Concept
Partisan Gerrymandering
Political question doctrine
Partisan Gerrymandering
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts. Federal judges, the Court said, have no legal standard for deciding when a map favors one party too much and no constitutional license to reallocate political power between the parties.1 A partisan gerrymander is a map drawn to advantage one party, usually by packing the other party’s voters into a few districts they win overwhelmingly or by cracking them across many districts where they fall short of a majority.2 The decision is the doctrine’s most recent major application, and it tests the framework just studied, because the Court asked the standards question and answered that the Constitution supplies no judicially manageable standard.
Courts decide most other disputes over districts and elections. Baker v. Carr opened the courthouse to voters who said unequal district populations diluted their votes, and the equal-population rule that followed gives a court a number to check. A jurisdiction may not depart from one person, one vote or discriminate by race in districting, and courts decide claims that it has.3 Even the 2000 presidential contest reached the Court as an equal protection challenge to Florida’s recount procedures in Bush v. Gore.4 Rucho left population and racial claims where they were.
Why, then, does a map that a court may review for population or race become unreviewable when the complaint is that it is too partisan? The answer cannot be that elections and parties are political, because Baker rejected that reasoning. It lies in the standards considerations covered earlier, which ask whether the law gives a court a measure for deciding the claim without first choosing among competing visions of fair representation. The first subsection traces the Court’s repeated and unsuccessful search for such a measure. The later subsections take up the holding and the avenues for challenge that survive it.
The Road to Rucho
Two lines of districting cases gave courts settled rules. Baker v. Carr began the first by holding malapportionment claims justiciable, and Wesberry v. Sanders applied the equal-population principle to congressional districts. Gomillion v. Lightfoot began the second when it allowed a challenge to an “uncouth twenty-eight sided” municipal boundary that excluded Black voters from city elections, and Wright v. Rockefeller extended that reasoning to congressional districting.5 Partisan gerrymandering claims, by contrast, “have proved far more difficult to adjudicate.” The basic reason is that departing from one person, one vote and discriminating by race in districting are illegal, while “a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.”6
The equal-population rule did not end manipulation of district lines; it changed the craft. Because every district must hold nearly the same number of people, the old customs of keeping counties, communities, and neighborhoods together lost most of their force, and mapmakers now treat even the smallest census units as building blocks and arrange them into whatever equal-sized districts best serve the party that controls the process.7 A simple example shows how packing and cracking work inside that constraint.
The Red map cannot be condemned by arithmetic or by a racial classification. A court could condemn it only by deciding how much partisan advantage the Constitution tolerates, and that is where the two settled lines give out. A jurisdiction “may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering,” and a rule barring every partisan consideration would countermand the Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political entities.8 What remains is a question of degree, which the Vieth plurality called the “central problem”: “determining when political gerrymandering has gone too far.”9 In a population case the Constitution draws the line and the court counts. When some partisanship is lawful, a court that rules for the plaintiffs must announce where lawful becomes unlawful, and if the text announces nothing, the judge must choose. Each partisan decision from 1973 on tried to say where that point lies, or whether a court can say so at all.
The first partisan claim to reach the Court, in Gaffney v. Cummings, failed. Connecticut’s plan aimed at a rough proportional representation of the two major parties by “wiggl[ing] and joggl[ing]” boundary lines to create safe seats for each, and the Court rejected an equal protection challenge on the reasoning that districting “inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences.”10 The Court did warn that districts of equal population remain vulnerable if they are “invidiously discriminatory” because they are used “to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.”11 That warning applies the principle that government may violate the right to vote by seeking to minimize the voting strength of an identifiable group.12 But the Court refused to hold that the Constitution categorically forbids mapmakers to take account of politics,13 and it declined “the impossible task of extirpating politics” from redistricting.14
Davis v. Bandemer (1986) produced a majority that held the claim justiciable and no majority on the standard. Four Justices would have required proof of intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group. Two would have asked whether district boundaries had been distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate ends. Three would have held that the Equal Protection Clause “does not supply judicially manageable standards for resolving purely political gerrymandering claims.”15 A justiciability holding means little when no test commands five votes.
Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), a challenge to Pennsylvania’s congressional map, split the Court three ways. Justice Scalia’s plurality would have held such claims nonjusticiable, reasoning that “fairness” is not a judicially manageable standard.16 Four Justices dissented. Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, noted “the lack of comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries [and] the absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention,” yet he left open the possibility that “in another case a standard might emerge.”17 He also suggested that the First Amendment, which protects political association, might offer a sounder footing than equal protection.
