Concept
What Political Questions Are
Political question doctrine
The Political Question Doctrine
What Political Questions Are
Federal courts decide only the kinds of disputes that judges ordinarily decide, and four doctrines police that boundary: standing, ripeness, mootness, and political questions.1 Each is designed, at least in part, to keep Article III courts out of matters that would take them beyond the sphere of activity commonly associated with judging.2 The first three also weigh factors other than separation of powers, such as timing and the plaintiff's injury. The political question doctrine looks only at how authority is divided among the branches.3 Everything that follows rests on that point: this is a separation-of-powers doctrine.
Judicial review is the power to interpret the Constitution in deciding cases and controversies. In one category of cases, the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution to conclude that the issues are not proper ones for a court to decide.4 Those questions go to the elected branches, Congress and the President, to be resolved fully and finally.5 Marbury v. Madison itself recognized the idea when it said the president holds certain important political powers, such as the veto, in the exercise of which he uses his own discretion and is “accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience.”6 Where the doctrine applies, the non-judicial branch becomes the final arbiter of the constitutionality of its own conduct.7
Beginning with Baker v. Carr, the Court has asked two questions. Does the Constitution make a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”? Or do the courts “lack discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it”?8 The first asks who decides, and the second asks whether any legal standard exists to decide with. The two blend at the edges, but analysis often treats them separately, and the next section does the same.9 Of the two, the Court treats an explicit textual commitment as the strongest sign that a case should be dismissed.10 Baker itself called the nonjusticiability of a political question primarily a function of the separation of powers.11
The label misleads, because an election, a party fight, or a famous officeholder invites the reflex to call a dispute political. Baker said the doctrine concerns “political questions,” not “political cases,” and added that courts cannot reject as “no law suit” a bona fide controversy over whether some action called “political” exceeds constitutional authority.12 In Bush v. Gore, the Court agreed to hear a challenge to the way the Florida Supreme Court had ordered ballots counted in that state's presidential election. The issues were political in several senses, yet the Court concluded they did not lie beyond judicial competence.13 Baker, an apportionment challenge, came out the same way.14 Political stakes do not make a question political in the doctrinal sense. Assignment to a political branch does, as does the absence of a legal standard.
Nixon v. United States supplies the contrast. The Court held nonjusticiable a challenge to the Senate's impeachment procedures, because Article I gives the Senate the “sole Power to try all Impeachments.”15 Impeachment, a presidential election, and legislative districting are all political in the everyday sense. What separates them is who the Constitution makes the final decider. A court that second-guessed the Senate's trial procedures would be overruling a coordinate federal branch on a power the text hands to that branch. A challenge to a state's district lines under the Equal Protection Clause puts no federal political branch's authority at stake. An exam fact pattern full of elections, parties, and prominent officials therefore settles nothing by itself, and the question to ask is who holds final authority.
A finding that a question is political ends the case without a ruling on the merits. The political branch's decision stands, and so does its own reading of its constitutional powers.16 Dismissal does not mean the Senate's procedures were wise, or even correct. It means the Constitution leaves that judgment to the Senate and no court reviews it.
The doctrine does not let a political branch declare its own conduct beyond review. Baker called the question whether a matter has been committed to another branch, or whether that branch has exceeded whatever authority was committed, “a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation” and a responsibility of the Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.17 The Court therefore decides for itself whether a commitment exists and how far it reaches. Later sections apply that principle in detail.
The identity of the defendant matters too. Baker found that in the Guaranty Clause cases and the other political question cases, the question arises from the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the federal government, and not from the federal judiciary's relationship to the states.18 A challenge to state action alone, such as a districting claim, therefore does not raise the problem. A state defendant does not always end the matter, however. In Gilligan v. Morgan, a challenge to a state's training of its national guard was nonjusticiable because the Constitution places authority to oversee that training in Congress.19