Concept
Classic Applications
Political question doctrine
Classic Applications
The considerations in Baker v. Carr become concrete in three settings where the Supreme Court has declined to decide constitutional claims: the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4, the amendment process of Article V, and the Senate’s procedures for trying impeachments. In each, two of Baker’s considerations arrive together. The Constitution assigns the matter to a political branch, so the text says whose judgment controls. The same provision supplies no legal measure for second-guessing that judgment, so a court that intervened would be applying its own view rather than a rule of law.
| Setting | Constitutional text | Who decides | Anchor case |
|---|---|---|---|
| Republican form of state government | Art. IV, § 4 | Congress | Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon |
| Ratification of amendments | Art. V | Congress | Coleman v. Miller |
| Impeachment trial procedure | Art. I, § 3, cl. 6 | The Senate | Nixon v. United States |
A dismissal on these grounds does not say that the political branch acted wisely, or even correctly. It says that the Constitution leaves the question with that branch, which resolves it fully and finally.1 The courts, for their part, decide for themselves whether the Constitution commits a question to another branch and how far the commitment reaches.2 The three settings also differ in scale. The Guarantee Clause concerns the character of an entire state government, the amendment process concerns how the Constitution itself changes, and impeachment concerns one chamber’s procedure at one trial.
The Guarantee Clause
Article IV, Section 4 provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”3 That promise leaves open the question that matters in litigation: who decides whether a state government keeps it? The Court has answered that Congress decides, and in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon it dismissed a claim that a state had lost its republican form of government as a political question beyond judicial power. The rule descends from Luther v. Borden, and the cases that followed show how to separate a genuine Guarantee Clause claim from another claim that merely borrows its theory.
Luther began as a private suit whose outcome turned on which of two groups was the lawful government of Rhode Island, because the plaintiff’s right to recover depended on which group was entitled to recognition.4 The trial court refused to receive evidence or hear argument on that issue, charged the jury that the earlier established “charter” government was lawful, and entered a verdict for the defendants, which the Supreme Court affirmed.5 The Court rested its decision on the clause itself. Because the United States guarantees each state a republican government, Congress must decide which government is the established one before it can decide whether that government is republican. When Congress admits a state’s senators and representatives, it recognizes both the authority of the government that appointed them and its republican character, and that decision “is binding on every other department of the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.”6
Luther looks like a dispute between a private party and the agents of a state government, but the real conflict was between the federal judiciary and Congress over which of them could judge a state government’s republican character. The Court concluded that Article IV, Section 4 textually commits the “republican” question to Congress.7 Later descriptions confirm that reading. Luther refused to decide which of two competing bodies was the legitimate government of Rhode Island and rejected the Guarantee Clause as a basis for adjudication, and Pacific States refused to decide whether a state could adopt legislation by initiative or referendum.8
Baker v. Carr identified what made the Luther question political: the commitment of the decision to the other branches, the President’s unambiguous recognition of the charter government, the need for finality in that recognition, and the lack of criteria by which a court could tell which form of government was republican.9 Baker treated the last feature as the one that matters for later cases. The Guarantee Clause is no repository of judicially manageable standards for identifying a state’s lawful government, and the Court has since refused to treat the clause, which alone had been invoked, as a source of a constitutional standard for invalidating state action.10 The missing standard follows from the word itself. “Republican” does not tell a court whether a government with a particular mix of voting rules and lawmaking procedures falls inside the guarantee, so any ruling would rest on the judge’s own theory of good government.