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (2006) challenged a mid-decade Texas map, and again a majority of the Court could not agree on a justiciable standard.18 Justice Kennedy located the difficulty in “providing a standard for deciding how much partisan dominance is too much.”19
The next round of litigation brought better data and a new metric. In Gill v. Whitford, Democratic voters attacked Wisconsin’s state legislative map as a gerrymander accomplished by cracking and packing, and they offered the “efficiency gap,” a statistic comparing the votes each party wastes, to show that the map favored Republicans.20 A three-judge district court ruled for the voters, but the Supreme Court vacated on standing. Vote dilution injures a voter in his or her own district, so plaintiffs who relied on their party’s statewide disadvantage had shown no personal injury, and the Court left justiciability undecided.21 Soon afterward Justice Kennedy, long the pivotal vote on partisan gerrymandering, announced his retirement, and Justice Kavanaugh took his seat.22
The Court later summarized where matters stood. Its “considerable efforts in Gaffney, Bandemer, Vieth, and LULAC” had left unresolved whether partisan gerrymandering claims may be brought at all, and two threshold questions remained: standing, which Gill addressed, and whether such claims are justiciable.23 Equal-population and racial claims had rules a court could apply. The partisan claim had no standard that five Justices would use, only Justice Kennedy’s open door as a hint that one might come. Gill is therefore a standing case, and a student who calls it a political question holding has skipped a step, because that holding came in Rucho.
Rucho’s Holding
Rucho v. Common Cause held that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts, so a federal court will not invalidate a districting map solely because it favors one party over another.25 Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a five-Justice majority, and Justice Kagan wrote for four dissenters.26 The majority rested on one of the Baker considerations, the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and it did not rest on a textual commitment of districting to Congress.
Two cases reached the Court together. A district court in North Carolina had found that all but one of the districts in the State’s 2016 congressional plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Democrats.27 In Maryland, three voters sued in 2013, alleging that the 2011 plan violated the First Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Article I, Section 2, and the district court granted them summary judgment, holding the claims justiciable and the plan a First Amendment violation.28 Legislatures controlled by opposite parties drew the two maps, Republicans in North Carolina and Democrats in Maryland, so the rule the Court announced does not favor either side. The Court vacated both judgments and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.29
The Court framed the question through the judicial power. Federal courts act only to resolve, according to legal principles, a plaintiff’s particular claim of legal right, so the question was whether partisan gerrymandering claims are claims of legal right or political questions that must find their resolution elsewhere.30 Rucho answered in the second way, through two steps that respond to different arguments the plaintiffs made.
The first step rejects the view that districting belongs to Congress alone. The Elections Clause assigns to state legislatures the power to prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections and gives Congress the power to “make or alter” those regulations,31 and the appellants argued that this text sets districting apart for the political branches. The Court answered that its cases already recognize a judicial role in two districting areas, one person, one vote and racial gerrymandering. The history is not irrelevant: the Framers knew of districting problems and settled on assigning them to state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by Congress.32 But the Court did not convert that history into a textual commitment.
Nixon v. United States shows what a textual commitment holding looks like. A convicted judge claimed that Senate Rule XI, which let a committee take evidence in his impeachment, violated the Senate’s power to “try” impeachments.33 The Court refused review because the Impeachment Clause gave the Senate “sole power to try all impeachments,” and because the word “try” has too many meanings to yield a manageable standard.34 A commitment of districting to Congress would have put every districting claim out of reach, including the population and race claims courts routinely decide. A standards holding draws its line inside districting, between claims a court can measure and claims it cannot.
The second step supplies the ground of decision. The Court asked whether any standard for partisan claims could be limited and precise, “clear, manageable, and politically neutral,” and it found no such standard in the Constitution.35 The demand is strict because the claim is one of degree. A court needs “a standard for deciding how much partisan dominance is too much,” and “[w]ith uncertain limits, intervening courts—even when proceeding with best intentions—would risk assuming political, not legal, responsibility for a process that often produces ill will and distrust.”36 A workable rule would need a measure of fairness and a cutoff at which unfairness becomes unconstitutional. The Court found neither.
