and the patients’ private use of what was prescribed, so officials who ignored the visible conduct were unlikely to pursue the invisible kind.8
From that record the Court concluded that Connecticut’s silence worked like a promise. When a prosecutor expressly agrees not to prosecute, a suit against him is not the kind of adversary case the Court will review, and eighty years of Connecticut history showed a similar, if tacit, agreement.9 Because the State had not chosen to press enforcement, the controversies lacked the immediacy that is an indispensable condition of constitutional adjudication, and the Court refused to be umpire to debates over “harmless, empty shadows.”10
The physician fared no better. A deterrent effect supports a suit when it rests on a realistic fear of prosecution, but the Court called the fear of enforcing provisions that had gone unenforced for so many years chimerical. Dr. Buxton’s compliance was therefore uncoerced, and his patients could not obtain a declaratory judgment on the strength of his reluctance.11 A prosecutor’s bare claim of power to enforce did not change the result either, and Justice Harlan faulted the majority for ignoring exactly that claim, made in these very proceedings.12
A tempting error is to call an old, plainly burdensome criminal statute ripe because the right at stake is weighty. Ripeness asks something else: whether the State is actually likely to use the law against these plaintiffs. The age of a statute matters only as evidence on that question, and evidence of a fresh, specific threat can reverse the answer.
The doctrine keeps a discretionary edge, and Epperson v. Arkansas shows its other side: the Court there reached the merits of an anti-evolution statute that had also gone unenforced for decades. Poe itself calls justiciability a concept without fixed content, shaped by “many subtle pressures,” among them the appropriateness of the issues for decision and the actual hardship to litigants of denying relief.13 Federal courts accordingly keep some room to decide whether a pre-enforcement challenge is ripe, which is why both withholding review of a dormant law and reaching its merits can be defended.14 Five Justices voted to dismiss Poe on justiciability grounds, but Justice Frankfurter wrote for only four of them, and Justice Brennan supplied the fifth vote on narrower reasoning, a division taken up below.15
Strict Necessity and Declaratory Relief
The Court’s caution in Poe did not come from the case-or-controversy requirement alone. It rested on the rules summarized in Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, which grow from two roots. One is the adversary system, which produces its soundest results when a lively conflict between antagonistic demands, actively pressed, makes resolution of the issue a practical necessity. The other is the tripartite structure of the national government and the restricted role it assigns the federal courts.16 That structure limits Congress as well: Article III bars Congress from telling a court how to apply preexisting law to particular circumstances, although Congress may amend a law and make the amended prescription apply in pending cases.17 Both roots bear on ripeness, because a dispute that turns on events yet to occur has not produced the conflict the adversary system relies on.
These restraints press with special urgency when a plaintiff asks a federal court to strike down legislative action, and Poe repeats the Court’s warning not to entertain constitutional questions in advance of “the strictest necessity.”18 The reason lies in what judicial review does. A court that holds a statute invalid displaces a choice made by an elected legislature, and judicial review sits uneasily with majority rule. A policy of strict necessity helps ensure that the power is not exercised gratuitously, and the idea of judicial review as a reluctant power, used only because the Court must decide the cases brought before it, supports the same policy.19
Poe then folds the timing and party doctrines into a single idea. Standing, ripeness, and mootness, each with its own varied application, are manifestations of one conception: federal judicial power is exercised to strike down legislation, state or federal, only at the instance of one who is immediately harmed, or immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged action.20 The three doctrines divide one question among them. Standing asks whether the person suing is the person the law is hurting. In a challenge to an Arizona tax credit, for example, the objectors lacked standing because taxpayers who contributed to the credit-eligible organizations spent their own money, not money the State had collected from the objectors.21 Ripeness asks whether the harm or threat has become immediate, and mootness asks whether it still is. A suit that rests on events that have not happened asks for an answer that may never be needed, and with no concrete facts to define its edges, the ruling has nothing to keep it narrow.
The same principle demands a genuine adversary. Poe relies on the statement in Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Wellman that the power to invalidate legislation is legitimate only as a last resort, as a necessity in determining a real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals, and that it was never meant to let a party beaten in the legislature move the fight to the courts through a friendly suit.22 The Court has accordingly refused cases lacking “a collision of actively asserted and differing claims,” even when the suit is not collusive in the derogatory sense of a dispute got up to secure an advantageous ruling.23 The mechanism is easy to trace. If the parties do not press opposing positions, the court hears one side, or two sides that agree, so the issues are never sharpened and the court cannot test the reach of its ruling against a real conflict.