The same rule applies when a claimant uses the clause against Congress. In Georgia v. Stanton, Congress had refused to recognize the republican character of the suing state’s government and had decided that the effects of the recent hostilities required extraordinary measures to restore governments of a republican form. The only constitutional claim the state could present arose under the Guarantee Clause, and the Court refused to interfere with Congress’s action at the behest of a claimant relying on that very guarantee.11
Pacific States carried the doctrine into an ordinary tax dispute. Oregon had amended its constitution to reserve to the people the power to propose and enact laws independently of the legislature and to approve or reject its acts,12 and in 1906 voters used the initiative to enact a license tax of two percent on the gross revenue that telephone and telegraph companies earned from business done within the state.13 The company struck some of its own defenses from its answer, and the defenses that remained rested exclusively on one theory: adopting the initiative and referendum had impaired the powers of the state’s government under Article IV, Section 4.14 That theory reduced the case to a single issue, whether enforcement of the guarantee is exclusively committed to Congress or is judicial in character.15
The scope of the theory showed why a court would find it political. If sound, it would affect not just this tax but every statute Oregon had passed since adopting the initiative and referendum, and in essence it asserted that Oregon had no legislative or judicial function at all.16 The Court dismissed the writ of error for want of jurisdiction, because the issues had long since been determined to be political and governmental, within the powers conferred on Congress and beyond the reach of judicial power.17
The Court described the company’s position partly by what it left out. The company did not contend that it could not be required to pay a license tax, did not assert that it was denied an opportunity to be heard on the amount, and pointed to nothing inhering in the law that violated its own constitutional rights; had it raised any of those points, they would have been justiciable.18 The attack was instead “not on the tax as a tax, but on the State as a State,” a demand that Oregon establish its right to exist as a state republican in form.19 A litigant who attacks a tax asks whether an exercise of power injured the litigant’s own rights, which is ordinary judicial work. A litigant who attacks the state as a state asks whether the government may act at all, and the Constitution gives that question to Congress.
The company’s pleading also used the vocabulary of equal protection and due process, and the Court looked past those labels. Every reason offered for those propositions rested solely on Section 4 and on the contention that the initiative left Oregon unable to levy any tax without violating the Fourteenth Amendment, so, “considering the substance of things,” the claims were the Guarantee Clause claim under other names.20 Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington shows the other side of the line. There the Court refused to consider whether a workmen’s compensation act violated the Guarantee Clause but considered at length, and rejected, the due process and equal protection arguments made against the act.21 Those arguments had content of their own, so they were decided. The rule serves the doctrine’s purpose, since a plaintiff who could convert a Guarantee Clause claim into an equal protection claim by changing its caption would leave the missing standard and the commitment to Congress untouched.
Not every dispute about how a state organizes or runs its government is political. Baker offered contrasting examples in which the Court decided such disputes on the merits because a court could measure the claim. The Court reversed a state court’s ruling that Nebraska’s governor was not a citizen and so could not continue in office, and it examined under the Fourteenth Amendment whether officials had been removed from public office by procedures consistent with due process. It also applied the Fifteenth Amendment to strike down a redrawing of municipal boundaries that discriminatorily impaired voting rights, even though a majority of the court of appeals had seen a sweeping commitment of that power to state legislatures.22
The rule remains current. Rucho v. Common Cause concerned partisan gerrymandering, the use of redistricting to “load the dice” in favor of the party that designs the map.23 Of one objection to the practice the Court said that it “seems like an objection more properly grounded in the Guarantee Clause,” and it added that the Court has several times concluded that the clause does not provide the basis for a justiciable claim, citing Pacific States.24 A grievance about the fairness of democratic institutions therefore gains nothing by being recast as a failure of republican government. The Constitution does speak to the election of Representatives, in the Elections Clause, which assigns to state legislatures the power to prescribe the times, places, and manner of congressional elections and gives Congress the power to make or alter those regulations.25 Congress has regularly exercised that power, including to address partisan gerrymandering.26 A later section takes up Rucho’s full reasoning.
The Amendment Process
Coleman v. Miller is the leading case on the amendment process, and it raised two hurdles that a plaintiff must clear separately: standing and the political question doctrine. The legislators who sued cleared the first and lost on the second. The dispute began in Kansas, where the legislature had rejected a proposed federal amendment, the Child Labor Amendment, and later, at a special session called by the governor, adopted a resolution ratifying it.28 The lieutenant governor, presiding over the state senate, cast the deciding vote for ratification. Twenty-one legislators who had voted against ratification, joined by a taxpayer, sued in the Kansas Supreme Court to compel the removal of the ratification endorsement from the resolution, and that court held that the lieutenant governor could cast the deciding vote and that the ratification was effective.29
The plaintiffs who mattered were the legislators. They had voted against ratification, and the lieutenant governor’s deciding vote carried the resolution over them; if their contentions about the earlier rejection and the passage of time were correct, the ratification was ineffective and their votes should have prevailed. The stake is personal for a reason that follows from how legislative office works. A legislator exercises the office by voting, and an official act that cancels a vote that would otherwise have prevailed takes something from that legislator in particular. Later decisions on legislative standing treat Coleman as the model for legislators who argue that their institutional power has been impaired.30 The question was contested, since four Justices took the view that the petitioners had no standing in the Court,31 but the Court went on to decide the case.