The measure fails first. Plaintiffs who cannot claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation must ask a court to make its own political judgment about how much representation each party deserves and then to rearrange the districts to match, and federal courts are not equipped to apportion political power as a matter of fairness or authorized to do so.37 Fairness has many candidate meanings, and choosing among those visions poses questions that are political, not legal. Any judicial choice would be an “unmoored determination” of the kind that marks a political question.38
The cutoff fails next, even for a court that has settled on a measure. Other areas of law leave questions of degree to judges, but there a statute, a related provision, or the common law gives the terms content. Here “the Constitution provides no basis whatever to guide the exercise of judicial discretion,” and the only provision that specifically addresses the matter assigns it to the political branches.39 The amendment cases rest on a similar intuition. The Court there refused to decide what counts as a “reasonable time” for ratification because the answer depends on appraising “a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic” that cannot sensibly be proved in a court of justice.40
The plaintiffs argued that courts able to enforce one person, one vote can police partisan gerrymanders too, and the Court disagreed. Equal population is a matter of math: each vote carries equal weight, so each representative answers to about the same number of constituents, and the rule says nothing about political parties. A racial gerrymandering claim asks a court to eliminate a racial classification, and race-based decisionmaking is “inherently suspect.” A partisan claim cannot ask a court to eliminate partisanship, because districting for some level of partisan advantage is not unconstitutional.41 The relief a partisan plaintiff seeks is a fair share of political power, which returns the court to the measure and cutoff problems.
The first suit stays within the territory the Court left open to courts, and the second falls on the Rucho side of the line however its constitutional theory is captioned.
The lower courts’ tests did not solve the problem. North Carolina’s court applied a three-part equal protection test of intent, effects, and causation. Its “predominant intent” prong came from racial gerrymandering law, but districting for some partisan advantage is not unconstitutional, so a finding that lines were drawn for partisan reasons shows nothing improper by itself. Its effects prong asked whether the dilution was “likely to persist” so that elected representatives would feel free to ignore the minority party’s supporters.42 The district courts also found the claims justiciable under the First Amendment, around a test of intent to burden voters based on voting history or party affiliation, an actual burden on political speech or association, and a causal link between the two. That analysis, the Court held, offers no “clear” and “manageable” way to distinguish permissible from impermissible partisan motivation.43
The dissent’s baseline met the same objection. It proposed comparing the enacted map with the maps the State’s own districting criteria could produce and asking how far the enacted map sits from the median. The majority answered that even with that baseline, nothing in the Constitution says whether the prohibited deviation from the median map should “kick in at 25 percent or 75 percent or some other point.”44 The North Carolina court’s other grounds failed for related reasons. It had held that partisan gerrymandering infringes the right of “the People” to select their representatives, yet the Vieth plurality had concluded, without objection from any other Justice, that neither Section 2 nor Section 4 of Article I provides a judicially enforceable limit on the political considerations States and Congress may take into account in districting.45 The objection that voters, and not legislators, should choose their representatives sounds in the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4, and the Court has several times held that the Guarantee Clause supplies no justiciable claim.46
The Court closed by stating the limits of its role. It held that federal judges “have no license to reallocate political power between the two major political parties, with no plausible grant of authority in the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit and direct their decisions.” It added that it had never struck down a partisan gerrymander despite requests over some forty-five years, and that the intervention sought would recur with every round of districting, for state as well as federal representatives.47
Justice Kagan’s dissent attacked the majority’s premise. “For the first time ever,” she wrote, “this Court refuses to remedy a constitutional violation because it thinks the task beyond judicial capabilities.”48 She conceded that judges should not apportion political power according to their own vision of electoral fairness and should not strike down maps on the view that every smidgen of politics is too much, and she accepted that restraint counsels intervention only in egregious cases.49 Her answer was that lower courts had converged on a standard that honors those limits: plaintiffs must show that the predominant purpose was to entrench one party by diluting its rivals’ votes and that the lines substantially dilute them, and the State may then defend the map with a legitimate nonpartisan justification. Majority and dissent share two premises, that some partisan districting is lawful and that judges must not impose their own conception of fairness. They split on whether a State’s own criteria can anchor a measure and whether extreme outliers can be identified without arbitrary line drawing. The decision also has a practical edge. Commentators have read the nonjusticiability holding as a merits ruling in disguise, because in disclaiming any manageable standard the Court in effect endorsed a rule that lets legislators adopt even the most obviously partisan maps.50
Paths Left Open
Rucho closed the federal courthouse to partisan gerrymandering claims, and the majority took care to say what that closure leaves untouched. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the conclusion “does not condone excessive partisan gerrymandering” and does not “condemn complaints about districting to echo into a void.”51 A political question holding allocates enforcement. It says that a federal court, with no constitutional directive and no legal standard, cannot decide how much political power each party should hold. It says nothing about whether a map is lawful under some other source of law or whether some other institution may act. Three can: state courts applying state law, States and voters who move districting away from the legislature, and Congress under the Elections Clause. Each holds the ingredient that federal judges lacked, a written standard or a grant of authority, so the holding and the availability of relief elsewhere fit together.