The friendly suit is the plain case. Suppose a landlord who wants to challenge a federal rent-regulation statute supplies a tenant with a lawyer to sue him for violating it, a pattern the Court rejected in United States v. Johnson. The parties have staged the dispute, and the court must dismiss for want of a case or controversy. Poe shows a quieter way for adversity to fail. The plaintiffs had staged nothing, yet a prosecutor’s express agreement not to prosecute would leave a suit short of a genuine adversary case, and eighty years of Connecticut history showed a similar, tacit agreement.24 The landlord’s suit fails because the parties manufactured the opposition; the Poe suit fails because the defendant, by long conduct, had no opposition to offer.
What does a plaintiff gain on the timing question by asking for a declaratory judgment instead of an injunction? Nothing. The Court has been on the alert against using the declaratory judgment device to avoid the rigorous insistence on “exigent adversity” as a condition of adjudication.25 A justiciable controversy differs from a dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character, and from one that is academic or moot, and every matter pending before an Article III court must satisfy that constitutional minimum.26 A declaration is a remedy the court grants, and a court can grant a remedy only in a case already within its power. If a request for a declaration could itself create the controversy, any litigant could turn an abstract constitutional question into a lawsuit by rewording the prayer for relief.
The Declaratory Judgment Act also leaves the court discretion to refuse relief. Poe recalled that the extent to which declaratory procedure may be used in federal courts to control state action lies in the sound discretion of the Court, and it described that discretionary element as a convenient instrument for making effective the policy against premature constitutional decision.27 In deciding whether to grant a declaration, courts ask whether it will serve a useful purpose and whether it will effectively settle the controversy.28 In Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover the Court read the Act as an authorization to grant declaratory relief, not a command to do so.
Declaratory relief nonetheless has real work to do, and the contrast locates the line. The usual way to test a statute is to violate it and object in the criminal prosecution, which forces a person to choose between obeying a law that may be invalid and risking punishment under one that may be valid. Congress enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934 to spare people that risk.29 A grocer who is genuinely ready to open on Sunday, facing a prosecutor who is genuinely threatening to prosecute under a Sunday-closing law, presents a real case and controversy, and a declaratory judgment is most appropriate.30 What separates the grocer from the Poe plaintiffs is the threat: the grocer faces a live prosecutor, while the Court read Connecticut’s history as showing no real threat to the plaintiffs.
The same line appears when the parties are branches of government. A President who asks the courts whether a contemplated executive order would be lawful is asking for advice about a hypothetical, and a justiciable controversy is something different.31 Once the order issues and a state refuses to comply, an executive officer’s suit for a declaration presents an actual dispute between adverse parties. A live defendant does not guarantee a ripe question, however. In Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co. the Court declined to give a company a declaration that its activities were interstate commerce beyond the state commission’s reach, because the question was so broad that deciding it would reach far beyond the particular case.
Poe closes this part of its analysis by finding that both considerations it had named, the appropriateness of the issues for decision and the hardship to the litigants of denying relief, supported withholding decision.32 Both show in the facts. A statute that had gone uniformly unenforced gave the Court no concrete application against these plaintiffs to examine, and because the Court treated the fear of enforcement as chimerical, refusing a ruling cost them little. Those two considerations, the fitness of an issue for decision and the hardship of withholding it, are the seed of the two-factor ripeness test the next section develops.33
Brennan’s Concurrence and the Dissents
Poe v. Ullman produced no majority opinion. Justice Frankfurter wrote a plurality opinion for four Justices, meaning an opinion that announces the Court’s judgment with fewer than five votes, and Justice Brennan supplied the fifth vote to dismiss on narrower reasoning.35 Brennan agreed that the appeal had to be dismissed because it failed to present a real and substantial controversy that unequivocally called for adjudication of the claimed rights before the State tried to curtail them by criminal prosecution.36 His vote completed the majority, so his narrower ground marks the least that the dismissing Justices shared, and the dissents read most clearly against it.
What Brennan found missing was proof about the plaintiffs’ own situation. On what he called a “skimpy” record, he was not convinced that these appellants as individuals were truly caught in an “inescapable dilemma.”37 In his reading of Connecticut’s history, the true controversy concerned opening birth-control clinics on a large scale. That was what the State had prevented in the past, and the use of contraceptives by isolated married couples was not.38 The clinic arrests recorded in the case fit that reading, since no comparable prosecution of couples appeared.39 The State had never made a definite and concrete threat to enforce the statute against individual married couples, except under the provocation of litigation, so these plaintiffs could point to no threat aimed at them.40 Brennan would wait until the real controversy flared up again, or until such a threat reached individual couples, before using what he called the Court’s most delicate power of constitutional adjudication.41 A prosecutor’s letter naming the plaintiffs’ planned conduct would have been the kind of fact he was asking for, and the Poe record contained nothing like it.