Standing opened the door, and the Court then held the central questions nonjusticiable. Baker v. Carr summarized the holding: how long a proposed amendment remains open to ratification, and what effect a prior rejection has on a later ratification, were committed to congressional resolution and involved criteria of decision that necessarily escaped the judicial grasp.32 Each half of that summary has its own source. The commitment comes from Article V, under which Congress may fix a reasonable limit of time for ratification. Coleman reasoned that when Congress fixes none, the question of a reasonable time lies within the congressional province, to be decided when three-fourths of the states have ratified and the time arrives to promulgate the amendment, and that Congress’s decision would not be subject to review by the courts.33
The missing yardstick supplies the other half. A court asked what time is reasonable would have to appraise a great variety of political, social, and economic conditions that can hardly be said to fall within the range of evidence a court may receive. The Court thought it an extravagant extension of judicial authority to decide the validity of a ratified amendment on judicial notice of such conditions, which are appropriate for the political departments, and it called the questions essentially political and not justiciable.34 Coleman named the two dominant considerations in this category: the appropriateness, under our system of government, of attributing finality to the action of the political departments, and the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination.35 Finality carries particular weight here. An amendment is either part of the Constitution or it is not, and everyone who must obey or administer the document needs one authoritative answer. Baker later carried the same reasoning to the enacting of statutes: the respect due to coequal and independent departments, and the need for finality and certainty about a statute’s status, make courts reluctant to inquire whether a statute, as passed, complied with all requisite formalities.36
The second question, the effect of an earlier rejection, was resolved the same way. The Court held that whether a ratification that follows a prior rejection is effective, absent a definite limitation imposed by Congress, is a political question.37 Coleman drew support from the Guarantee Clause line. In Pacific States the Court had considered that questions under the guaranty of a republican form of government had long since been “definitely determined to be political and governmental,” so that whether Oregon’s government had ceased to be republican was a question for Congress, to be finally settled when Congress admitted the state’s senators and representatives.38 The amendment process and the Guarantee Clause thus belong to one family: the Constitution gives the question to Congress, and no legal measure exists for a court to apply.
The separate opinions mark the edges of the majority’s position. Four Justices objected that the Court treated the amending process in some respects as subject to judicial construction and in others as subject to Congress’s final authority. They would have recognized exclusive congressional authority over submission and ratification, leaving the judiciary, once an amendment is proclaimed, only its traditional authority of interpretation.39 A dissent took the opposite course on timing, concluding that more than a reasonable time had elapsed and that the Kansas judgment should be reversed.40 The majority held the middle ground: it left these questions with Congress without declaring every step of the process beyond judicial reach.
Standing and the political question doctrine ask different things, and a plaintiff must clear both. Standing asks whether this plaintiff has a personal stake in the dispute, and the political question doctrine asks whether the issue belongs to a court at all. The Kansas legislators satisfied the first and lost on the second, and the Court affirmed the Kansas judgment, so the ratification stood.41 An exam fact pattern that gives the plaintiffs a nullified vote is therefore only halfway through the analysis, since the vote supplies standing and the question must still be one a court may answer.