The first path runs through state constitutions. Litigants have repeatedly asked courts to rein in gerrymandering, and the Supreme Court has declined to impose federal constitutional constraints, but some state courts have ruled against partisan gerrymanders on state constitutional grounds.52 In 2015 the Supreme Court of Florida struck down the State’s congressional plan under the Fair Districts Amendment to the Florida Constitution, and the Rucho dissent asked why the United States Supreme Court could not do the same.53 The majority’s answer was that no “Fair Districts Amendment” exists in the Federal Constitution, while provisions of state statutes and constitutions can supply the standards and guidance state courts apply.54 Florida’s text shows what such a standard looks like: no apportionment plan or individual district “shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.” Iowa and Delaware likewise forbid drawing districts to favor a party, and Missouri directs its mapmakers to achieve partisan fairness.55 A court enforcing the Florida sentence asks whether the plan was drawn for a forbidden purpose, a question the State’s own voters framed in advance, so the judges need no theory of fair representation of their own.
Florida and Rucho show one grievance moving in opposite directions depending on the law invoked. The North Carolina and Maryland voters relied on federal provisions, and the Supreme Court vacated both judgments with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.56 The Florida challengers relied on a state clause that told the court what the legislature may not intend, and the state court struck down the plan.
The usual exam error is to treat the federal dismissal as the end of the matter. Rucho applied only to partisan gerrymandering claims under the U.S. Constitution, and state courts remained free to consider districting challenges under their own constitutions. That freedom was tested in Moore v. Harper. The North Carolina Supreme Court had invalidated the State’s post-2020 maps under the state constitution, and the legislature argued that the Elections Clause’s reference to “the Legislature” gave it a free hand over congressional districts.57 The Supreme Court largely rejected that theory, holding that “[t]he Elections Clause does not insulate state legislatures from the ordinary exercise of state judicial review.”58 The Court added a limit: state courts may not “transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review” so as to arrogate to themselves the power the clause vests in legislatures, and that caveat gives a losing litigant an opening to argue that a state court went too far.59
Whether a particular state court will hear such a claim depends on that State’s own constitution and its own judges. After a judicial election changed its membership, the North Carolina Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier decision and held that partisan gerrymandering claims under the state constitution present nonjusticiable political questions, while courts in other States have found justiciable limits in their own constitutions. The split follows from the structure of the federal holding. Rucho decided that the Federal Constitution supplies no manageable standard, so each state court must ask for itself whether its own constitution does.
The second path removes the map from the people who profit from it. Rucho noted that in November 2018 voters in Colorado and Michigan approved constitutional amendments creating multimember commissions to draw or approve congressional and state legislative maps, and that Missouri voters created a state demographer to draw state legislative lines.60 A legislature that draws its own districts has an incentive to entrench itself, and a commission outside the legislature has none. No constitutional issue arises when voters use such a commission to redistrict the state legislature, but the Elections Clause assigns the regulation of congressional elections to “the Legislature,” so the commissions were challenged as applied to congressional maps. In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Court rejected that challenge by a 5 to 4 vote.61 The Court’s own premise that districting is inherently political supports the voter initiatives that moved it outside the legislature.62
The third path runs through Congress, which holds an express textual grant that no court has to find by interpretation. The Elections Clause lets the States prescribe the times, places, and manner of congressional elections but gives Congress the power to “make or alter” those regulations.63 Congress has regularly exercised that power, including to address partisan gerrymandering.64 Rucho observed that the Framers gave Congress the power to do something about partisan gerrymandering and pointed to the first bill introduced in the 116th Congress, which would require States to create 15-member independent commissions to draw congressional districts, set redistricting criteria including protection for communities of interest, and ban partisan gerrymandering.65 The Court expressed no view on that bill or any other pending proposal and said only that the avenue for reform the Framers established, “and used by Congress in the past, remains open.”66
Justice Kagan’s dissent doubted that these paths offer much comfort. The congressional bills, she observed, are not laws, and the politicians who profit from gerrymandering are unlikely to change it. Voters can act by initiative only in States that provide one, and even there legislators often resist. If state courts can develop neutral and manageable standards, she asked, why could the Supreme Court not do the same? The majority’s answer is that state constitutions and statutes supply written standards the Federal Constitution lacks. The disagreement concerns how much comfort the alternatives provide, while the holding itself forecloses only the federal judicial route.