Justice Harlan dissented on the same record and found a complete dispute. The appellants had stated in their pleadings, fully and unequivocally, what they intended to do, and no clarifying or resolving contingency stood in their way. Nothing besides detection or prosecution made the controversy remote.42 That an actual prosecution would make the controversy still more unavoidable did not, for Harlan, make it too remote at the stage of anticipatory relief, and he observed that neither the plurality nor the concurrence suggested what more “grist” the judicial mill needed.43
The two positions divide over what counts as a contingency. Brennan treated the State’s willingness to prosecute individual couples as an open question on this record. Harlan thought it destroyed the whole purpose of anticipatory relief to treat the prosecutor’s discretion, once all legal and administrative channels were cleared, as analogous to the contingencies that make a controversy remote.44
Harlan also attacked the inference at the center of the plurality’s reasoning. He thought the plurality and the concurrence had confused a prediction, that the prosecutor would probably leave the appellants alone so long as they did not draw attention to themselves, with an entirely suppositious “tacit agreement” not to prosecute. In doing so, he said, they ignored the prosecutor’s claim, asserted in these very proceedings, of a right to enforce the statute at his unbounded discretion.45 A prediction of restraint can fail the day an official changes course, while a binding agreement would remove the threat, and only the second supports calling the dispute hypothetical.
On Harlan’s account, the most substantial claim the married persons pressed was their right to enjoy the privacy of their marital relations free of the criminal law’s inquiry. That enjoyment is impinged, he argued, when the only thing standing between them and being forced to render criminal account of their marital privacy is “the whim of the prosecutor.” Connecticut’s highest court had told the Justices in the clearest terms that, given proof, the prosecutor would succeed against appellants who took the very actions they announced.46 Harlan could not regard the discouragement of the appellants’ liberties as “less present, or less real” because it flowed from their reluctance to submit their freedom from prosecution to the discretion of Connecticut’s prosecutors.47 The plurality saw something different. In its view the absence of demonstrated enforcement showed an absence of exigent adversity, and the physician’s compliance was uncoerced by any realistic fear of prosecution.48 The two sides thus disagreed about whether any present injury existed at all. On Harlan’s view a dispute is ripe when the plaintiffs have unequivocally pleaded their conduct, no contingency remains besides discretionary enforcement, and the chill from the threat is already felt. The same facts were unripe on Brennan’s view because no definite threat had ever been aimed at couples.
Justice Douglas, also dissenting, said the statute “reaches into the intimacies of the marriage relationship” and warned that full enforcement would reach the point where search warrants issued and officers appeared in bedrooms to find out what went on.49 For the plurality, the answer to such concerns was that to pass on the statutes now, in order to protect appellants from the hazards of prosecution, would be to “close our eyes to reality.”50 Critics of the decision answer that the Court seemed to tell potential plaintiffs that the only way to test a law is to violate it and risk punishment, the very risk the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 was meant to spare them.51
The two sides track the two costs a ripeness ruling can impose. Deciding early on a thin record risks answering a constitutional question in the wrong posture, which was Brennan’s worry. Waiting forces ordinary people either to give up what they claim as a right or to break the law to get a hearing, which was the worry of Harlan and Douglas.
The constitutional question did not stay unanswered. In Griswold v. Connecticut the Court later held the Connecticut statute unconstitutional in a case that reached it through a prosecution, the concrete enforcement Brennan had found missing. That route also required the step the dissenters objected to, which was to violate the statute and submit to prosecution.
The Poe opinions also show that the concreteness a Justice demands can track that Justice’s view of the merits.52 Adler v. Board of Education illustrates the point. A judge who believed a state could never condition public employment on the surrender of constitutional rights would need a less complete record than Justice Frankfurter, who thought the validity of the law’s application depended on what an individual teacher might actually say.53 The difference is the one between a facial and an as-applied attack. A Justice who sees a law as invalid, or valid, in every application finds little use for further facts, while a Justice who sees both valid and invalid applications needs a record showing which one the plaintiff presents.54 Brennan wanted more than a skimpy record, and Harlan could not say what more a record needed, so the two weighed the same pleadings against different views of what a decision on these claims required.
A ripeness answer built on Poe should therefore name the facts that move the line. Have the plaintiffs pleaded definite intended conduct? Does any contingency of application remain? Has the State made a definite threat against these plaintiffs themselves, as distinct from clinics or others, or only under the provocation of litigation? Poe states no clear criteria, since the Court called justiciability a concept without fixed content.55 The next section turns to the leading two-factor test, which gives the inquiry more structure.