The doctrine reaches the process of amendment and stops at its product. Once an amendment is ratified and proclaimed, it is part of the Constitution, and the judiciary keeps its traditional authority to interpret it.42 The courts also decide for themselves whether a question about the amending procedures falls within Congress’s commitment and how far that commitment extends.43
Impeachment Procedures
Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 gives the Senate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments,”45 and the same clause specifies three requirements for the proceedings: senators sit on oath or affirmation, conviction requires a two-thirds vote, and the Chief Justice presides when the President is tried.46 In Nixon v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a challenge to the Senate’s impeachment trial procedures, including its practice of delegating the taking of evidence to a committee, presents a nonjusticiable political question.47 Nixon is one of only two Supreme Court decisions to find a political question in the post-Baker era; the other is Rucho v. Common Cause.48
Nixon, a federal judge whom the Senate had convicted, sued on the theory that Senate Rule XI violated the constitutional grant of authority to “try” all impeachments because it kept the whole Senate from taking part in the evidentiary hearings. He asked for a declaration that his conviction was void and that his judicial salary and privileges be reinstated, and both the district court and the court of appeals held his claim nonjusticiable.49 His argument rested on one word. “‘[T]ry’ means more than simply ‘vote on’ or ‘review’ or ‘judge,’” he contended, because “trying a case means hearing the evidence, not scanning a cold record.”50
The Court answered from the language and structure of the clause. The first sentence is a grant of authority to the Senate, and “sole” indicates that the authority is reposed in the Senate and nowhere else; the next two sentences specify requirements to which the Senate’s proceedings must conform.51 The Court then tied textual commitment to the standards inquiry. The concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political department is not completely separate from the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and the lack of such standards may strengthen the conclusion that the text commits the matter to another branch.52 For Nixon, that meant the question was whether “try” could serve as a limit a court could enforce.
The Court accepted that courts possess power to review legislative or executive action that transgresses identifiable textual limits. It also accepted that deciding whether a branch has exceeded the authority committed to it is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, one that falls to the Court as ultimate interpreter, and it cited both Baker and Powell v. McCormack for the point.53 Having exercised that responsibility, it concluded that the word “try” does not provide an identifiable textual limit on the authority committed to the Senate.54 The practical test for exam purposes is to ask whether some text, apart from the grant of power itself, marks a boundary a court could enforce. For “try,” the Court found none.
The Court added a practical doubt about remedy. It is uncertain what relief a court could give beyond setting aside the judgment of conviction, and the Court asked whether a court could order the reinstatement of a convicted federal judge, or order Congress to create an additional judgeship if the seat had been filled in the interim.55 The setting also has a structural wrinkle. Impeachment is probably the strongest weapon any branch has for checking another, since Congress can use it to force the removal of the President, the Vice-President, Justices, lower federal judges, and other officers, and it has been used sparingly.56 A judge convicted by the Senate who asks other judges to void his removal is asking the Judiciary to review the process by which judges are removed.
Three Justices wrote separately, and their opinions show how far the holding might extend. Justice White concurred in the judgment but would have reached the merits. He read the word “sole,” which appears only in the House and Senate impeachment clauses, as dividing the prosecutorial role of the House from the adjudicative role of the Senate, so the majority was wrong to identify the Judiciary, rather than the House, as the source of interference the word excludes.57 He found the textual and historical evidence to show that the clause did not bind the Senate beyond a set of minimal procedures and that the use of a fact-finding committee under Rule XI was entirely compatible with the command to try impeachments.58 In a balanced system, he argued, Senate trials would control an unaccountable Judiciary while judicial review would ensure that the Senate adhered to a minimal set of procedural standards, and he described the majority’s result as making the exercise of the impeachment power “one of the very few areas of legislative authority immune from any judicial review.”59
Justice Souter agreed that the case presented a political question but left room for review of extreme Senate conduct. A Senate that convicted upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer was simply “a bad guy,” might act so far beyond its constitutional authority, and with so great an impact on the Republic, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that ordinarily counsel silence; the political question doctrine, he noted, will not be applied so as to promote only disorder.60 Justice Stevens thought the central fact more important than the inferences from “sole” and “try”: the Framers assigned the impeachment power to the Legislative Branch, and the Senate’s handling of the Chase impeachment in 1805 and the later history show that it is conscious of the importance of that assignment.61
Commentators have pressed the weak point in the opinion. The commitment ruling comes close to a ruling on the merits, since saying that the Senate has final authority over its own procedures differs little in effect from saying that it did not exceed its powers.62 All of the Justices agreed that the trial in Nixon’s own case raised no fairness concern, so the debate was about the breadth of the doctrine and the concurring Justices’ wish to preserve judicial review for unfairness in a future case.63 An exam answer should rest on the text, the missing limit in “try,” and the uncertainty of any remedy, and it should present the standards point as support for the commitment, which is how the Court itself used it.64