Concept
Doubtful Cases Before Long
The “adequate and independent state ground”
Doubtful Cases Before Long
The adequate and independent state ground doctrine is easy to apply when a state court announces which ground decided the case. It is hard to apply when the court cites federal and state law side by side and never says which one carried the judgment. Michigan v. Long arose from such an opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the deputies' search of a vehicle was forbidden by the Fourth Amendment and by article 1, section 11 of the Michigan Constitution, yet it referred to the state constitution on only two occasions: once in a footnote that merely cited both constitutions, and once in the sentence announcing that holding.1 Whether those two references made the state constitution an independent ground for the judgment was a jurisdictional question, and the Court could not leave it to the state court. It was "incumbent upon this Court . . . to ascertain for itself . . . whether the asserted non-federal ground independently and adequately supports the judgment."2
Before Long, the Court dealt with such opinions in three ways and chose among them case by case. Each method carried a cost, and Long later counted all three against the Court's own practice:
- The Court sometimes dismissed on the strict view that a ground of decision that was at all unclear defeated review, as in Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson. The cost was unreviewed federal law. The need for uniformity in federal law goes unsatisfied when the Court declines to review an opinion that rests primarily on federal grounds merely because the independence of an alleged state ground is not apparent from the four corners of the opinion.3
- The Court sometimes vacated or continued the case so that the state court could clarify its ruling. The cost was delay, lower efficiency in judicial administration, and, more important, a burden on state courts, which had to demonstrate the presence or absence of the Court's jurisdiction.4
- The Court sometimes examined state law itself to decide the nature of the state court's decision. The cost was that the Court had to interpret state laws with which it was generally unfamiliar and which the parties had often not discussed at length.5
Dixon v. Duffy shows a further difficulty with asking state courts to clarify: they may not answer. The Court continued that case twice to obtain clarification, but none came. The California court informally advised counsel that it doubted its jurisdiction to render such a determination, and the Court ended by vacating the judgment and remanding.6 A state court that declines to explain itself leaves the Court where it began, with added delay. Long called the practice of requiring state courts to clarify their decisions to the Court's satisfaction both unsatisfactory and intrusive.7
The deeper difficulty was inconsistency. Long described the Court's ad hoc handling of these cases as "antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is required when sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved," and observed that none of the methods recommended itself as the one to apply to the exclusion of the others.8 The inconsistency mattered because the doctrine rests on two commitments: respect for the independence of state courts and avoidance of advisory opinions.9 The second follows from the limits of federal review. The Court may correct state judgments that wrongly decide federal rights, but it may not revise opinions, and if the state court would reach the same judgment after the Court corrected its view of federal law, review would amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.10 Respect for state courts and the wish to avoid advisory opinions were the reasons Long gave for no longer deciding issues of state law beyond the opinion under review and no longer requiring state courts to reconsider cases to clarify their grounds.11
The opposite risk, leaving federal law unreviewed, carried particular weight because state courts handle the vast bulk of criminal litigation. In 1982 more than 12 million criminal actions (excluding juvenile and traffic charges) were filed in the fifty state court systems and the District of Columbia, against about 32,700 in the federal courts. State courts must apply federal constitutional standards, and in doing so they create a considerable body of "federal law." The Court's interest in that body had grown as it imposed more federally created standards on the States.12
Long replaced the three techniques with a single approach. The Court expected it to spare the Court from examining state law in most cases, to avoid the danger of advisory opinions, and to end the practice of requiring state courts to clarify their decisions. It would also give state judges a clearer opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference while preserving the integrity of federal law.13 The Court quoted National Tea Co. for the balance it was striking: "It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action."14
Remand for clarification did not disappear. The Court originally prescribed it in three circumstances: where state law changed after the state court's judgment in a way that might affect the case, where the record did not clearly reflect the facts underlying the federal issue, and where the actual ground, state or federal, for the state decision was not clear. The first two survive today, and the Court has dispensed with the third, though only sometimes.15 Long itself acknowledged that clarification may still be necessary or desirable in certain circumstances.16 The rule it adopted for the doubtful opinion, a presumption in favor of jurisdiction, is the subject of the next section.